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High hopes for democracy and sustainability are placed on participatory planning. Policy makers 
and scholars argue that broad participation can revitalise democracy and tackle sustainability 
challenges. Yet, critics claim that power asymmetries stand in the way of realising the potential 
of participatory planning. In the everyday practices of planning, this controversy comes to a 
head. Here, planners interact with citizens, politicians and developers around making choices 
about places and societies. Planners’ practices are contested and they are challenged by the 
complexity of power relations. They need conceptual tools to critically reflect on what power is 
and when it is legitimate. Reflective practice is a prerequisite for making situated judgements 
under conditions of contestation.   
Yet, the planning theories, which are most influential in practice, have not been developed 
with the intention of conceptualising power. Rational planning theory, which still is influential 
in practice, largely reduces planning into a technical power-free activity. Communicative 
planning theory, which underpins participatory practices, instead suggests that expert power 
ought to be complemented by inclusive dialogue. This theory criticises hierarchical power 
relations as domination, without providing elaborated understanding of other facets of power. 
Hence, the conceptual support for reflective practice is too reductive. 
The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing concepts 
that can enable reflective practice. I draw on power theory and explore the utility of treating 
power as a family resemblance concept in participatory planning. Applying this plural view, I 
develop a family of power concepts, which signifies different ideas of what power is. The 
usefulness of this “power family” is tested through frame analysis of communicative planning 
theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice.   
The result of the research is a family of power concepts that can enable reflective practice. 
Power to signifies a dispositional ability to act, which planning actors derive from social 
order. This ability can be exercised as consensual power with or as conflictual power over. 
The latter is conceptualised as an empirical process which, on a basic level, can be normatively 
appraised as illegitimate or legitimate. 
This thesis contributes to planning theory and environmental communication by 
problematising reductive notions of power and, as an alternative, rethinking power as a family 
resemblance concept. This theoretical contribution matters to planning practice as it can 
enable planners to develop their ability to be sensitive to what a situation requires, i.e. to 
acquire practical wisdom (phronesis). 
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Rethinking power in participatory planning: 
Towards reflective practice 
Abstract 
Det finns höga förväntningar på medborgardialoger. Politiker, forskare och planerare 
argumenterar för att medborgardeltagande i samhällsplanering kan förnya demokratin 
och bidra till hållbar utveckling. Kritiker hävdar dock att ojämlika maktrelationer står i 
vägen för att förverkliga förväntningarna. För dem är medborgardialoger naiva eller till 
och med manipulativa. I medborgardialogens vardagspraktik ställs maktrelationer på sin 
spets. Här interagerar planerare med medborgare, politiker och andra aktörer med avsikt 
att förbereda och fatta beslut om platser och samhällen. Planerare ställs inför svårtydda 
och omstridda situationer i sin praktik. Sådana situationer kräver gott omdöme (fronesis), 
som kan utvecklas genom kritisk reflektion över maktrelationer. 
Men de planeringsteorier som är mest använda i medborgardialogspraktiken har inte 
utvecklats med avsikt att konceptualisera makt. Rationell planeringsteori, som fortfarande 
har stort inflytande över planeringspraktiken, reducerar samhällsplanering till en teknisk 
och värderingsfri aktivitet. Medan den kommunikativa planeringsteorin, som underbygger 
medborgardialoger, istället föreskriver att experternas makt behöver kompletteras med 
inkluderande dialoger. Denna teori kritiserar hierarkiska maktrelationer, men tillhanda-
håller inte djupare föreståelse av andra aspekter av makt. Det konceptuella stödet för 
reflekterande medborgardialogspraktik är således begränsat.  
Målet med den här avhandlingen är att tänka nytt om maktrelationer i medborgar-
dialoger genom att utveckla koncept som kan möjliggöra reflekterande praktik. Jag 
använder maktteorier och prövar idén att makt kan ses som ett familjelikhetsbegrepp. Detta 
pluralistiska synsätt använder jag för att utveckla en familj av koncept som betecknar olika 
föreställningar om vad makt kan vara. I vilken utsträckning ”maktfamiljen” är användbar i 
reflekterande praktik prövas genom ramanalys av föreställningar om makt inom 
kommunikativ planeringsteori och svensk medborgardialogspolicy och praktik. 
Forskningen resulterar i en familj bestående av koncept som kan möjliggöra reflek-
terande praktik. Konceptet makt att definieras som en dispositiv förmåga att agera som 
planeringsaktörer får från social ordning. Denna förmåga att agera kan utövas i konsensus 
som makt tillsammans eller i konflikt som makt över. Det senare konceptualiseras som en 
empirisk process som, på en basal nivå, kan värderas normativt som legitim eller illegitim 
makt över. 
Avhandlingen bidrar till planeringsteori och miljökommunikation genom att problema-
tisera ensidiga föreställningar om makt och istället definiera makt som ett familje-
likhetsbegrepp. Det här teoretiska bidraget spelar roll i medborgardialogspraktiken genom 
att möjliggöra för planerare att utveckla situationskänslighet och gott omdöme (fronesis). 
Nyckelord: medborgardialog, makt, planerare, samhällsplanering, ramanalys, 
reflekterande praktik, kommunikativ planeringsteori, fronesis. 
Att tänka nytt om maktrelationer i medborgardialoger: 
På väg mot reflekterande praktik 
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We do not learn from experience...we learn from reflecting on experience. 
- John Dewey 
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This thesis grew out of practical puzzles. It all started with the work I did to 
facilitate participatory processes. I worked in the public sector in Sweden with 
dialogue processes intended to improve educational policy and also within 
development cooperation in view of poverty reduction in Africa and South East 
Asia. Besides being inside the policy machinery, I have also worked within civil 
society as a consultant and in academia. I have practiced “hands on” with 
facilitating participatory processes, as well as taken more of a supportive role 
with training, advising and researching facilitators’ work.  
To work alongside engaged and dedicated people towards important ends is 
a blessing. Still it is far from an easy ride to attempt to realise the potential of 
participatory processes. In my experience, participants and also facilitators, 
frequently have different views about what the processes should be like and 
preferable outcomes. It is rather difficult to talk through the differences, due to 
conflicting world views and time limitations. Therefore, I have frequently 
experienced how participatory processes remain ambiguous and contested.  
The puzzle I address in this thesis originates from the manner in which 
facilitators deal with ambiguity and contestation. Over the years, I have heard 
facilitators, including myself, say things like, “We must trust the process”, “We 
ought to make the road while walking it” or “We should not control the process”. 
At the time, when I entered into PhD training, I had become uneasy about such 
expressions. I felt that this language suggested that ambiguity might just resolve 
itself, if only facilitators took a step back. My own experience seemed to indicate 
that this might not be the case. I therefore found the unwillingness to 
acknowledge the need for direction puzzling and, honestly, also irritating.  
At the onset of my thesis work I elicited and analysed stories about my 
experiences of participatory processes. I came to use the concept of power as an 
analytical lens. When I analysed the stories, I realised that my puzzle might be 
about facilitators’ understanding of power. Up until this point, power had been 
a central yet illusive concept to me. As far as I recall, I rarely talked in depth 
about power with other facilitators before entering into PhD training. Yet, I 
assumed that we tacitly shared a desire to level power asymmetries or perhaps 
even replace power with collaboration. It seemed to be what this practice was all 
about. It was the decent thing to do, due to the inequalities and injustices of this 
world. Could it be that facilitators’ tacit notions of power explain why they are 
unwilling to provide direction?  
Prologue 
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The thesis grew out of that question. Through engagement with power and 
planning literature and empirical investigations into Swedish planning policy 
and practice, I learned that there was much more to this puzzle than I originally 
thought. It is that story I tell in this thesis.  
But a thesis is not only about a practical puzzle. It is also about making it less 
puzzling through researching and theorising. I have throughout my professional 
life been interested in research. When I started to work at Swedish agencies 
around the millennium shift, I found the prevailing understanding of the 
relationship between research and practice problematic. Management was 
pushing hard for Results Based Management (RBM) and evidence-based 
methods. At meetings colleagues and directors referred to evidence and claimed 
that research told us “what works”.  
I was not convinced by this way of seeing the relationship between research 
and practice. When I looked at how experienced practitioners worked, I couldn´t 
see that they were applying any evidence-based methods. Reading the reports, 
which were supposed to provide the evidence, did not convince me. Instead, I 
saw that experienced practitioners were flexible and used their intuitionʊtheir 
gut feelingʊin their practice. 
Over the years, and increasingly since entering into PhD training, I have read 
about the relationship between research and practice and talked to people who I 
felt had similar concerns. Gradually, I have started to engage in counter 
practices, exploring alternative ways of practicing, where we draw on theory for 
reflection, while also trusting our situated judgements.  
I have thus come to see how the boundaries between research and practice 
and researchers and practitioners are blurred. I pay attention to how practitioners 
develop (practical) theories and how researchers perform practices. I also see 
how many practitioners have, like me, one foot in academia and the other in 
facilitation practice.  
Yet, this does not mean that facilitating and researching are the same kind of 
practice. Instead, I recognise how these two practices require different logics. 
Practicing facilitation requires both analytical skills and swift practical situated 
judgments, while practicing research is a slower process, which requires much 
more explicit attention to how knowledge is developed. With this thesis, I hope 
to show how research practice can enrich facilitation practice. I set out to develop 
concepts of power that can enable reflective practice. 
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High hopes for democracy and sustainability are placed on participatory planning. 
Policy makers, scholars and planners argue that broad participation is needed to 
revitalise democracy and address sustainability challenges (Abrahamsson, 2016; 
Innes and Booher, 2010; SOU 2016:5). Since the 1980s, participation has been 
mainstreamed in planning and governance frameworks all over the world. 
Planning processes bring together a variety of actors, across differences in 
understanding and values (Fung, 2015; Hajer, 2003; Hertting, 2017).  
Yet, critics claim that power asymmetries stand in the way of realising the 
high hopes for democracy and sustainabilty. They see participatory practices at 
best as naïve and at worst as manipulative. They argue that the theoretical 
underpinning of participatory practices is weak in explaining power, and thereby 
weak in guiding planning action (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002). The practice 
of participation is accused of constituting a “new tyranny” (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001), depoliticising planning (Metzger et al., 2014) and securing consent to 
unjust power relations through token participation (Purcell, 2009).  
In the everyday practices of planning, planners are responsible for realising 
the democratic potential of participation. They interact with developers, 
politicians, activists, experts and ordinary citizens in making choices about 
places and societies (Campbell, 2002). Their practice is contested and they are 
challenged by the workings of power (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Fox-Rogers and 
Murphy, 2016; Grange, 2017). Power relations in planning are situated and 
dynamic, they take different shapes in different situations (Hillier, 2002). The 
most influential forms of power frequently work under the surface to shape 
agendas, desires and realities (Lukes, 1974, 2005). Hence, planners are tested 
when they attempt to understand “what is going on with power” as a basis for 
deciding how to act (Flyvbjerg, 2004). On top of that, the legitimacy of power 
relations is contested. Actors come to different conclusions about what kinds of 
power are desirable. Therefore, planners are faced with vexing questions 
pertaining to their own, as well as other actors’ roles in power relations.  
1 Introduction 
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Theory has a function in the power-laden everyday practices of planning. But 
it is not merely, as conventional wisdom would have it, to supply evidence-based 
methods. The role of theory is also, and arguably more importantly, to provide 
a basis for planners’ critical reflections (Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2016; Grange, 
2017; Richardson, 2002). In planning practice, academic planning theory resides 
alongside the “theories-in-use” that planners develop and apply (van Hulst and 
Yanow, 2016; Schön, 1983). Deeper notions of power often remain tacit in both 
kinds of theories.  
Through processes of socialisation, planners learn certain ways of 
understanding and valuing, which leads to specific ways of framing problems 
and solutions (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön, 1983). They internalise 
certain notions, which are embedded in their practices from past interactions 
(Healey, 1997). If such notions remain tacit they may work to block learning and 
stabilise power relations by rendering them taken for granted (Haugaard, 2003).  
When practitioners are unaware of their frames for roles or problems, they do not 
experience the need to choose among them. They do not attend to the ways in which 
they construct the reality in which they function; for them, it is simply the given reality 
(Schön, 1983, p. 310) 
In contrast, if notions of power are made explicit, they become accessible for the 
kind of reflective practice that is required to learn by doing in relational and 
political practices, such as planning (Bornemark, 2016; Campbell, 2012; 
Fridlund, 2017; Schön, 1983). Hence, a key task for theories in participatory 
planning is to supply conceptual tools for critical reflection on the manner in 
which power relations and planners’ roles are framed.  
Planning theory is seemingly well suited for this task. But, the two planning 
theories that are most influential in participatory planning practice, rational and 
communicative planning theory, have not been developed with the intention of 
theorising power. Rational planning theoryʊstill influential in practice despite 
sustained academic critiqueʊserves to build up a basis for a planning practice, 
which aspires to be scientific in a positivistic fashion. Consequently, little 
attention is paid to understanding the intricacy of power relations (Allmendinger, 
2009; Friedmann, 1998). Planning is instead seen as a technical and value-free 
activity for defining problems, generating options for solutions and choosing 
between them to achieve an unambiguous, rather than contested, common good. 
Planners are thereby conceptualised as value-neutral experts whose influence 
over planning processes are left largely unquestioned. 
Communicative planning theory, which has been influential in practice since 
the 1980s, challenges rational planning by criticising hierarchical expert-driven 
planning processes. Instead its scholars promote egalitarian, consensual and 
inclusive dialogues by, implicitly or explicitly, promoting symmetric power 
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relations (Forester, 1989, 1999; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995; Sager, 1994). 
Originally drawing on Habermas’ (1984) theory of communicative action, 
communicative planning tends to cast planners as facilitators in deliberative 
democracy, rather than rational experts in representative democracy. Power is 
thereby largely seen as a problem, which planners ought to do away with.  
Other scholars, drawing on Foucauldian power analytics, instead claim that 
power is ever-present in planning and hence must be placed in the centre of 
planning theory. They argue that communicative planning is weak in explaining 
what is going on in planning, due to its Habermasian aspirations for universal 
“power-free” communicative ideals (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Flyvbjerg and 
Richardson, 2002; Richardson, 1996). In line with the Foucauldian tradition, 
these scholars are unwilling to provide universal guidance for the role planners 
ought to play in power relations. Instead, they see their task as unmasking how 
planning works to normalise domination, through power/knowledge regimes, 
and thereby force planners to question what they take for granted.  
More recently another kind of post-political and agonistic critique has been 
levelled towards communicative planning and the practices it supports. Here, 
participatory planning is seen as an instrument for legitimising the status quo 
and depoliticising planning. Communicative planning is thus accused of 
underpinning a practice, which maintains neo-liberal hegemony by drawing in 
alternative voices in well-choreographed processes of token participation. Some 
scholars within this tradition suggest that planners ought to, rather than being 
facilitators, be activists working from inside the system to promote the interests 
of those who lack power (Purcell, 2009). While others alternatively draw on the 
work of Mouffe (2005) and push for planners to repoliticise planning processes 
by invoking the political and move towards agonism: the respectful 
confrontation between opposing discursive communities (Bäcklund and 
Mäntysalo, 2010; Bond, 2011; Pløger, 2004). 
Hence, planning theory provides a multitude of, more or less elaborated 
conceptualisations of power. All of which, in their own ways, supply useful tools 
for critical reflection. Yet, as is evident from the brief summary above, the 
treatment of power in planning theory is fragmented and deeper notions of power 
often remain tacit. Debates between the different camps in planning theory most 
frequently take shape as zero-sum competitions about the best approach to power.1 
This provides the impression that alternative ideas about power are mutually 
exclusive and that planners ought to choose only one. This is problematic since 
                                                     
1. The exchange between Flyvbjerg (2001a) and Forester (2001) is an example of the zero-sum 
debates. 
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planners, rather than one approach, need different concepts of power for reflecting 
on the situated and dynamic power relations in their practice.  
In sum, the treatment of power in planning theory is fragmented. The two 
theories, which are most influential in practiceʊrational and communicative 
planning theoryʊsupply a reductive view of power as either placed in the hands 
of experts and elected politicians or as wielded to unfairly exclude alternative 
voices from planning. This reductive conceptualisation of power is problematic 
since it limits the vocabulary available for planners to reflect on power relations 
and their own role in them. The following risk is that “unreflective practice” 
might stabilise undesirable power relations and block planners from learning by 
doing and reflecting.  
1.1 Aim, research questions and relevance 
The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing 
concepts that can enable reflective practice. To reach this aim I pursue four 
research questions. 
I. What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and 
rethinking power in participatory planning? 
II. Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?  
III. To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice? 
IV. How can rethinking power in participatory planning provide a set of 
concepts that can enable reflective practice? 
RQ1 is warranted since conceptual tools are needed for researching and 
rethinking the notions of power, which often remain inferred in participatory 
planning.  
RQ2 is intended to provide an account of the current understanding of power 
in communicative planning theory and participatory planning policy and 
practice. This question is necessary since explicating the notions of power in 
participatory planning is a precondition for rethinking them.  
RQ3 serves to asses to which extent the current notions of power in 
participatory planning are providing support for reflective practice. This 
question assesses how useful the current understanding of power is for planners. 
Pursuing this question leads to identification of the conceptual voids that the 
rethinking must fill. 
RQ4 is intended to synthesise the findings from the previous questions into a 
rethinking of power in participatory planning. Based on the conceptual tools 
from power theory (RQ1) and the explication and assessment of the current 
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notions of power (RQ2-3), this question leads to the development of a set of 
concepts that can enable reflective practice.  
 What is the normative position from which I set out to rethink power? In the 
prologue, I explained how this thesis grew out of practical difficulties experienced 
in my work with participatory processes. My normative position has evolved 
through these experiences, coupled with the learning during my PhD studies. In 
practice, I was puzzledʊat times also irritatedʊwith the manner in which 
facilitators seemed reluctant to provide direction for participatory processes. I 
gradually grew attentive to how this tendency came back to haunt us as facilitators. 
It led to ambiguity, ambivalence and perhaps even made facilitators disguise their 
exercises of power behind a language of power-free participation. Through my 
reviews of the planning and power literature, I have come to interpret facilitators’ 
unwillingness to lead as originating from the notion of power as an evil, which 
seems to be embedded in participatory practices. I have therefore concluded that 
rethinking the theoretical underpinnings of participatory planning is required in 
order to support reflective practice.  
Importantly, I do not assume a position as an advocate for a return to expert 
rule and hierarchical power relations. On the contrary, drawing on the tradition 
of reflective practice (Forester, 2013; Schön, 1983; Yanow, 2009), I take a 
position as a proponent of value-based situated judgements, rather than universal 
ideals. This is a position, which I believe is much more likely to move 
participatory processes closer to realising their promises. So, when I set out to 
rethink power, my normative ambition is to support planners’ situated reflection 
by developing concepts, which can be used to critically scrutinise that which is 
taken for granted.  
The aim of this thesis is highly relevant since we are living in times when 
participatory practices are questioned in Sweden, as well as in many other 
countries. Mixed experiences over several decades of participation in planning 
and governance have resulted in a situation where proponents of participation 
are struggling to regain their footing. Long-standing critiques from both 
academia and citizens’ groups, and personal experiences resembling my own, 
have created ambivalence among those who practice participation (Bornemark, 
2016; Westin and Hellquist, 2018). By rethinking power, I wish to upset the 
assumed understanding of power relations in participatory practices and thereby 
make a conceptual contribution that potentially can move the practice beyond 
the days of naivety, towards  a situation where its practitioners are “usefully 
critical (rather than generally cynical) and appropriately positive (rather than 
naively optimistic […])” (Richardson, 2005, p. 342). 
Hence, even if this thesis is positioned as a contribution to planning theory and 
practice, I aspire for the findings to be relevant for understanding participatory 
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practices more broadly. Hence, I strive to develop concepts of power, which can 
also be useful in fields such as environmental assessment (Blicharska et al., 2011; 
Kågström and Richardson, 2015; Larsen et al., 2017; Richardson and Cashmore, 
2011); environmental governance (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006); adaptive governance of social ecological systems (Folke et al., 
2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2009); social learning (Blackmore, 2010; Borowski, 2010; 
Collins and Ison, 2010; Colvin et al., 2014) and collaborative natural resource 
management (Raitio, 2013; Schusler et al., 2003).   
The aim of rethinking power in participatory planning is also relevant to the 
subject environmental communication, which this thesis contributes to. 
Environmental communication is a broad subject encompassing a variety of 
theories and methods concerned with understanding, as well as improving, 
communicative practices pertaining to the environment and sustainability (e.g. 
Alarcón Ferrari, 2015; von Essen, 2016; Pezzullo and Cox, 2017; Powell, 2016; 
Wibeck et al., 2015). The subject is frequently framed as a “crisis discipline” 
and many of its scholars, like me, aspire to make a difference in practice by 
addressing the greatest challenges of our times (Pezzullo and Cox, 2017). In 
environmental communication scholarship concerned with governance 
processes, participation is a core empirical and normative interest (Calderon, 
2013; Fischer et al., 2018; Hallgren et al., 2018; Holmgren and Arora-Jonsson, 
2015; Joosse et al., n.d.; Lööf and Stinnerbom, 2016; Raitio and Harkki, 2014).  
Power is a recurrent theme in environmental communication research (von 
Essen, 2016). One of the main tasks that environmental communication scholars 
have taken on is to critique the manner in which expert power has a grip over 
environmental communication in governance practices and envision a different 
kind of more participatory practice (e.g. Lööf and Stinnerbom, 2016). A core 
intention with this thesis is to demonstrate how the long standing work to 
theorise participation, deliberation and collaboration in planning theory can be 
useful within the discipline of environmental communication (e.g. Forester, 
1989, 2013; Healey, 1997, 2012). 
Recently, a group of scholars and practitioners, with which I am affiliated, 
have, funded by the Swedish agency Mistra, initiated a research programme 
intended to reframe environmental communication (SLU, 2019). One of the core 
issues in the reframing is to revisit the treatment of power in this discipline. The 
group of scholars takes a critically engaged approach to their research by paying 
attention to how their practice includes dilemmas, which require reflection 
(Joosse et al., n.d.). I draw on these ideas and wish for this thesis to contribute 
to substantiating what it means to approach environmental communication as a 
critical yet engaged researcher.  
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1.2 Research design 
To pursue the aim and the research questions, I have designed an abductive 
research process. By abduction I refer to the kind of research where the 
researcher moves back and forth between empirical observation and theory. 
[…] the researcher tacks continually, constantly, back and forth […] The back and 
forth takes place less as a series of discrete steps than it does in the same moment: in 
some sense, the researcher is simultaneously puzzling over empirical materials and 
theoretical literatures. (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013, p. 27) 
Starting with the puzzle about power described in the prologue, I have 
abductively moved between planning theory, power theory and empirical 
investigations into planning policy and practice. Notably, this means that the 
research has been a cyclical process. Whereas when the research is reported upon 
in this thesis, I adhere to more linear storytelling, which is better suited to 
communicate the findings. 
To design the research process, I have drawn on the interpretive research 
tradition (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). 
Interpretive research analyses actors’ meaning-making in the contexts where 
they are active. To operationalise this research focus I have chosen to apply 
frame analysis as the core methodology (Schön and Rein, 1994; van Hulst and 
Yanow, 2016). In this methodology frames refer to thought styles and 
knowledge structures, which guide actors meaning-making. Frames provide a 
diagnosis of situations and thereby predispose actors for certain actions. Frame 
analysis has been chosen since it offers a useful methodology for identifying and 
explicating the notions of power, which are embedded in participatory planning 
(cf. Dewulf et al., 2009; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016).2 
Drawing on the interpretive research tradition, I have designed the research 
as displayed in Table 1. 
  
                                                     
2. See Chapter 3 for an elaborated discussion on the application of frame analysis in the thesis. 
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Table 1. The research design 
Task 
Research 
question Method Study object 
Chapter  
presented in 
1. To develop conceptual tools 
from power theory  
RQ1 Literature review Scholarly publications within 
power theory 
Chapter 4 
2. To analyse notions of power 
in communicative planning 
theory 
RQ2-3 Frame analysis Publications from leading 
communicative planning 
scholars 
Chapter 5 
3. To analyse notions of power 
in Swedish participatory 
planning policy 
RQ2-3 Frame analysis Written planning guidance 
from Swedish authorities 
Chapter 6 
4. To analyse notions of power 
in Swedish participatory 
planning practice 
RQ2-3 Qualitative interviews, 
practitioner profiles 
and frame analysis  
Transcripts from interviews  Chapter 7 
5. To synthesise the findings  
in order to rethink power  
in participatory planning 
RQ4 Conceptual 
development  
through abduction 
Findings from the previous 
research tasks 
Chapter 8 
 
Research Task 1 is to review power theory in order to develop the conceptual 
tools needed to research and rethink notions of power in participatory planning. 
This task originates from the idea that the reductive and fragmented treatment of 
power in planning theory can be addressed through conceptual tools developed 
from power theory. Through this task I answer RQ1 by developing conceptual 
tools intended to: i) make it possible to explicate and assess tacit notions of 
power in participatory planning and ii) in the final step of the research, rethink 
these notions. The usefulness of these tools is tested through empirical 
investigations (Tasks 2-4) and then validated in order to develop concepts during 
research Task 5.  
Research Task 2 is to analyse notions of power in communicative planning 
theory. I chose this theory for analysis since it is influential in participatory 
planning practice. Notably, I use the term communicative planning theory to 
signify a theory that seeks to explain, influence and support participatory 
planning. But I do not, as some scholars (e.g. Sager, 2012), dissolve the 
difference between this theory and participatory planning practice. The reason is 
that I see that participatory planning is influenced by alternative theories. Even 
if I have decided to focus the analysis on communicative planning, I also make 
use of the Foucauldian and the post-political planning theories when I, in the 
final research Task 5, rethink power in participatory planning. 
 To analyse communicative planning theory, I focus on the work of its leading 
scholars, John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes from the 1980s to the 
present. I subscribe to the view that planning scholars do not merely describe and 
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analyse planning practices, they are also engaged in “world making” by suggesting 
that certain ways of making meaning are more useful than others. Therefore, they 
are to be viewed as planning actors, rather than objective observers. Thus, I see 
the analysis of communicative planning theory, not as a conventional literature 
review, but as a frame analysis of scholars’ meaning-making. Through the 
engagement with the leading communicative planning scholars this research task 
provides part of the answer to RQ2 and 3 by explicating the notions of power, 
which frequently remain tacit, in this theory and assessing the extent to which these 
enable reflective practice. 
Research Task 3 is to analyse notions of power in Swedish participatory 
planning policy. To study Swedish planning is an important task in itself, due to 
the need to scrutinise assumed notions of power. Importantly, in line with 
interpretive research, studying Swedish planning means that I “dig where I 
stand”. My practical knowledge about the Swedish context provides possibilities 
to go under the surface to explicate and assess unspoken notions of power.  
I also assert that Swedish planning is a case that potentially provides insights 
of value for other planning contexts. Trust in Swedish democracy is still 
relatively high and political institutions stand comparatively strong (Andersson 
et al., 2018) and participation is mainstream in spatial and societal planning 
(Isaksson et al., 2009; Strömgren, 2007). Hence, Sweden is a “friendly context” 
for realising the dialogical notions of power in communicative planning theory. 
Studying Swedish planning is putting my assertion that rethinking power in 
participatory planning is required for the hardest test and can potentially provide 
insights of value for other planning contexts (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2006 discussion of 
critical and most-likely cases).  
 To analyse notions of power in Swedish planning policy, I chose to study 
planning guidance issued by two influential Swedish authorities, The National 
Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) and the Association for 
Swedish Municipalities and Counties (SALAR). Planning guidance documents 
are suitable study objects in view of my interest in clarifying and assessing 
notions of power in participatory planning. Governments and agencies use 
guidance in their attempts to steer the implementation of planning policy and to 
influence planning practices in the direction they prefer. Thus, as Cashmore et. 
al., (2015, p. 85) argue, “guidance plays a prominent role in contemporary 
governance”. Given my interest in reflective practice, guidance is especially 
relevant to study, since it is intended to help planners make sense of the 
difficulties they face.  
 Through the analysis of planning policy, I get access to notions of power 
from within the machinery of Swedish public agencies and organisations. This 
is expected to enable clarification and assessment of alternative notions to those 
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within communicative planning theory and complementary findings feeding into 
answering RQ2 and 3. The end result of this task is that additional notions of 
power are explicated and assessed. 
Research Task 4 is to analyse notions of power in Swedish participatory 
planning practice. Inspired by John Forester’s (1999, 2009a) method for 
practitioner profiles, I illicit practice stories through interviews with Swedish 
planners. I have chosen to interview planners who are reflective and engaged in 
their practice. This selection is expected to provide access to rich practice 
accounts where notions of power become accessible for research. The planners’ 
stories are analysed through frame analysis to explicate and assess the 
understandings of power, which often reside under the surface of the narratives. 
Thereby, a full answer is provided to RQ2 and 3. The result of this task is insights 
into how the notions of power in communicative planning theory and Swedish 
planning guidance enable and constrain planners’ meaning-making.  
Research Task 5 is to synthesise the findings from the previous tasks in order 
to rethink power in participatory planning. At this final stage of the research 
process, the conceptual tools developed through reviews of power theory have 
been tested through investigations into communicative planning theory and 
Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. The notions embedded in 
participatory planning have thus been explicated and assessed. Hence, this final 
research task is about responding to RQ4 by synthesising the findings from the 
previous research tasks. It is about developing concepts based on the findings 
from the abductive research process. The end result is a rethinking of power, 
which provides a set of power concepts that enable reflective practice. 
Throughout the research process, I have sought to realise three central 
qualities in research practices: being reflective,3 being systematic and employing 
and attitude of doubt (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). For reasons already 
explained, reflective practice is an important ideal for me. In this PhD project it 
is particularly important since, as described in the prologue, my own practical 
experiences position me within the practice I research. This position gives the 
possibility to enrich the research through practical knowledge, but also comes 
with the risk of lacking the distance needed for critical scrutiny. By being 
reflective, systematic and doubting, I have sought to realise the possibilities and 
mitigate the risks throughout the research process.4  
                                                     
3. Notably, the term “reflexivity” is often used to signify researchers’ scrutiny of their social 
position and guiding assumptions. I chose to instead use “reflective” to signify the same process 
because, if “reflexivity” had been used, the two similar terms might have caused confusion.  
4. For a methodological discussion see Chapter 3. 
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1.3 Outline of the thesis 
The argument unfolds as follows in this thesis. Chapter 2 positions the thesis 
in discussions about participation, planners and power. Chapter 3 discusses the 
interpretative research methodology applied in this thesis. In Chapter 4, I 
present a review of the power literature intended to develop conceptual tools 
to research and rethink power in participatory planning. Chapters 5-7 present 
the investigations into communicative planning theory and Swedish partici-
patory planning policy and practice. In the closing Chapter 8, I draw together 
the findings and answer the four research questions in order to rethink power 
in participatory planning.  
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[…] practicing reflectively means learning by doing and learning from doing; at best, 
it means pushing the boundaries of one’s field and questioning one’s role in it. 
(Fischler, 2012, p. 314) 
This chapter positions the thesis in the discussions about planners, participation 
and power and thereby explains why a rethinking of power in participatory 
planning is warranted.  
The first section explores planners, power and participation. Through 
discussing power relations in planning, the nature of planning practice and 
situated judgment, I arrive at the conclusion that phronesis, (the ability to make 
value-based situated judgements), is required by the planners who are key actors 
in participatory planning.   
Section 2 links the development of phronesis to reflection, and thereby makes 
the case for reflective practice. It is argued that massive amounts of practical 
experience are not sufficient for the development of phronesis. Reflective 
practitioners pay attention to difficulties they confront and use these to prompt 
critical scrutiny of what they take for granted and thereby learn to master their 
profession.    
In Section 3, I review the discussion about power in planning in order to 
elaborate on the problem the thesis addresses. I take stock of the treatment of 
power in communicative planning theory and the critique posed towards this 
theory. The chapter concludes by arguing that the fragmented and reductive 
treatment of power in participatory planning is an impediment to reflective 
practice and thereby makes this thesis warranted. 
  
2 Planners, participation and power  
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2.1 Why do planners need concepts of power? 
Scholars have long told us that the concept of power is central to understand 
planning. Few would object to Flyvbjerg’s (2004, p. 293), characteristically 
dramatic, assertion that, “There can be no adequate understanding of planning 
without placing the analysis of planning within the context of power”. For my 
purposes, it is obviously not sufficient to merely say that power is important, we 
must also ask why it is so. Why do planners need concepts of power (cf. 
Hayward and Lukes, 2008; Morriss, 2002)? To answer this question, let us 
consider the power relations that are performed in the participatory planning 
processes. 
Planning is about making choices about places and societies (Campbell, 
2002). In order to plan places and societies a power system, which orders social 
positions and actions, is necessary. A system of power provides planning actors 
such as politicians, planners, citizens, activists and developers with social 
positions, which confirms upon them (varying) abilities to act, which is to 
exercise power (Haugaard, 2003). Planning actors might in some planning 
situations use their power towards shared objectives. They might agree upon 
what is best to do. In such episodes, we get the kind of consensual power that 
Hanna Arendt refers to as “the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” 
(Arendt, 1970, p. 44). Yet, stakes are often high and interests collide. Planning 
becomes conflictual, contested in its process and/or in its outcomes (Campbell, 
2006). Then we get the kind of power, which Robert Dahl (1957, pp. 202–203) 
referred to when saying that “A has power over B to the extent that he (sic) can 
get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Hence power is, rather 
than merely an evil, ever-present and productive in participatory planning. 
Planning processes provide arenas where power relations are performed. 
Planners interact with a variety of actors whose identities, world views and 
desires might be more or less aligned. In our multicultural societies, citizens 
from alternative walks of life share the same places and participate to varying 
degrees in planning these. In more or less close contact with citizens, experts 
from different professions with alternative knowledge systems and ways of 
practicing, play important roles in the shaping of places and societies. 
Developers and private interests areʊespecially in today’s deregulated planning 
systemsʊkey actors who provide resources and execute tasks throughout all 
stages of planning, often wielding a considerable amount of power. Elected 
politicians from different parties are involved in decision making, which may be 
more or less controversial throughout a planning process. When issues are 
contested, actors who have a stake in the outcome enter into the equation by 
pushing for their specific interests. Sometimes academics fill a function as 
stakeholders by articulating specific values and interests. In other planning 
 27 
episodes they may merely assist with more conventional knowledge inputs or 
work alongside planners and other actors to plan places and societies.  
Hence, a multitude of actors are involved in a planning practice, which is 
intended to better places and societies (Campbell, 2002). These actors frequently 
have different visions and alternative ideas about what “better” might be. 
Planning issues are contested in their process, as well as in their outcome. In 
participatory planning “different knowledge and lived experiences rub up 
against one another, raising questions about whose knowledge constitutes proof, 
and, indeed, what constitutes proof […]” (Campbell, 2002, pp. 277–278). 
Planning involves making choices that inevitably lead to exclusion of certain 
knowledge, values, visions and ideas (Connelly and Richardson, 2004; Mouffe, 
1999; Wiberg, 2016).  
The necessary art of exclusion is performed through power relations in 
different spaces and at various levels (cf. Gaventa, 2006). Spaces, can be seen as 
the locations, moments and situations where planning actors come together to 
communicate. Spaces where power relations are performed can be categorised 
as closed spaces, where the “powerful” insiders in a planning system make 
decisions without broader participation. While other kinds of spaces can be 
understood as invited spaces (cf. Ibid.). Then citizens and other actors are asked 
to join planning processes by those who are charged with convening power, 
either through regulated formalised consultations or on a more ad hoc basis. 
Finally, spaces can be claimed by less powerful actors who wish to open up new 
arenas for getting “their” issues into the planning processes.  
The spaces for participation can be seen as located on different levels of 
planning systems. One distinction, which is often made, is the one between the 
power relations that take place inside a designed participatory planning process 
and those broader relations of power, which are influencing and influenced 
outside a formal planning process (Healey, 1997; Innes and Booher, 2010). One 
might additionally distinguish between power relations at global, regional, 
national and local levels. Participation takes shape on all four levels. Planning 
frameworks at different levels overlap, and at times compete in ways that 
influence conditions for power relations in participatory planning (cf. Armitage 
et al., 2010).  
Let us return to the question this section started with. Why do planners need 
concepts of power? I argue that planners need concepts of power in order to 
understand what is going on in power relations between the actors who inhabit 
the participatory spaces at different levels of planning systems. As asserted by 
Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002, p. 14) “Understanding how power works is the 
first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power”.  
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I also make the additional claim that an important function for concepts of 
power are to enable normative appraisal of these power relations as a basis for 
planners’ action.  
Actions cannot be value-free, so rather than hiding, implying or sidestepping such 
concerns, explicit consideration needs to be given to the nature of the ethical values that 
our processes and outcomes are seeking to promote. (Campbell, 2002, pp. 274–275) 
Hence concepts of power are needed in order for planners to make sense of the 
ethical challenges in their practice.  
In the complex world of plural politics, planners charged with serving the public 
interest are often challenged by the frequently competing demands of various 
stakeholders […] Planning activities are intended to serve an entire community, but in 
reality can and do affect various constituencies differently, which poses multiple 
ethical challenges. (Lauria and Long, 2017, p. 202) 
If concepts of power were to perform these tasks, to understand and normatively 
appraise power, they would play important roles in participatory planning 
practices as tools for planners’ reflection and action. The problem I address in 
this thesis, is that the most influential planning theories in participatory planning 
fall short of supplying the variety of concepts needed for understanding and 
normatively appraising power.5 
2.2 Planners and practical wisdom (phronesis) 
Planners are in focus in this thesis. I chose to view this profession broadly, 
recognising that planners play alternative roles in different countries and in 
different kinds of planning processes. The tasks they perform range from 
providing expert inputs in the various stages of planning to facilitating dialogues 
with citizens, developers, activists, academics and other actors. In this thesis, I 
focus on planners within the public sector, while also recognising that planners 
can perform their duties from positions within civil society and the private 
sector. I also see how some planners might be concerned merely with spatial 
planning, but also recognise that planning is increasingly about linking spatial 
and societal issues. Hence, planners’ work spans over broad areas of expertise.         
Planners are frequently seen as value-free experts who merely supply their 
objective know-how to make planning rational. This view of the profession is an 
important basis for the legitimacy of planning. But it is too reductive since it 
neither recognises the variety of work planners actually do, nor opens 
                                                     
5. See Section 2.4. 
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possibilities for planners to make a difference in relation to political issues, 
which is the reason why many planners enter into the profession (Grange, 2013).  
In this thesis, I see planning as a power- and value-laden practice and hence 
subscribe to an alternative view of the kind of knowledge planners need. Instead 
of merely recognising conventional expert knowledge as a basis for planning 
practice, I follow those who stress how planners make situated judgements based 
both on deep expertise and ethical considerations.   
Judgement between these [planning] options depends on the interplay of universal 
ways of understanding about better and worse and the particularities of place. It is 
about practical wisdom. […] Planning should be about a process of valuation and 
evaluation, not the imposition of fixed values and singular notions of the good life. 
(Campbell, 2002, p. 282) 
To master their profession, planners need to develop “an appropriate basis for 
ethical judgement in planning based on a relational understanding of society which 
recognizes both difference and the common good” (Watson, 2003, p. 404).  
Hence, good planners possess the kind of practical wisdom, which Aristotle 
called “phronesis” (Bornemark, 2016; Flyvbjerg, 2004). This is an intellectual 
virtue that is “reasoned and capable of action with regard to things that are good 
or bad for man” (The Nicomachean Ethics, 1976, pp. 1140a24–b12, 1144b33–
1145a11 cited in Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 284). Aristotle argued that phronesis is the 
most important of the three intellectual virtues: episteme, techne, and phronesis. 
Phronesis is about making value-based judgements and thus goes further than 
scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical knowledge or know-how (techne) 
(Bornemark, 2017).  
Phronesis includes understanding the context as well as universal theories 
and normative principles. In practical wisdom “[…] the meaning of any 
universal, or any norm, is only justified and determined in and through its 
concretisation” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 40). In this sense, practical wisdom is about 
knowing what to do in a certain situation, which, involves understanding what 
is going on and making normative judgements about what is at stake in that 
situation. It is about knowing what is right to do, here and now. “We cannot say, 
in a general and abstract way, which action is just and which is not: there are no 
just actions ‘in themselves’, independent of what the situation requires” (Ibid.).  
Phronesis is a powerful mix of deep understanding of the universal and the 
particular (Flyvbjerg, 2004). It is the ability to be sensitive to what the situation 
requires (Bornemark, 2016). “Abstract theoretical understanding of political 
institutions, for example, is far from irrelevant, but it must reside alongside a 
nuanced appreciation of the rules of the political game and the ability to judge 
correctly the best course of action” (McCourt, 2012, p. 36). 
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How do practitioners develop practical wisdom? According to Flyvbjerg 
(2001), practice is the key to acquiring phronesis. He refers to Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986) phenomenological studies and argues that developing complex 
contextual knowledge, which phronesis is, requires a lot of emotionally engaged 
practical experiences.  
In Aristotle’s original work on Phronesis, as well as in later work, power has 
largely been absent (Flyvbjerg, 2001b). Situated judgment and practical wisdom 
have been theorised without a conceptualisation of power. Given the centrality 
of power to planning practice, this is problematic. Like Flyvbjerg (Ibid.) I wish 
to contribute to charging phronesis with a clearer conceptualisation of power, 
for planners need concepts of power both to understand and to normatively 
appraise interactions between planning actors. 
2.3 The case for reflective practice 
The tradition of reflective practice provides a suitable theorisation of the learning 
process through which practical wisdom can be developed (Fischler, 2012; 
Forester, 2013; Schön, 1983; Yanow, 2009). The reason for turning to reflective 
practice, is that this tradition carries the potential to conceptualise the manner in 
which planners need to turn their gaze towards their assumptions of power, if 
they wish to learn from their experiences.  
2.3.1 What is reflective practice? 
It was Donald Schön (1983) who originally developed the ideas of reflective 
practice, which were later applied and developed by many scholars and 
practitioners (e.g. Fischler, 2012; Forester, 2013; Yanow, 2009; Yanow and 
Tsoukas, 2009). Schön developed his ideas based on his own practicical 
experiences and close studies of how practitioners go about doing their work. 
Importantly, some of his most influential work was done with planners.  
Schön drew on the work of Dewey (1933, 1938) and further developed some 
of his core ideas. Most notably, Schön subscribed to Dewey’s view that learning 
occurs from the personal experience of puzzling, surprising and difficult 
situations, which require reflection on habitual ways of thinking and doing.  
In general, practicing reflectively means learning by doing and learning from doing; 
at best, it means pushing the boundaries of one’s field and questioning one’s role in it. 
Reflective practitioners consciously aim to improve their practice by analyzing their 
own experience. They improve their professional behaviour and ameliorate its effects 
by sustained inquiry into the causes, meanings, and consequences of their actions. 
(Fischler, 2012, p. 314) 
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Schön (1983) elaborated on his ideas of reflective practice by contrasting it to 
technical rationality. In technical rationality, professional practice includes 
instrumental problem solving through the application of scientific theory and 
technique. It involves selecting the best models and tools to tackle a given 
problem. In contrast, Schön saw how practitioners, who master their practice 
rather exhibit an “artful competence” whereby, instead of carefully selecting 
appropriate tools prior to action, they spontaneously apply their “knowing in 
action”. 
When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the actions of everyday 
life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special way. Often, we cannot say 
what it is that we know. When we try to describe it, we find ourselves at a loss, or we 
produce descriptions that are obviously inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, 
implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. 
It seems right to say that our knowing is in our action. (Schön, 1983, p. 49)  
As observed by Schön, our knowing in action is largely tacit. Even if we can put 
words on the logic underlying what we do, we are rarely inclined to do so in the 
midst of action. A competent planner might, for example, be capable of enabling 
a constructive conversation on a difficult planning choice with a citizen, but 
might not immediately be able to explain how they do it.  
Yet, Schön (1983, p. 50) tells us how professionals, stimulated by surprise, 
puzzles and difficulties, “turn thought back on action and on the knowing, which 
is implicit in action”. For example, if the the planner suddenly notices that the 
citizen seems troubled, they might in the moment pause their routinised 
behaviour, their knowing in action, and become attentive to the way they speak 
and what they say. In this pause, the planner might reflect-in-action. They might 
ask themselves and/or the citizen if their use of language is overly technical and 
thereby makes the citizen feel excluded. This kind of reflection-in-action is 
important for developing the sensitivity for what a situation requires, which is 
central to practical wisdom (Bornemark, 2017). 
Schön, distinguishes between reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. 
The latter takes place after a situation when a practitioner thinks back on a 
situation and scrutinises the way he or she understood the situation. To Schön, 
this form of reflection was crucial for understanding how practitioners learn 
from their experience, by questioning habitual ways of thinking and acting and, 
if called for, change them (Schön, 1983).  
In theories of reflective practice, the metaphors frame and framing are used 
to signify tacit thought models and ideas. These metaphors explain that there is 
a less visible foundation “that lies beneath the more visible surface of language 
or behaviour, determining its boundaries and giving it coherence.” (Rein and 
Schön, 1996, p. 88). Through this language we can see how our frames of 
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meaning-making, like picture frames, set a boundary within which we focus our 
attention on what is inside as opposed to what is outside of the frame and thereby 
make sense of what is going on (Raitio, 2008). 
To Schön, practitioners’ artistry, which resembles practical wisdom and 
phronesis, originates from their ability to be sensitive to surprise and engage in 
reflection over the usefulness of the frames embedded in their practices. 
Surprises and difficulties show a lack of appropriateness between the 
practitioners’ knowing in action, tacit ways of framing, and the situation at hand. 
Practitioners are in such situations, helped by reflecting upon their tacit frames 
and adjusting them to become more effective in their knowing in action.  
According to Schön (1983, p. 50) it is the critical scrutiny of assumed ideas, 
the reflection-in and on-action “which is central to the ‘art’ by which 
practitioners sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, 
uniqueness and value conflict.” In this thesis, I am interested in analysing and 
assessing the frames, which inform planners’ understandings of power in 
participatory planning. By making these explicit I wish to develop concepts that 
can enable reflective practice. 
2.3.2 Reflective practice and power  
Notions of power often remain implicit in participatory planning. As research into 
meaning-making tells us, actors draw on their particular view of “the order of 
things” most often without making the underlying assumptions explicit to 
themselves and others (Schön, 1983; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009). As discussed in 
my own practice story in the prologue, unspoken differences in understandings 
might result in ambiguity regarding the purpose of participation and planners’ 
roles in power relations. It might result in a kind of “unreflective practice” which, 
according to Schön (1983, p. 289), is equally “limited and destructive” regardless 
if practitioners follow the conventional ways of their practice or see themselves as 
progressively pursuing a mission to change their practice.  
Arguably, an unreflective planning practice might be equally dangerous 
regardless of whether it is performed in the name of participation or in the name 
of technical expertise. Universal aspirations for participation or technical 
rationality are ill-suited in a practice that requires situated judgements. Presuming 
that certain understandings and normative aspirations are always valid might deter 
planners from being sensitive to the workings of power in a particular situation. 
From the power literature, we learn that unreflective practice might stabilise 
power relations by rendering them presumed as a given reality. Thereby, 
unreflective practice is a vehicle for “reification”, the process by which certain 
kinds of power relations are seen as given, as objective reality. In the power 
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literature, reification is a term used to signify one of the most important 
mechanisms through which power is created by ordering and stabilising social 
relations (Haugaard, 2003). Critical power analysis tells us that when reification, 
which is the construction of reality, remains tacit and unquestioned the risk for 
dominance by powerful actors increases (Lukes, 2005).  
Following this reasoning there is a potential for reflective participatory 
planning practice to “unmask” what is taken for granted about power. Reflective 
practice provides the possibility to explicate and scrutinise the way that 
reification stabilises power relations. Opening the process of reification for 
critical examination carries the potential for assessing the legitimacy of power 
relations and, if deemed necessary, transforming them.  
The links between reflective practice and power will stay in focus throughout 
this thesis. At this point, it suffices to reiterate that this thesis is intended to enable 
reflective practice, due to the potential this form of practice carries for developing 
phronesis by reflection, and for opening power relations to critical scrutiny.  
2.4 The fragmented and reductive treatment of power in 
planning theory 
This section zooms in on the treatment of power in planning theory. It thereby 
clarifies what this body of theories offers for reflections on power in 
participatory planning and what is missing. I first discuss the treatment of power 
in communicative planning theory and thereafter summarise the critique from 
other strands of planning theory.   
2.4.1 Power in communicative planning theory 
In the 1980s and 1990s, planning theory joined a larger communicative turn in 
social science through an increased analytical focus on language and sense-making 
in the micro-practices of planning. This analytical turn was intertwined with a 
normative desire to shift the power balances to benefit civil society and 
marginalised communities in order to democratise planning processes from the 
bottom up (Watson, 2002). The communicative turn in planning theory influenced, 
and was in turn influenced by, a move from government to governance in planning 
policy. Hence, communicative planning theory is arguably a theory that to some 
extent has been capable of challenging the dominance of rational planning theory 
in policy and practice. 
Communicative planning theory is best understood as an umbrella concept, 
which covers a broad and diverse set of theories that have an analytical focus on 
communication and a normative preference for inclusive dialogues in common 
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(Sager, 2012). The theories included under the umbrella are given different 
names, which are used interchangeably and overlap, including but not exhausted 
by collaborative planning, argumentative planning, consensus building, 
dialogical planning and deliberative planning. Influential contributors include 
John Forester (1989, 1999, 2009), Patsy Healey (1992a, 1997, 2012), Judith 
Innes (1995; 1999, 2010) and Tore Sager (1994, 2012).  
The communicative planning theories originate from a critique of rational 
planning theory, which was and still is, influential in planning policy and 
practice. Rational planning is criticised for being unable to explain how planning 
practice is performed in real life and for resulting in exclusion and injustices 
through its application in practice. Innes (1998, p. 53) articulates this critique as 
follows: 
[…] the tidy process specified for analysis [in rational planning], […] is simply not 
a good description of the reality of planning […] nor does it appear that the model's 
[rational planning] neat divisions of labour among professionals and public officials 
are found in practice. […] Finally, the notion of value-neutral expertise is no longer 
widely accepted, either among the lay public or by philosophers of science and 
social theorists.  
At the heart of communicative planning, is the view that reality is socially 
constructed. This body of theories pays attention to the social construction of 
meaning, the social embeddedness of ways of thinking and acting in varied 
discourse communities and the interpretive nature of the world (Healey, 1997; 
Innes and Booher, 1999). As Healey (1992b, p. 241) states, knowledge is then 
not seen as  
[…] a pre-formulated store of systematised understandings [instead knowledge] is 
specifically created anew in our communication through exchanging perceptions and 
understandings and drawing on stocks of life experiences and previously consolidated 
cultural and moral knowledge available to participants.  
From this social constructivist position, scholars in communicative planning 
theory level critique towards the epistemological basis of rational planning. The 
idea of rational planning is said to produce a practice in which knowledge is 
primarily developed through scientific analysis and deductive logic. Thereby, 
voices adhering to these ways of knowing are privileged, whereas those who 
appeal to other ways of knowing are marginalised (Healey, 1997; Innes, 1998). 
According to proponents of communicative planning theories, the dominance 
of rational planning leads to the exclusion of a range of knowledge forms and 
value systems from planning practice. These include experiential, local, 
intuitive, tacit, and expressive knowledge, which draw on the moral or aesthetic 
realms rather than solely on the realms of scientific logic and empiricism 
(Healey, 1997; Innes, 1998). 
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Communicative planning scholars pay attention to planners’ everyday 
practices both analytically and normatively. As argued by Forester (1999, 2009), 
focusing on what planners do provides important practical and theoretical insights. 
Communicative planning scholars combine their analytical interests in planners’ 
micro practices with the normative idea that planners are capable of democratising 
planning from within, by creating more inclusive planning processes. Hence, 
communicative planning theory suggests replacing the rational expert planner with 
the planner as a facilitator of participation (McGuirk, 2001).  
The normative idea in communicative planning is, as McGuirk (Ibid., p. 196) 
puts it, “dramatically opposed to instrumental rationality and its processes of 
creating knowledge and ascribing value”. This view leads communicative 
planning scholars to criticise hierarchical power relations since these are seen as 
standing in the way of inclusive dialogue. The dominance of an expert-driven, 
top down planning process is seen as undesirable, whereas it is argued that an 
increase in community-based bottom up planning processes are desirable.   
To theorise their normative ideas, communicative planning scholars in the 
early days in the 1980s and 1990s, turned to Habermas (1984) and argued that 
rational planning’s “instrumental rationality” should be replaced with 
communicative rationality (Forester, 1980, 1989, 1993; Healey, 1997; Innes, 
1995). Innes (1998, p. 60) explained what communicative rationality would 
mean in planning. 
First, individuals representing all the important interests in the issue must be at the 
table. All the stakeholders must be fully-and equally-informed and able to represent 
their interests. All must be equally empowered in the discussion; power differences 
from other contexts must not influence who can speak or who is listened to, or not. 
The discussion must be carried on in terms of good reasons, so that the power of a 
good argument is the important dynamic.  
Inserting communicative rationality in planning would, according to the scholars, 
create a new kind of practice, which would ensure that forms of knowledge, 
reasoning, and representation beyond instrumental rationality, were part of 
inclusive dialogues in planning. 
It is this move, to import Habermas’ thinking into planning, that has been 
given the most attention in the power debates in planning (Flyvbjerg and 
Richardson, 2002; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Purcell, 2009). Whereas other 
approaches to power, within the broad umbrella of communicative planning 
theories, have attracted much less attention.  
Although I share the critics’ view that it is useful to discuss the import of 
Habermas’ ideas to planning, I find this focus too reductive to fully assess the 
treatment of power in communicative planning theory. As pointed out by 
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Healey (2003, 2009) in her responses to her critics: there is more to this theory 
than Habermas.  
At the core of communicative planning is, in addition to Habermas’ critical 
theory, American pragmatism (Forester, 1999, 2009, 2013), new institutionalism 
(Healey, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2012) and attempts to theorise the practical 
knowledge developed through participatory practices (Innes and Booher, 1999, 
2010). These three streams within communicative planning remain under-
explored in the discussions about power in participatory planning.   
John Forester is one of the scholars who has woven American pragmatism into 
the fabric of communicative planning theories. In his later work he has, mainly 
implicitly, distanced himself from Habermas and subscribed to a form of 
communicative planning, which emphasises situated action rather than grand 
theorising, and focuses on how planners deal with the practical problems of power. 
To do better in our applied fields, we need to beware of two dangers, those of naïveté 
and cynicism. The first assumes too easily the motivating power of abstract ideals; 
the second assumes too easily that those with power yesterday must prevail today 
and tomorrow. Assuming in many political settings that sincerity or reciprocity will 
independently motivate others can easily be a fool’s errand, to be sure. (Forester, 
2013, p. 7) 
As evident in this quote, Forester’s brand of American pragmatism provides 
another kind of perspective on power in planning, as compared to the ideas of 
Habermas’ critical theory. Instead of emphasising universal ideals and 
communicative rationality, Forester’s later work makes the case for pragmatic 
incremental action to shift power balances in micro practices. Yet Forester has 
after his Habermasian period in the 1980s and early 1990s, refrained from 
theorising power. Hence, the notions of power underpinning his American 
pragmatism remain to be explained. This is the task I turn to in the analysis 
presented in Chapter 5. 
Another influential stream within communicative planning derives from new 
institutionalism’s interest in the interplay between structure and agency. In this 
approach, which provides yet another perspective on power, Healey (1997, 
2012) is one of the prominent scholars. She has used and further developed 
Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. Even if she has refrained from using power 
as a key concept, her work provides conceptual resources for understanding 
power beyond the Habermasian focus on power as a distortion.  
We live through culturally-bound structures of rules and resource flows, yet human 
agency, in our continually inventive ways, remakes them in each instance, and in 
remaking the systems, the structuring forces, we also change ourselves and our 
cultures. Structures are 'shaped' by agency, just as they in turn 'shape' agency. (Healey, 
1997, p. 45) 
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As illustrated by this quote, even if Healey rarely elaborates on the concept of 
power, her work carries the potential for reflection on power relations. She draws 
attention to how social relations can be understood as an interplay between 
structure and agency. Hence, this stream of communicative planning theory 
might, as Healey (Ibid.) points out, teach us how power is embedded in social 
structures through “implicit and explicit principles about how things should be 
done and who should get what”.  
To Healey, structuration practices carry power relations from one period to 
the next. Thereby, she provides an approach to power, which is distinctively 
different from both American pragmatism and Habermasian communicative 
rationality. Yet, like Forester, Healey has not used power as a core concept and 
hence the notions of power underlying her work remain largely hidden. 
Therefore, I include her work in the analysis of communicative planning theory 
presented in Chapter 5. 
In addition to American pragmatism and new institutionalism, communicative 
planning scholars have also drawn on the practical knowledge developed within 
the growing field of participatory practices. This work has attracted little interest 
in the debates about power in participatory planning. Judith Innes, often working 
with David Booher, is arguably the communicative planning scholar who has most 
influentially sought to theorise based on her own and others’ practical experiences 
of facilitating participation (Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes, 2016; Innes, 1995; 
Innes and Booher, 1999). Hence, I have also included her work in the analysis 
presented in Chapter 5.  
The treatment of power in communicative planning theories have endured 
sustained critique over the years. The critique has prompted communicative 
planning scholars to respond and it is to these debates we now turn. 
2.4.2 The critique of the treatment of power in communicative planning 
theory 
The first wave of critique towards communicative planning came from scholars 
who were inspired by the work of Foucault. Instead of importing Habermas’ 
ideas, they set out to make use of Foucault’s power analytics to theorise planning 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2004; Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Richardson, 1996). 
Scholars who draw on Foucault’s work approach planning based on a conception 
of power as ubiquitous to human relations and thus planning practice. The 
approach to planning they have thereby developed has been, and still is, 
influential in planning theory (Metzger et al., 2016; Schmidt-Thomé and 
Mäntysalo, 2014).  
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Based on Foucault (1979, 1980), Flyvbjerg and Richardson (2002, p. 46)  
succinctly formulate the core of their critique towards communicative planning.  
[…] communicative planning theory fails to capture the role of power in planning. As 
a result, it is a theory which is weak in its capacity to help us understand what happens 
in the real world; and weak in serving as a basis for effective action and change. 
The critique zooms in on the communicative planning scholars’ affinity for the 
universal aspirations of Habermas’ communicative rationality. Foucauldian 
scholars claim that communicative rationality is naïve and idealistic and put 
forward the real rationality of Foucauldian power analytics as an alternative. 
Instead of looking at what ought to be done in planning, we should pay attention 
to what is actually done.  
Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an 
alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all-pervasive 
nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory 
engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different 
interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is 
exposed as a focus of conflict. (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002, p. 52) 
As illustrated by this quote, this critique towards communicative planning 
draws on Foucault’s emphasis of “unmasking” the domination hidden in 
societal practices, such as planning. According to Flyvbjerg and Richardson 
(2002) this is what Foucault offers when it comes to institutional change: to 
expose the mechanisms of power that produce inclusion and exclusion. By way 
of unmasking the practices and the techniques of governing, institutions can 
potentially be transformed in order to minimise domination.  
What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which 
appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the 
political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be 
unmasked, so that one can fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault, 1974, p. 171). This is 
what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to 
institutional change. (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002, p. 55)  
Following from this critical perspective, is a reluctance to provide universal 
solutions to how power should be approached in planning. 
 […] there are few easy explanations and fewer model solutions. They [foucauldian 
scholars] rarely seek to provide procedural models for practice. Rather, they offer a 
set of reference points which can be used by planners and others to critically, 
reflexively, and ethically establish their basis for action. (Richardson, 2005, p. 345) 
Thereby, the Foucauldian critique to communicative planning theory does not 
prescribe what planners should do with power. Instead scholars in this tradition 
see it as their task to critically scrutinise current planning practices and reveal 
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the hidden domination; and then leave planners to make situated judgements of 
what ought to be done (Flyvbjerg, 1998; McGuirk, 2001; Richardson, 2002). If 
any role of the planner can be derived from the Foucauldian approach, it is the 
critical and reflective planner, who based on power sensitivity, makes ethical 
and situated judgements. 
[…] theory is not being used to provide answers to what is right or wrong, or to 
generate procedural theories about how planning should be done. It is a critical 
approach which intends to equip the planner to operate more effectively in challenging 
environments, through reflection. (Richardson, 2005, p. 346) 
Thus, critique is seen as a basis for improving practice and Foucauldian planning 
theorists are suspicious of prescriptive theory. 
[…] practitioners should build critique into their work. Critical understanding, 
supported by academic work, can maintain a perspective which is more aware of the 
clash (or subtle shaping) of ideas and practices than an approach which expects 
procedural models and norms to absolve the individual practitioner from 
responsibility. (Richardson, 2005, p. 362) 
I find the Foucauldian approach to planning useful in many ways. In this thesis 
I especially draw on the view of power as productive, dynamic and situated, 
rather than universally destructive. I also adhere to the view that approaching 
planning from the perspective of real rationality is more useful than from a 
universal theory of right and wrong. Following this view, is my preference for 
reflective practice, which I view as related to the Foucauldian scholars’ emphasis 
on situated power relations and the necessity of critique as a basis for change.  
Yet, I differ with the Foucauldian approach on at least one point. While I 
acknowledge the situatedness of planning ethics, I also see a need for being able 
to discuss the legitimacy of power by taking into account ethics, which transcend 
context (see Clegg et al., 2014 for a discussion between proponents of universal 
and situated appraisal of power). I will return to develop this position further in 
Chapters 4 and 8.   
During the last decades, another kind of  “post-political” critique has been 
posed towards communicative planning theory and the participatory practices 
this theory underpins (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012; Franzén et al., 2016; 
Metzger et al., 2014; Pløger, 2004; Purcell, 2009). Here scholars draw on, and 
contribute to, a larger stream of social science research, which is concerned with 
critical scrutiny of “the deeper purpose behind and wider implications of policy 
terms such as governance, partnerships and sustainable development” 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012, p. 91). Post-politics is then used as a term 
to signify how dominant neoliberal discourses smooth out conflicts and 
resistance by masking itself under, for example, participatory planning practices.  
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The post-political take on power is related to Foucauldian power analytics 
and yet different. It has a similar focus on how discourses carry power and work 
through planning to normalise domination. But, post-political planning is 
arguably different from Foucauldian power analytics, due to its affiliation with 
late Marxism, most notably in the form of agonism (Mouffe, 1999, 2005) and 
actor network theories (Callon and Latour, 1981; Latour et al., 1988). At the 
heart of this theoretical stream is the idea that current politics is locked up in a 
post-political system. Allmendinger and Haughton (2012, p. 90) explain what 
this means: 
This system gives the superficial appearance of engagement and legitimacy, whilst 
focusing on delivering growth expedited through some carefully choreographed 
processes for participation which minimise the potential for those with conflicting 
views to be given a meaningful hearing.  
According to post-political planning, the emphasis on participation and 
consensus is underpinning and legitimising the dominance of market-driven 
development. As an example, Hilding-Rydevik et. al. (2011, p. 182) discuss the 
consequences of what they see as the post-political state in Swedish regional 
planning:  
One obvious consequence, as we see it, is that the consensus norm as a basic organizing 
principle for the SRD [Sustainable Regional Development] discourse leads to a 
systematic avoidance and concealing of conflicts. In other words, it produces and 
reproduces a false sense of unity and coherence, which in turn prevents the formulation 
of alternative goals and trajectories for society.  
In one stream of post-political planning, Chantal Mouffe’s (1999, 2005) work 
on agonism has been used to analyse contemporary planning and to build up an 
idea of an alternative planning practice (Bäcklund and Mäntysalo, 2010; Bond, 
2011; Gunder, 2003; Larsen et al., 2017; Mouat et al., 2013; Pløger, 2004). Here 
pluralism, conflict and power are seen as inherent to processes of identification 
and human interaction. Thereby, the emphasis on consensus in communicative 
planning theory and participatory practices is seen as problematic, since it can 
only be temporary and will mask the necessity of exclusion of perspectives and 
interests (Mouffe, 1999). According to Mouffe (2000), this kind of “false 
consensus” makes our society vulnerable to different extreme movements and 
radicalised groups. Instead she puts forward the concept of agonistic pluralism 
to present a new way to think about democracy. Mouffe argues that antagonism 
is the kind of conflict that is dangerous to society, while agonism is the desirable 
constructive conflict necessary for society to prosper. 
When Mouffe’s ideas are brought into planning, it is often in opposition to 
the ideas of communicative planning (Bond, 2011; Gunder, 2003; Hillier, 2003; 
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Mäntysalo et al., 2011; Mouat et al., 2013). Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010, p. 
341) provide an example of the agonistic critique towards communicative 
planning theory.  
[…] the search of consensus in a communicatively rational planning argumentation any 
presumption of a shared life-world horizon forms a straitjacket that restricts participation 
(Mäntysalo and Rajaniemi, 2003, p. 127). People’s individual differences are thereby 
tossed aside while they are offered a universal identity as rational and moral beings 
(Hillier, 2002, p. 159). The ability to recognize the better argument requires a shared 
reality with shared problems. Habermasian communicative planning theory is unable to 
acknowledge conflicting conceptions of reality as being equally valid.  
Thereby, power is understood as inherent in human relations and there is a 
recognition that planning will always involve conflict between people who are 
shaped through different cultural, societal and personal experiences. The key in 
this planning theory is thus that planning ought to provide a legitimate arena for 
negotiation between different meaning systems. 
According to the proponents of the agonistic version of post-political 
planning, inserting an ethos of agonism into planning will lead towards a culture 
of planning that is more tolerant of the coexistence of, and conflicts between, 
different meaning systems. Even if the conflicts were found to be irresolvable, 
the actors may still come to a mutual agreement on the procedure – how the 
differences in opinion are to be dealt with.  
As in the Foucauldian tradition, the role of the planner is not clearly pinned 
down in agonistic planning. This is in line with the post-modern resistance to 
closure. Although Bond (2011, p. 176), defined two problems that planners have 
to deal with in agonistic planning: the first is how to get to some kind of a 
decision given the ideal of contestation and contingency in agonistic planning 
and the second is how to normatively decide when a decision is democratic.  
How can planners work with dissensus? Decisions will be taken. Sometimes there will 
be widespread agreement and at other times there will be much dissensus. In any 
context it is important to understand the conditions of possibility for a decision where 
one trajectory is taken and others are foreclosed. 
Thus, an agonistic planner needs to be capable of working under conditions of 
uncertainty or even un-decidability.  
[…] in contrast to furthering this modernist tradition of control and normalisation 
through the use of a plan forming a rigid ‘consensus’ towards the future, planning may 
have the potential to develop practitioners who can foster, accommodate and protect 
the ever-evolving desires of the different and diverse groups that comprise the majority 
of our societies within an increasingly uncertain and complex dynamic world. 
(Gunder, 2003, pp. 237–238)  
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I am largely sympathetic to the ideas about agonistic planners. I do agree that 
planners have a role to play when it comes to “repoliticising” planning. 
However, I also see the practical problems confronting an agonistic planner 
working inside a system where closure and consensus are highly valued and 
necessary in practice. Hence, following my preference for reflective planners, I 
do believe that the identity as an agonistic planner is useful and productive in 
certain situations, while in other situations might be difficult or even 
counterproductive to adhere to.  
Finally, a more activist conclusion has been derived from the post-political 
narrative. Taking up the legacy of Davidoff’s (1965) advocacy planning, 
scholars here cast planners as inside activists. 
As planners […] we must make it our business to actively […] offer us a way out of 
the wilderness of neoliberalism. Reclaiming power through political mobilization is 
our best hope for creating more democratic, more just, and more civilized cities. But 
it requires that […] planners consciously take up the hegemonic struggle against 
neoliberalization, rather than trying to paper it over with dreams. (Purcell, 2009, p. 
160)  
The activist planner should take on the role of the leader of the struggles against 
domination from inside the planning system. As Purcell (Ibid., p. 158) explains: 
What is required is a strategy of counter-hegemonic struggle to achieve “a profound 
transformation of existing power relations” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 52). For planning, that 
transformation requires “counter-hegemonic planning practice” (Sandercock, 1998, p. 
169) that can destabilize the current hegemony and establish an alternative one.  
I certainly agree with the idea that planners could be progressive change makers, 
instead of merely reproducers of unjust power relations. However, I differ with 
the advocates for activist planning by also recognising that the choices planners 
make take shape as situated dilemmas rather than clear cut choices between right 
and wrong. Hence, my preference is for reflective planners rather than activist 
planners. Activists are important in democracies, but to merely construct 
planners' identities as activists comes with totalitarian consequences. From 
where would a radical activist planner derive a universal mandate to further their 
cause? Instead, I argue that a reflective planner might, in certain but not all, 
situations see their identity as an activist. 
How have the leading communicative planning scholars responded to the 
various lines of critique? 
Judith Innes’ has tended to take a position where she cast the critics as 
“uniformed”, making “inaccurate generalizations” or accused them for being 
“downright uncivil” (Innes, 2004; Innes and Booher, 2015). Yet, in a more 
constructive manner, she has also proposed that the differences in perspectives 
might  be embraced as an opportunity to develop a more robust planning theory 
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(Innes and Booher, 2015). She then, very briefly, sketches how Castell’s (2009) 
theory of communication power might be used to “overcome the dividing 
discourses” in planning theory. In Chapter 5 I will, as part of the analysis of 
communicative planning theory, assess this attempt alongside Innes’ work over 
the decades.  
Tore Sager has, in contrast, chosen another basis for his response: “in so far 
as the [critics’] arguments are valid and the planning theory is not modified – 
CPT [communicative planning theory] will lose credibility as a critical theory” 
(Sager, 2012, p. xi). Choosing to take the critique seriously, he outlines an 
elaborate response in view of reviving communicative planning theory “so as to 
take the sting out of the criticism and restore CPT as a plausible theory” (Ibid., 
p. xi). I find Sager’s response to be useful, especially since it explicitly 
recognises that planners must act, not only communicatively, but also 
strategically. However, his response is insufficient for addressing the problem 
of the treatment of power in communicative planning theory. For Sager has not 
included an explicit rethinking of the communicative planning approach to 
power in his responses to the critics. This is a task that I deem necessary and take 
on in this thesis. 
Patsy Healeys’ responses have been to stress that her work, as well as other 
communicative planning scholars work, draws on broader theoretical resources 
than Habermas’ theories (Healey, 2003, 2009). She emphasises how the ideas of 
new institutionalism provide a useful relational perspective on power and how 
American pragmatism is an integral part of the treatment of power by 
communicative scholars, such as John Forester (Healey, 2009). Yet, Healey has 
not engaged in any elaborated attempt to explicitly theorise power from a new 
institutionalism stand point. 
John Forester in turn draws on his preference for American pragmatism to 
respond. He then claims that the critics rediscover power over and over again, 
without attempting to understand how it can be resisted in planning practice.  
By the mid-1970s, we had celebrated a good ten years of discoveries at the end of 
planning theory articles that ‘(Aha!) Planning is political’. We know that quite well by 
now. We really need less often to keep rediscovering politics and ‘power’, and more 
often to carefully assess forms of power and their specific types of vulnerabilities, for 
only where dominating power is vulnerable is critical resistance possible. (Forester, 
2000, p. 915)  
The route Forester has taken based on this position, is to, during the last decades, 
pay attention to what planners do in their everyday practices. Thereby he has 
collected a portfolio of exemplars and discussed these to cast light on important 
dimensions of planning, among them power relations. But he has not returned to 
theorise on power in planning after his Habermasian period in the 1980s and 
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1990s. It is this task I attend to in attempting to rethink power in participatory 
planning.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have positioned the thesis in the discussions about planners, 
participation and power. I have suggested that planners might learn by doing and 
open power relations for critical scrutiny by engaging in reflective practice. I 
have also demonstrated that the two most influential planning theories in 
participatory planning practice, rational and communicative planning theory, are 
too reductive in conceptualisation of power and hence only provide part of the 
conceptual support needed for reflective practice. The chapter also clarified how 
other competing planning theories can potentially fill the conceptual voids. But 
the debates about power are fragmented and alternative conceptualisations are 
often portrayed as mutually exclusive rather than complementary. This problem, 
the reductive and fragmented treatment of power, is what makes this thesis 
warranted. 
The chapter points towards how I attempt rethinking power in participatory 
planning. I will draw on and problematise communicative planning theory, but 
also make use of the critique against this theory. Due to the fragmented treatment 
of power in planning theory, I will turn to power theory to develop the 
conceptual tools needed for researching and rethinking power (Chapter 4). But 
first, the next chapter explains the methodology applied in the thesis.   
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Framing enables actors to understand a situation as being of a certain kind […] and 
they can start to imagine what could or should happen next in light of prior notions 
concerning the ways certain problems can and should be handled. (van Hulst and 
Yanow, 2016, p. 98) 
The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing 
concepts that can enable reflective practice. In Chapter 1, I presented the 
research design. This chapter explains why and how frame analysis is the main 
methodology in the thesis.  
In the first section I explain why I have assumed a social constructivist 
position and how that leads me to subscribe to the interpretive research tradition. 
In the second section, I discuss the methodology frame analysis and in closing 
section three I elaborate upon the interpretive and abductive research process.  
3.1 Social constructivism and interpretation 
3.1.1 Social constructivism 
This thesis is based on a view of the world as socially constructed through shared 
systems of meaning. Humans are thereby seen as engaged in meaning-making 
to understand the situations they confront (Berger and Luckmann, 2011; 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). Meaning-making is performed by 
individuals, but takes place through interactions within social practices, which 
include shared routinised ways of understanding the world (Reckwitz, 2002). 
This ontological position leads me to focus the research on planning as a practice 
with multiple systems of meaning. 
3 The research methodology: Frame 
analysis 
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To assume a social constructivist position is to subscribe to an anti-
essentialist ontology (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). This entails a recognition of 
the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities instead of a single reality, 
governed by immutable natural laws (as in positivist ontologies). In this 
understanding, people’s meaning-making is seen as informed by competing and 
partly overlapping ideas, world views and thought styles (Lewicki et al., 2003; 
Raitio, 2008; Schön and Rein, 1994). Characteristically, social constructivism 
therefore takes a critical stance towards reified truths and alternatively 
emphasises the communications through which such truths are constructed 
socially. Based on this understanding of the world, it becomes relevant to search 
for different notions of power in participatory planning, rather than a singular 
essential definition. 
In social constructivist accounts, meaning-making is seen as a messy and often 
subconscious process (Schön and Rein, 1994; Hajer, 2003). Thus, as Hajer (2003, 
p. 176) points out, people “do not hold immutable and stable beliefs and value 
positions” and actors are most often unaware of the shared systems of meaning 
that they draw upon in meaning making (Schön and Rein, 1994). The messy and 
tacit nature of meaning-making prompts me to access a variety of empirics and go 
behind actors’ explicit statements to search for the underlying knowledge 
structures and thought styles pertaining to their understanding of power. 
Considering reality as socially constructed also includes an appreciation of 
the contextuality of meaning-making. Actors confirm meaning upon the world 
in a specific historical and material context, which shapes their understandings 
and that they in turn shape (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). Hence, I view 
power relations as situated and dynamic. 
3.1.2 An approach inspired by the interpretive research tradition 
The ontological view that the world is socially constructed corresponds with 
my interest in researching and rethinking notions of power. For this task I have 
found inspiration in the interpretive research tradition (Jennings, 1983; 
Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). This tradition 
focuses on how knowledge can be developed around the different ways in 
which humans make meaning. 
In line with the interpretive research tradition, I have taken an abductive 
approach in this research. Abduction starts with puzzles, surprises or tensions 
that the researcher experiences “and then seeks to explicate by identifying the 
conditions that would make that puzzle less perplexing and more of a ‘normal’ 
or ‘natural’ event” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. 27). For me, the puzzle 
 47 
originates from the difficulties I have had in reconciling the tensions surrounding 
power in participatory planning (see prologue). 
In abduction the researcher is engaged in “puzzling-out”, in making the study 
object less puzzling. The researcher then constantly moves back and forth in an 
iterative cyclical fashion between the puzzle and possible explanations in the 
findings from the research and the relevant literature. The back and forth takes 
place less as discrete steps and more in the same moment: the researcher is 
simultaneously puzzling over empirical material and theoretical literature 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). This way of seeing abductive research has 
led me to a cyclical engagement with (i) the power literature, (ii) the planning 
literature and (iii) the findings from the analysis of notions of power in 
communicative planning theory and Swedish planning policy and practice. 
In interpretive research, researchers as other actors, are seen as engaged in 
the social construction of knowledge (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). The 
interpretive tradition posits that the researcher can not assume a position 
outside of the social, since this would be a view from nowhere (Nagel, 1989). 
Notably, this is a different understanding compared to conventional positivist 
methodology, where researchers are seen as objective and distanced from the 
world they study. The difference in ontological assumptions means that 
commonly accepted positivist standards for assessing the trustworthiness of 
scientific knowledge are not entirely appropriate for interpretive research 
(Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). 
How have I conducted the research in order to make it trustworthy? In this 
section I will merely discuss the main principles I have based the research on. 
The more concrete detailed methodological choices will instead be discussed in 
Section 3.3. The three overarching principles I have applied are to be doubtful, 
systematic and reflective.  
In interpretative research, as in all research endeavours, an attitude of doubt is 
crucial to the generation of knowledge. Adhering to this ideal, I have throughout 
the research process consciously strived to include “checks” on my own meaning-
making (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013). This includes testing alternative 
interpretations by internal reflection as well as in deliberation with others.  
Being systematic has meant that I have made purposeful choices, which I 
explicatly discuss in the thesis. Additionally, I have assured that the analytical 
process is formalised into a sequence of steps that can be repeated. I have also 
created an audit trail so that others can access the empirical material I have 
analysed and assess the accuracy of my interpretations (see Section 3.3). 
To be reflective has been a key principle in the research. The term reflective 
(and the similar term reflexive) are widely used and different definitions are 
applied. Here I use reflection to signify the process to (i) question my own 
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normative position in relation to my scholarship; (ii) question the relation 
between me as the researcher and the phenomena studied and (iii) how my 
position in social systems might affect the knowledge I produce about the social 
puzzle I study (cf. Rose, 1997; Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000; Schwartz-Shea 
and Yanow, 2013). It is in this manner I use the concept of reflection to signify 
the critical scrutiny of my own research practices.  
I have sought to engage in reflection throughout the research process. Two 
themes have been particularly salient to me: (i) the friction and corresponding 
traits between my two identities as researcher and facilitator/planning 
practitioner and (ii) my own (shifting) understanding of power in participatory 
planning. When reporting on the research, I have chosen to clarify personal 
reflections on these two themes in a narrative in the prologue, in a discussion of 
my normative position in Section 1.1, in Section 8.4.3 and in the epilogue.  
For researchers who take an interpretative approach, language matters since 
it “profoundly shapes our view of the world and reality, instead of being merely 
a neutral medium mirroring it” (Hajer, 2006, p. 66). As language is at the nexus 
of meaning, context, and action, interpretive research takes language seriously 
(White, 1992). Since the 1960s, there has been an increased interest in language 
and meaning-making within social science, often referred to as a communicative 
turn (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Schön and Rein, 1994). The increased interest 
in language use is due to the links between language and actions. Richardson 
(2002, p. 354), writing about discourse analysis, explains how analysis of 
language: “[…] puts the spotlight on the boundaries of thought and action. 
[Discourse analysis] is an attempt to first notice how these boundaries are 
established and maintained, and then to notice the effects of this closing down 
process”. Thereby, my interest in language is justified, since humans use 
language to interpret reality and since these interpretations condition people’s 
thinking and actions. Following this line of argument I agree with Hajer’s (2006) 
claim that language has the capacity to make politics, shift power balances and 
impact institutions and policy making.  
Critics might say that a focus on language hides how social processes are also 
shaped by “real” material and political realities (Bhaskar, 1991; Niiniluoto, 
1999). My answer is first that a focus on language does not entail a complete 
denial of the existence of “reality”. As Dryzek (1997, p. 12) argues, 
Just because something is socially interpreted does not mean it is unreal. Climate is 
changing as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, pollution does cause illness, 
species do become extinct […] But people can make very different things of these 
phenomena […]. 
Secondly, I also acknowledge that human behaviour is shaped not only by 
language, but also by the material circumstances humans act in and by the 
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practices in which people engage (Hajer, 2006; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). As 
Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 177) argue, “Language does not simply ‘float’ in 
society, but should be related to the particular practices in which it is employed”. 
Thus, planners’ sense-making does not emerge “out of the blue”. As Healey 
(1997, p. 7) tells us.  
Every field of endeavour has its history of ideas and practices and its traditions of 
debate. These act as a store of experience, of myths, metaphors and arguments, which 
those within the field can draw upon in developing their own contributions, either 
through what they do, or through reflecting on the field. This ‘store’ provides advice, 
proverbs, recipes and techniques for understanding and acting, and inspiration for 
ideas to play with and develop.  
An important choice I have made is to primarily focus on language as the study 
object. This means that I have refrained from studying other important features, 
which influence meaning-making in practices. Speaking with Reckwitz (2002, 
pp. 250–252), I have thereby left out how practices includes “routinised bodily 
activities” and “using particular things in a certain way”.  
Instead I have focused on spoken and written language. This study object 
allows me to access the deeper notions, which planners draw upon to make 
meaning. I conceptualise these as frames (see next section). Frames organise 
experience, predispose actors for certain actions and influence the way they act. 
Even if I recognise that planning practice is taking shape through complex 
processes, which include more than frames, I still maintain that the focus on 
language enables development of important and relevant knowledge about 
planners and their practices. Because “language matters” (Hajer and Versteeg, 
2005; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). 
3.2 About frame analysis  
In order to study the complexities and ambiguities of planners’ meaning-making 
I need a methodology fit for the task. The immense focus on language in 
contemporary social sciences has provided me with a multitude of options. Most 
relevantly, in view of the aim of this thesis, is discourse analysis (Dryzek, 1997; 
Foucault, 1979, 1982; Hajer, 2003; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Richardson, 2002) 
and frame analysis (Goffman, 1974; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Raitio, 2013; 
Rein and Schön, 1996; Schön and Rein, 1994). I have come to choose the latter 
for studying the fine grains of the dynamic and power-laden meaning-making in 
planning practice.  
The main reason for choosing to apply frame analysis instead of discourse 
analysis is due to the links between frame analysis and reflective practice (van 
Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön, 1983; Schön and Rein, 1994; Yanow and 
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Tsoukas, 2009). Working with frame analysis comes with the advantage of 
having a consistent terminology for both the empirical investigations and the 
practice I am aspiring to support. 
Frame analysis has proven to be a valuable methodology for understanding 
policy processes and the actors who inhibit these (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; 
Schön and Rein, 1994). Donald Schön, with his colleague Martin Rein, made 
important contributions to developing frame analysis. There is a link between 
reflective practice (see Section 2.3) and frame analysis, which makes this 
methodology especially suitable for my thesis. Adding to the relevance of frame 
analysis is the work that more recently has been done by others interested in 
reflective practice, to develop frame analysis into a more “dynamic, process-
oriented engagement that is politically nuanced and power-sensitive” (van Hulst 
and Yanow, 2016, p. 93). 
Frame analysis traces back to the early contributions of Bateson (1973) and 
Mead (1934) who were interested in studying meaning-making as an interactive 
process, whereby humans define the situations they confront (van Hulst and 
Yanow, 2016). Following this tradition, Goffman (1974) made an influential 
contribution by conceptualising meaning-making through the concept frame. His 
early work has since been used to develop a heterogeneous set of analytical 
traditions with different ontological groundings and empirical interests, all of 
which are included in the family of approaches to frame analysis. 
It is rather difficult to sort out how alternative approaches to frame analysis 
vary according to assumptions about the nature of frames. Dewulf et. al. (2009)  
have made a helpful distinction. First, there are approaches that are interested 
in frames as cognitive representations located in the individual mind (Neale 
and Bazerman, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Secondly, there are 
approaches which, in contrast, are interested in frames and framing as a way 
to conceptualise interactional meaning-making (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; 
Rein and Schön, 1996).  
In the cognitive approaches, meaning is located “between the ears” of each 
individual and “ultimately depends on their private understandings and 
interpretations of information communicated and processed” (2009, p. 163). In 
contrast, in social constructivist accounts of frames and framing, meaning is 
located “between the noses” and is constructed through interactions. Following 
my social constructivist position, I have chosen to draw on the latter approaches 
to frame analysis. 
Within the approaches focusing on frames as interactively constructed,  I 
have chosen to work with the strand developed within policy analysis (Bacchi, 
2009; van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Raitio, 2008, 2013; Rein and Schön, 1991; 
Rein and Schön, 1996; Schön and Rein, 1994). I have opted to do so since this 
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tradition has been developed to understand frames and framing in the kind of 
practice I am interested in: policy processes (in my terminology, planning 
processes). Additionally, this tradition of frame analysis is suitable due to its 
affiliation with reflective practice.  
The basic metaphor in this analytical tradition is the frame. This metaphor is 
used to signify that there is a less visible foundation “that lies beneath the more 
visible surface of language or behaviour, determining its boundaries and giving 
it coherence.” (Rein and Schön, 1996, p. 88). The metaphor of a frame is 
generative since it allows us to see how people consciously or unconsciously, 
set a boundary within which they are able to focus on what is inside as distinct 
from what is outside. Thus frames select for attention certain features of reality 
and enable people to construct a coherent understanding of them (Raitio, 2013). 
Thus, as Perri (2005, p. 94) explains, frames essentially perform two functions. 
First, frames organize experience; that is to say, they enable people to recognize what 
is going on, they provide boundaries, define what counts as an event or a feature; 
crucially, frames define what counts as relevant for attention and assessment. 
Secondly, they bias for action; that is to say, they represent people’s worlds in ways 
that already call for particular styles of decision or of behavioural response. 
Thereby, frames are often said to include two linked elements: a diagnosis 
element answering the question “what is going on” and an action bias element, 
which answers to the question “what should be done.” (Schön and Rein, 1994). 
I use this distinction in the research because it is analytically useful, even if, 
in human interactions, these two elements are intertwined (van Hulst and 
Yanow, 2016).  
In line with Dewulf (2009) and van Hulst and Yannow (2016), I separate 
frames, distinguishable thought styles and knowledge structures, from framing, 
the situated, dynamic and interactive process through which people make 
meaning of the situations they face. I find the distinction between frames and 
framing effective for my purposes. I will assume that the scholars, policy makers 
and planners, who’s meaning-making I study, engage in framing to understand 
phenomena associated with power, and that when doing so they, consciously or 
unconsciously, draw on shared generic narratives, knowledge structures and 
thought styles embedded in their practice, which usefully can be conceptualised 
as frames.  
Notably, this is a different usage from Dewulf’s typology, since I do not 
assume that using frames instead of framing implies an assumption that these 
are located “between the ears”, which would be a cognitive approach. Instead, I 
use frames to recognise that it is not only interactions in the moment, which 
shape meaning-making, but also distinguishable collective narratives, 
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knowledge structures and thought styles created through historical interactions 
in planning practice (Healey, 1997). 
According to van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 96) policy-focused frame 
analysis in the tradition of Schön and Rein is interested in the work frames and 
framing accomplish by: “(a) highlighting certain features of a situation, (b) 
ignoring or selecting out other features, and (c) binding the highlighted features 
together into a coherent and comprehensible pattern.” Since these situations 
often are far from easy to interpret, planners must rely upon simplification and 
previous experience.  
Thereby: “framing provides a scaffolding for perceiving and articulating 
patterns among [a situation’s] disparate, and perhaps contending, elements” 
(Ibid, pp. 97-98). It is in this way framing enables what Rein and Schön called 
“a normative leap” between what is to what ought to be. van Hulst and Yannow 
(Ibid. p. 98) explain. 
Framing enables actors to understand a situation as being of a certain kind […] and 
they can start to imagine what could or should happen next in light of prior notions 
concerning the ways certain problems can and should be handled. 
In planning studies (Forester, 1999; Richardson, 2005; Throgmorton, 1992) as 
well as in frame analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Rein and Schön, 1996) 
narratives, stories and storytelling are seen as important in frames and framing, 
since these serve to bind together the salient features of a situation. One might 
say that storytelling is a deeply human activity that serves to create order out of 
chaos. As van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 100) tell us, “Stories frame their 
subjects as they narrate them, explicitly naming their features, selecting and 
perhaps categorizing them as well, explaining to an audience what has been 
going on, what is going on, and, often, what needs to be done […].” 
In this manner, strong and generic narratives guide both analysis and action 
in practical situations. In line with this, van Hulst and Yannow (Ibid.) draw 
attention to the work of selecting, naming and categorising that framing does.  
Through all three of these [selecting, naming and categorising], policy actors draw 
disparate elements together in a pattern, selecting some things as relevant or important 
and discarding, backgrounding or ignoring others, occluding other ways of seeing (and 
acting), and thereby silencing them in policy discourse and ensuing action. (van Hulst 
and Yannow, 2016, p. 99) 
Based on this understanding, in the analysis I pay attention to how this work of 
selecting, naming and categorising is done by actors employing generic 
narratives when they frame power relations. It is also this line of thought that 
leads me to pay attention to the stories planners tell about their practices (see 
Section 3.3).  
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In this tradition of frame analysis, and in line with my interpretative 
approach, frames and framing are situated in a specific context. Acknowledging 
this situatedness, I have chosen to locate the empirical investigations in Swedish 
planning policy and practice. I will elaborate on this choice in the coming 
Section 3.3.  
Planning processes can be understood as struggles over meaning (Mouffe, 
2000), where actors drawing on alternative frames compete to shape 
understanding and action. With the language of frames, these struggles are frame 
contests where certain institutions “sponsor” certain frames. In frame analysis it 
is acknowledged how such frame contests are not merely individual endeavours, 
but also take shape through application of alternative “institutional” frames, 
which are linked to the role that different organisations have in a given practice 
(Schön and Rein, 1994). This understanding leads to an empirical interest in the 
different kinds of organisations that operate within planning practice (see 
Section 3.3).  
Frame analysis has been accused of neglecting processes of power by 
favoring individual meaning-making (Carragee and Roefs, 2004; van Hulst and 
Yanow, 2016). Recognising the validity of this critique, I have drawn on the 
work of van Hulst and Yanow (2016), who have taken on the task of theorising 
framing as a political and power-laden activity. By viewing frames as embedded 
in practices and systems of meaning, rather than constructed by autonomous 
individuals, I have taken this critique into account.   
There are different views on the intentionality of framers. In media studies 
and in social movements studies frames are often seen as strategic devices that 
actors use rhetorically to get their message across (Dewulf et al., 2009). Whereas 
in policy analysis, it has been revealed that actors might use certain frames 
rhetorically without being immediately aware of how their behaviour is actually 
shaped by other underlying generic frames (Schön and Rein, 1994). Therefore, 
I recognise that analysing frames will require me to go beneath actors’ texts and 
speech to search for the underlying knowledge structures and thought styles. 
How this is concretely done in the research is explained in Section 3.3. 
As van Hulst and Yannow (Ibid.) show, framing in policy processes has an 
intersubjective aspect, which takes shape through direct and indirect interactions 
between actors. These interactions include talk, gestures and other modes of 
nonverbal communication, as well as non-human elements that are called 
“things” in Reckwitz’s (2002) practice theory. Thus, framing “draw[s] on more, 
or other, than cognitive ways of knowing alone” (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016, 
p. 98). As discussed previously, I have chosen to acknowledge that these other 
ways of knowing exist, but I have not gone in depth with analysing them.  
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A related feature of framing, in my usage, is that the meaning of the situation 
lies not in the acts, events or frames actors supposedly carry in their heads. 
Instead, it arises in the course of actors’ interactions with those acts, events, and 
things. As van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 98) argue, “Grasping framing’s 
dynamism rests on understanding that actors act toward things on the basis of 
the meanings things acquire for them in the course of that sense-making […]”. 
van Hulst and Yannow further explain how it is fruitful to see framing as a 
conversation with the situation. Through this “conversation” actors attribute 
some initial meaning to the situation at hand and look at what happens as a result. 
In this way van Hulst and Yannow (2016, p. 98) see framing as “an interactive 
and iterative process, in which details and generalities inform one another, a 
clearer idea of what is going on develops, and meanings ‘emerge’”. 
Due to my interest in analysing notions of power through frame analysis, I 
will refrain from attempting to capture all the complexities of frames and 
framing discussed in the previous paragraphs. Hence, I do not aspire to analyse 
framing as dynamic and contingent meaning-making. Instead, I focus on 
explicating notions of power embedded in participatory planning through frame 
analysis. This is in line with the aim I have set for this thesis. 
So, frames and framing work by making certain features of a situation salient 
and drawing them together into a coherent narrative. But what is it that framing 
frames? I follow Dewulf et al. (2009) and van Hulst and Yannow (2016) to argue 
that framing in policy processes can frame three kinds of “entities” (which I call 
frame topics): the substantive content of the policy issue, the identities of actors 
in the policy process and the policy process itself.  
When content is framed actors pay attention to the meanings attached to 
agenda items, events or problems in planning processes. Whereas when 
identities are framed the focus is on the meanings about oneself and one’s 
relationships with a counterpart(s). Process frames refer to the interpretations 
that actors assign to the “policy process itself”. In my investigations, I direct 
interest towards how actors frame power in participatory planning, which is 
process framing and how they frame planners’ roles in power relations, which is 
identity framing.  
After having explained my general view of frame analysis, I now discuss 
more specifically how frame analysis is applied in this thesis.    
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3.3 Analysing frames in participatory planning 
3.3.1 Aim and research questions 
Frame analysis is conducted in pursuit of the aim to rethink power in 
participatory planning by developing concepts that can enable reflective 
practice. To reach the aim, I pursue four research questions: 
I. What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and 
rethinking power in participatory planning? 
II. Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?  
III. To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice? 
IV. How can rethinking power in participatory planning provide a set of 
concepts that can enable reflective practice? 
Through the abductive process, I gradually came to develop a research design 
including the five linked research tasks, which were discussed in Section 1.2. 
For the empirical investigations (Tasks 2-4) I developed a tailored version of 
frame analysis, presented and discussed in the following sections.   
3.3.2 The common process for frame analysis 
Following the abductive approach, I gradually distinguished three linked 
investigations into: (i) communicative planning theory, and Swedish 
participatory planning (ii) policy and (iii) practice. I developed and applied a 
tailored version of frame analysis, which I use in all three investigations in 
accordance with the ideal of making the research systematic. Yet, due to the 
differences between the three domains - theory, policy and practice - I have also 
tailored certain parts of the analytical process to fit each investigation. I will first 
discuss the common analytical process and thereafter discuss the specificities of 
investigating theory, policy and practice. 
To generate data, I followed alternative procedures in the three investigations 
(see Section 3.3.3-5). The common steps in the analysis were selecting suitable 
study objects, generating text or analysing already available text. In the analysis 
of the texts, I focused on identifying frames concerned with two topics: i) power 
in participatory planning (process frames) and ii) planners’ roles in power 
relations (identity frames).   
In the analysis, I have paid attention to how the actors are employing process 
and identity frames, which includes two dimensions: i) a diagnosis, which is 
linked to ii) an action bias. To do that I have both analysed the sections of the 
texts where power is explicitly discussed and looked for tacit understandings, 
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which are hidden underneath texts where notions of power are inferred. Further, 
I have paid attention to what is left unspoken about power and planners, i.e. I 
have been attentive to the “silences”.  
The investigations were guided by RQ 2 and 3 (see Section 3.3.1), which 
were broken down into the analytical questions portrayed in Table 2.  
Table 2. Analytical categories and questions in the frame analysis 
Topic Diagnosis Action bias 
Power in participatory planning How are the scholars, policy makers  
and planners diagnosing power in 
participatory planning? 
Which action bias is  
the diagnosis leading to? 
Planners’ roles in power relations How are the scholars, policy makers  
and planners diagnosing planners’  
roles in power relations? 
Which action bias is  
the diagnosis leading to? 
More specifically the analytical process in the three sub studies consists of 
movement back and forth between the following steps in consecutive iterations. 
1. Reading through the selected and generated texts. 
2. Identifying quotes dealing with the two frame topics: power in 
participatory planning and planners’ roles in power relations.  
3. Coding the quotes in Atlas.ti in the categories: diagnosis, action bias and 
frame topic. 
4. Putting all the quotes into a single document structured per framer with all 
quotes divided into the two frame topics. 
5. Analysing the quotes in view of identifying diagnosis and action biases 
regarding the two frame topics. To do that, I searched for the features and 
concepts made salient; analysed the metaphors; elicited the narratives and 
looked for how diagnosis is linked to action bias. Here I used the 
conceptual tools developed in Research Task 1 through the review of the 
power literature (see Chapter 4) to identify alternative notions of power. 
6. Writing up an analysis of each framers’ framing. Here I aimed at being 
descriptive, but also towards identifying puzzles and tensions in the 
treatment of the two frame topics. 
7. Identifying the underlying process and identity frames. This task consisted 
of comparing the framers’ framing and analysing these through the 
conceptual tools developed from review of the power literature (see 
Chapter 4). 
8. Labeled the identified process and identity frames through a short storyline 
and summarised the generic narrative in each frame in the format 
demonstrated in Table 2. 
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9. Presented and discussed the preliminary findings with supervisors, 
planners, other researchers and PhD students.  
10. Presented and discussed the preliminary findings with the policy makers 
and planners within Research Task 3 and 4. 
11. Went back to the proceeding steps to revise the analysis based on the 
feedback. 
It is by going through these 11 steps in consecutive iterations that I have 
conducted the analysis.  
After having described the common analytical process, I now elaborate on 
the specificities of investigating theory, policy and practice.   
3.3.3 Analysing frames in communicative planning theory 
For reasons elaborated upon in Chapter 2, I have chosen to analyse 
communicative planning theory, among the alternative planning theories. I 
subscribe to the view that planning scholars do not merely describe and analyse 
planning practices, they are also engaged in “world making” by suggesting that 
certain ways of making meaning are more useful than others. Therefore, they are 
to be viewed as planning actors, rather than objective observers. Thus, I see the 
analysis of communicative planning theory, not as a conventional literature 
review, but as a frame analysis of scholars’ meaning-making. 
Most of the communicative planning scholars combine their analytical work 
with normative intentions to democratise planning from the bottom up, by 
criticising hierarchical forms of power and advocating for inclusive dialogues. 
This general orientation is employed quite differently by scholars active in 
different contexts. There have also been changes over time in how 
communicative scholars deal with power.  
In order to access process and identity frames within communicative 
planning theory, I have chosen to focus on the work of three influential scholars 
over four decades: John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. I have selected 
these scholars because they are prominent representatives of influential and 
distinct streams within communicative planning theory (see Chapter 2). In order 
to track changes over time, I have decided to analyse the scholars’ publications 
from the 1980s to the present. 
These three scholars are widely recognised as founders of communicative 
planning theories. They have been and are active within different planning 
contexts in Europe (Healey) and the US (Forester and Innes). Pursuing their own 
approaches, they also share a common orientation and have over the years been 
part of a community of scholars who frequently meet and exchange ideas. These 
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three scholars exercise influence over the development of communicative 
planning theory by mentoring younger scholars and are widely cited within 
planning theory and beyond. They share ambitions to be useful for practitioners 
and strive for their research to be practice-oriented. 
I argue that analysing these scholars’ work over four decades will enable me 
to access distinct influential approaches to power in communicative planning 
theories. By making a longitudinal study I additionally claim that I am able to 
trace changes over time in the communicative planning approaches to power. 
Yet, I also recognise that zooming in on these three scholars comes with 
limitations.  
First, it means that I will refrain from conducting in-depth analysis to map 
alternative approaches to power, within communicative planning theories 
beyond the work of the three scholars. However, through the literature review 
presented in Chapter 2, I have drawn the conclusion that the work of Forester, 
Healey and Innes is representative of the most influential streams within 
communicative planning theory. It can thereby be assumed that the chosen focus 
should enable identification of the most influential approaches to power within 
communicative planning.   
Secondly, the three scholars are working in British/European (Healey) and 
US planning contexts (Forester and Innes), which means that I will not go into 
depth with theoretical approaches developed in other contexts (for example 
Sweden, which is the empirical focus of the analysis of planning policy and 
practice). The reason for this choice is simply that the three scholars exercise 
influence over planning discussions across the Western planning systems and 
beyond. Specifically, in Sweden, there are arguably no planning scholars who 
are seen and see themselves as key contributors to communicative planning 
theory. Instead the three studied scholars are often used when participatory 
planning in Sweden is discussed (e.g. Strömgren, 2007; Tunström, 2009; 
Lindholm et al., 2015; Fridlund, 2017; Wiberg, 2018).   
To select publications from the long work of the three productive scholars, I 
identified the most influential work from each, informed by citation index and 
singled out publications where the scholars are explicit about their views of 
power and included work from different time periods. This led to the selection 
of publications listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Analysed publications 
Scholar Publication 
John Forester Forester, J. (1980). Critical Theory and Planning Practice. Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 46 (3), pp. 275–286.  
Forester, J. (1989). Planning in the Face of Power. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Forester, J. (1993). Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical 
Pragmatism. New York: SUNY Press. 
Forester, J. (1999). The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes. 
Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. 
Forester, J. (2009). Dealing with Differences: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes. Oxford/New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Forester, J. (2013). On the theory and practice of critical pragmatism: Deliberative practice and 
creative negotiations. Planning Theory, 12 (1), pp. 5–22.  
Forester, J. (2015). What kind of research might help us become better planners? Planning Theory 
& Practice, 16 (2), pp. 145–148.  
 
Patsy Healey Healey, P. (1992). Planning through Debate: The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory. The 
Town Planning Review, 63 (2), pp. 143–162. 
Healey, P. (1992). A Planner’s Day: Knowledge and Action in Communicative Practice. Journal of 
the American Planning Association, 58 (1), pp. 9–20.  
Healey, P. (1997). Collaborative planning: shaping places in fragmented societies. Planning, 
environment, cities. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan. 
Healey, P. (1999). Deconstructing Communicative Planning Theory: A Reply to Tewdwr-Jones and 
Allmendinger. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 31 (6), pp. 1129–1135.  
Healey, P. (2003). Collaborative Planning in Perspective. Planning Theory, 2 (2), pp. 101–123.  
Healey, P. (2012). Re-enchanting democracy as a mode of governance. Critical Policy Studies, 6 
(1), pp. 19–39.  
 
Judith Innes Innes, J. E. (1995). Planning Theory’s Emerging Paradigm: Communicative Action and Interactive 
Practice. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 14 (3), pp. 183–189 
Innes, J. E. (1998). Information in communicative planning. Journal of the American Planning 
Association; Chicago, 64 (1), pp. 52–63. 
Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A 
framework for evaluating collaborative planning. Journal of the American Planning Association, 
65 (4), pp. 412–423. 
Booher, D. E. and Innes, J. E. (2002). Network Power in Collaborative Planning. Journal of 
Planning Education and Research, 21 (3), pp. 221–236.  
Innes, J. E. (2004). Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics. Planning Theory, 3 (1), pp. 
5–20 
Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2010). Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative 
Rationality for Public Policy. London/New York: Taylor & Francis. 
Innes, J. E. and Booher, D. E. (2015). A turning point for planning theory? Overcoming dividing 
discourses. Planning Theory, 14 (2), pp. 195–213.  
Innes, J. E. (2016). Collaborative rationality for planning practice. The Town Planning Review, 87 
(1), pp. 1–4.  
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3.3.4 Analysing frames in Swedish participatory planning policy 
To access the framing of power in Swedish participatory planning policy, I have 
chosen planning guidance as the study object. Planning guidance documents are 
suitable study objects in view of my interest in explicating notions of power in 
participatory planning policy. Governments and agencies use guidance in their 
attempts to steer the implementation of planning policy to influence planning 
practices in the direction they prefer. Thus, as Cashmore et al. (2015, p. 85) 
argue, “guidance plays a prominent role in contemporary governance”. Given 
my interest in reflective practice, guidance is especially relevant to study as it is 
intended to help planners make sense of the difficulties they face.  
I have chosen to focus the analysis of guidance on the National Board of 
Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) and the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR). These two organisations are arguably 
two of the most important norm-setting organisations for participatory planning 
in Sweden.  
Boverket is the central authority commissioned by the Swedish government 
to review developments within the fields of housing, building and planning. 
Boverket supervises town and country planning in Sweden from legislative, 
procedural and architectural perspectives. The agency carries the responsibility 
to develop Swedish planning processes and instruments, including pointing out 
best practices and providing planning guidance.  
SALAR represents the governmental, professional and employer-related 
interests of Sweden's 290 municipalities and 20 county councils/regions. All 
of Sweden's municipalities, county councils and regions are members of 
SALAR. SALAR has been one of the most influential actors when it comes to 
promoting citizens’ dialogues (medborgardialoger) since the early 2000s. 
Medborgardialoger is one of the key terms used to signify participatory 
planning processes in Sweden. Their work is steered with a special commission 
from SALARs congress, which is comprised of municipal and regional 
politicians from the Swedish parties. SALAR has a division in their 
organisation that is responsible for democracy and co-creation. They work 
intensively in networks with politicians and civil servants, organise training 
programmes, provide web support and produce publications and guidance to 
promote citizen dialogues. 
By selecting SALAR and Boverket, I gained access to two different kinds of 
organisational frames within Swedish planning policy. SALARs work is anchored 
in the Swedish democracy policy and is centred on the need to revitalise 
democracy, which is felt by many Swedish municipalities. Thereby, their framing 
is based on a different kind of logic compared to that of Boverket, which mainly 
upholds the Swedish states’ interests in the planning system. This selection will 
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thereby include two important tensions within the Swedish planning system: that 
between the state and the municipalities and that between the spatial planning 
system’s reliance on the ideas of rational planning and representative democracy 
(Strömgren, 2007) and the democracy policy, which is more inclined to push for 
communicative planning and deliberative democracy. 
Like all choices, these choices will open some possibilities and close others. 
Notably, my selection excludes the guidance offered by consultancy firms and 
academic institutions. Perhaps guidance from these kinds of organisations could 
provide access to innovative and radical process and identity frames, which have 
not yet been taken up in the slower moving norm-setting organisations I have 
chosen to study. However, I do have access to the more radical frames from my 
review of planning theory (Chapter 2), e.g. in the writings about agonistic 
planning (Bond, 2011; Fröberg, 2017; Mouat et al., 2013) and the planning 
thoughts inspired by Foucault’s work (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Richardson, 2002). I 
have also mitigated the risk of missing out on important frames by studying 
notions of power in planning practice (Section 3.3.5 and Chapter 7).   
I have chosen to analyse guidance in written publications. This choice has 
been made since publications have gone through a thorough process of internal, 
and at times external, scrutiny before going to press. This means that the framing 
in these publications can be seen as representing the official position of the 
organisation and thus reflective of its norm-giving function.  
To select among the publications from Boverket and SALAR, I first looked 
into the list of available publications from each organisation and selected those 
I found to be most relevant for my purpose. Thereafter, I have explained the 
purpose of my study to the responsible desk officers at Boverket and SALAR 
and asked if they found my selections sufficient for enabling an analysis of their 
guidance for participatory planning (medborgardialog). After small 
adjustments, this led to the selection of the publications listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Analysed guidance publications 
Publication Purpose 
SKL (2009) 11 tankar om medborgardialog i 
styrning. 
To provide guidance on how to include participatory planning in 
municipal governance. 
SKL (2013) 10 steg för dialog vid konflikter. To provide guidance for the handling of conflictual and complex 
issues through citizens’ dialogues. 
SKL (2019a) Medborgardialog i komplexa frågor: 
erfarenheter från utvecklingsarbete 2015-2018. 
To provide guidance based on lessons learned from recent 
development work sponsored by SALAR. 
SKL (2019b) Medborgardialog i styrning: 
 för ett stärkt demokratiskt samhälle. 
To provide guidance for how municipalities ought to include 
participatory planning in their governance systems. 
Boverket (2018) Boverkets vägledning för 
medborgardialog. 
Web-based guidance for municipalities work with citizens’ 
dialogues within the Swedish national planning framework (PBL). 
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3.3.5 Analysing frames in Swedish participatory planning practice 
In this investigation I am interested in the framing of power in Swedish 
participatory planning practice. I have, due to the focus on planners in this thesis, 
chosen not to include other planning actors such as citizens, politicians, activists 
and developers. This choice limits the scope of the empirical material, but it is a 
choice made purposefully in accordance with the aim of the thesis, with its focus 
on reflective practice. 
Inspired by Forester’s (1999, 2009) method for eliciting practitioners’ 
profiles, I seek to access planners’ understandings of power through interviews 
about an episode of participatory planning in which they have been engaged. I 
have chosen to conduct interviews as it is a useful method for accessing the life 
worlds of practitioners (Kvale, 2007). An additional advantage of using 
interviews for this task, is that the interviews complement the reliance on written 
language in the other two investigations and thereby provide access to another 
kind of study object: spoken language. 
Following Forester (1999, 2009), I have paid attention to the personal 
characteristics of the planner when selecting who to interview. I strive towards 
interviewing planners who are thoughtful, reflective and engaged in their work. 
The reason for this choice is that it can be assumed that these engaged and 
reflective planners have paid attention to power and reflected upon it. Therefore, 
this way of selecting planners provides potential for accessing the notions of 
power, which are embedded in their practice.   
The interview study was done in two phases. In the beginning of the research 
during a scoping phase, I interviewed five planners with the purpose of 
developing the research design by accessing concrete practice stories. These 
stories where used to inform the parallel investigations into participatory 
planning theory and policy.  
In the second phase, I decided to go deeper into one of the stories, since it 
seemed to provide important insights about the framing of power when planning 
is contested. This story puts the consensual notions of power in communicative 
planning theory to a hard test and thereby informs the assessment of the extent 
to which the treatment of power in this theory can enable reflective practice.  
In addition to this “least likely” case, in the second phase I chose to conduct 
an additional interview with a planner with experience with a “most likely” 
participatory planning episode. This was a well-resourced planning episode, 
where stakes were not as high as in the first story. Bringing this second story 
into the research was important, since it can be assumed to show the manner in 
which communicative planning theory might work when the context is 
friendlier. It is these two stories, a conflictual and a harmonious one, which are 
presented and analysed in Chapter 7. I left it to these two planners to decide if 
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they wanted to be anonymous or use their names in the thesis. Both planners 
decided upon the latter.6 The six interviewed planners are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5. Interviewed planners 
Title Organisation Planning process 
Project leader Save the children Sweden Multi-stakeholder collaboration to support youth at risk 
Dialogue strategist Gothenburg municipality Contested location of refugee houses 
Project leader Malmö municipality Place development with gender perspective 
Communication strategist Sollentuna municipality District planning for the area Edsberg in Sollentuna 
City planner Uppsala municipality Development of a park within the district planning of the 
area of Gottsunda in Uppsala 
Consultant Preera School development in the municipality of Upplands Väsby 
Throughout the interview study, I worked iteratively to test different approaches 
to doing the interviews and different sets of questions and ways of asking them. 
Based on these experiences, I gradually developed the following approach to the 
interviews.  
Prior to the interview I made a consent agreement with the respondent. 
Following Kvale (2007), I prepared interview guides (see Appendix 1), with 
themes and example questions prior to the interviews, but I was also flexible and 
open to straying from the interview guide to follow up with unexpected and 
interesting answers from the planners.  
Following Forester (1999, 2009), I decided to let the interviews revolve 
around the planners’ experiences of a specific participatory planning episode. 
These episodes can be seen as “cases”, yet it was not my ambition to go in to 
depth with these. Rather the planners’ stories provided me with access to notions 
of power through the narratives they told.  
Prior to each interview, I selected the case we would talk about with the 
planners. We discussed potential cases and selected one to focus on. The cases 
were recent to make sure that the planner still had a fresh recollection of their 
experiences. Further, the cases had activated power relations and thereby lead 
the planners to narrate. However, as discussed previously, this did not 
necessarily mean that the planner paid explicit attention to the two frame topics 
in the conversations. In order to stimulate rich conversations, it was also of 
importance that the planner was central and engaged in the case we discussed.  
                                                     
6. I interviewed Bernard le Roux (Dialouge Strategist Gothenburg Municipality) twice during 
2016 and once during 2019. I interviewed Henrik Ljungman (City Planner Uppsala Municipality) 
twice during 2018. Their stories are presented and analysed in Chapter 7. 
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I divided the interviews into two themes: (i) the planner’s own narrative of 
the participatory planning episode and (ii) reflections and analysis of the 
episode. These two themes were selected since I found it important to first elicit 
the planners’ narrative and thereafter allow for the planners to analyse their 
experiences, since such reflections might reveal differences in the framing used 
in a reflective conversation compared to narrating. Consequently, during the first 
theme my role was to assist and enable the planners to tell their own stories of 
the selected episode. In this segment I attempted to get access to the planners’ 
own narrative by asking enabling questions and being appreciative.  
In the second theme, I followed Kvale (2007) and switched to a more active 
role, in order to build analysis into the interview. Thus, I used different interview 
approaches, such as asking clarifying questions, suggesting hypotheses and 
interpretations and even confronting and challenging the planner. I clarified the 
meaning of the planners’ story during the interview and attempted to confirm or 
reject my preliminary interpretations by sharing my tentative ideas with the 
planners. Thereby, initiated the analysis and validation of the findings already 
during the interviews. 
The interviews were audio recorded and as part of the analysis I transcribed 
the recordings into written text (the initial interviews were transcribed by a 
research assistant). Transcription is a transformation of the rich communication 
during an interview into written form. As Kvale (2007) tells us, meaning will by 
necessity be lost during this transformation. In order to mitigate the risks 
involved with transcribing interviews, I made the following choices.   
I had a research assistant do the transcripts and compared that with doing the 
transcription myself. My conclusion was that transcription is an important 
interpretative process and therefore I decided to do the transcripts myself. This 
is as Kvale (2007, p. 92) puts it: “Rather than being a simple clerical task, 
transcription is an interpretative process, where the differences between oral 
speech and written texts give rise to a series of practical and principal issues”. 
Transcription involves many small decisions of technical and interpretational 
character. I followed Kvale’s (Ibid.) suggestion and developed a formal 
procedure for the transcriptions to ensure that the transcripts used the same form. 
An important choice was between letting the transcript mimic oral speech, (i.e. 
including hesitation, humming and the like), or letting the transcript take the 
more formal shape of a written text. Here I decided on the latter. The reason was 
that my interest is not directed towards a detailed linguistics conversational 
analysis; rather it is about getting a readable account of the interviews.  
In the second phase of interviewing, I decided to focus upon two stories. 
Following Forester’s (1999, 2009) method for practitioner profiles and frame 
analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön and Rein, 1994) I chose to elicit a 
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condensed narrative from the transcripts of these two interviews (presented in 
Chapter 7).  
From the two selected interviews, I developed a narrative for each in written 
form, which allowed for a continued conversation with the planner to analyse the 
underlying frames. In order to get as close as possible to the planners’ under-
standings, I elicited the planners’ own narratives of their practice experiences. 
Previous planning studies have demonstrated the value of  taking planners’ 
narratives as the starting point for analysis (Bornemark, 2016; Forester, 1999; 
Fridlund, 2017; Lindholm et al., 2015; Richardson, 2005; Wiberg, 2018).  
Inspired by Forester’s work (1999, 2009), I aimed to elicit narratives, which 
as accurately as possible mirrored the planners’ recollections. This meant that 
I mostly used the planners’ own words and refrained from including my own 
analysis. The output from this step is the two practice stories presented in 
Chapter 7.  
The narratives then served as the textual basis for the continued analysis, 
which included follow-up interviews with the two planners. First, I shared the 
draft written stories with the planners and asked them to read through and 
suggest changes if they like.7 After that step, I applied the analytical process 
described in Section 3.3.2 to make a tentative interpretation. I then presented and 
discussed my tentative interpretation with the planners and asked if they could 
recognise their own framing and the underlying frames. After feedback from the 
planners, I went back to another analytical iteration following the common 
procedure for frame analysis described earlier. 
After discussing the frame analysis methodology in this chapter, I will now, 
in the following Chapter 4, report on the review of power theory, which informs 
the rethinking of power in participatory planning.  
  
                                                     
7. Notably, the stories at this stage were written in Swedish, whereas in the versions in Chapter 
7, the stories are translated into English. 
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If a singular view of power is held on to, debates tend to be zero-sum. In place of this 
zero-sum situation, I propose that power consists of a cluster of concepts, each of 
which qualifies as ‘power’. Following Wittgenstein, I argue that power is a family 
resemblance concept, which entails that there is no single ‘best’ definition of power. 
(Haugaard, 2010a, p. 420) 
The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing 
concepts that can enable reflective practice. In the previous chapters, I have 
demonstrated that this aim is warranted due to the fragmented and reductive 
treatment of power in participatory planning theory (Chapter 2) and explained 
the thesis’ methodology (Chapter 3). I will in this chapter answer Research 
Question 1: What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching 
and rethinking power in participatory planning?  
I answer the question through a review of the power literature. I thereby tap 
into the rich repository of conceptual tools and explain how these can be used to 
research and rethink power in participatory planning.  
My engagement with the power literature has taken shape abductively over 
the course of the research process. I have moved back and forth between reading 
literature and investigating notions of power in planning theory and Swedish 
planning policy and practice. The argument I thereby developed, unfolds as 
follows.   
In the first section, I draw on Haugaard (2010a) and Wittgenstein (1967), and 
decide to treat power as a family resemblance concept. This means that power is 
not seen as a single entity, but as a cluster of concepts, which are related to the 
reproduction of social order. This view of power makes it possible to conceptualise 
alternative notions of power, as members of the same family of concepts.  
In the next section, I employ this plural view of power to develop a family of 
power concepts, which carry potential to enable reflective participatory planning 
practice. The power family is intended to be tested in the empirical investigations 
4 A plural view of power 
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(Chapters 5-7) and then validated as a basis for rethinking power (Chapter 8). At 
the end of the section, after reviewing the most influential contributors to the 
power literature, I assemble a family of four power concepts: power to, power 
with, illegitimate power over and legitimate power over.  
4.1 Power: a family resemblance concept 
Power is one of the most central and contested concepts in social science and 
praxis (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). While many agree about the importance of 
power, there is controversy about how to define it, how to study it and how to 
normatively appraise it (Lukes, 2005). In the planning literature, as well as in 
the more specific power literature, debates about these kinds of questions tend 
to be zero-sum. Scholars compete about the best way to define and study power. 
This leads to entangled debates, where it is difficult to relate alternative notions 
by clarifying differences and similarities. To disentangle the treatment of power 
in participatory planning a plural view of power is preferable since it can lead to 
a broader and more complex understanding, which is conducive to reflective 
practice. To view power as a single entity can actually lead to unreflective 
practice, since it might prevent critical reflections on presumed notions of power.  
In order to operationalise a plural view of power, I follow Haugaard (2010a) 
and suggest that power is the kind of concept that Wittgenstein (1967) coined as 
family resemblance concepts. This means that the concept power covers an 
ambiguous set of different but related concepts associated with the reproduction 
of social order. In this section I elaborate on why I have chosen this way of 
defining power. 
4.1.1 A brief genealogy of power  
Let us first acknowledge, through the work of Clegg and Haugaard (2009), the 
richness and diversity of alternative approaches to power, and thereby 
demonstrate the value of a plural rather than a singular view of power. Clegg 
and Haugaard (Ibid.) explain that already the Ancient Athenians were interested 
in political power. At that time legitimate and illegitimate power were 
distinguished through the contrast between power that followed the dictates of 
the law (nomos) and power that exalted in the glorification of an individual 
(hubris). Thereby, a line of inquiry concerned with the normative appraisal of 
power was opened, which is still relevant for contemporary planning practice 
where ethical situated judgements are made between better and worse options 
(Campbell, 2002). 
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In the medieval period, Machiavelli (1903) took the power canon further. 
While he did not dwell on legitimacy he was concerned with explaining how 
a prince could rule, (i.e. maintain social order), through cunning manipulation. 
His account revolves around power as domination with a special interest in 
how the successful prince manages society through strategic action. Here 
power is exercised over others and society is constituted through the 
domination of the weak by the strong (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009). Even if the 
prince wielded his power in a manner that was far from democratic, 
Machiavelli’s emphasis on the strategic use of power still tells us something 
important about conflictual power and also contemporary participatory 
planning episodes. 
In contrast Thomas Hobbes’ (1981) influential work on the Leviathan, in the 
year of 1651, provides an image of how power flows from society to the 
individual. Hobbes argues that society must be ruled by absolute sovereignity, 
less the “egoistic nature of man” would result in civil war. Hobbes saw the 
legitimacy of sovereign power as a presupposition of common wealth (Clegg 
and Haugaard, 2009). In modern democracies we no longer think of society as a 
Leviathan and do not accept sovereigns. Yet, the democratic state and its 
planning system must be capable of exercising the kind of coercive power, which 
Hobbes found necessary to avoid civil war (Mansbridge, 2012).  
For Nietzsche (2011), power was the ability to define reality. He showed that 
if you can define what is seen as real and what is seen as moral then you create 
the conditions for legitimacy. In the work of Nietzsche, Machiavelli’s and 
Hobbes’ interest in the cruder forms of power are replaced by a focus on the 
more sophisticated and less visible aspects of power (Clegg and Haugaard, 
2009). This is the kind of power, which is central to democratic societies and 
democratic practices, such as planning; power that we are often not aware of, 
but structures social relations and thereby provides the predictability needed to 
make planning, as coordinated action, possible.  
According to Clegg and Haugaard (Ibid.), in the post-World War II 
discussions about power, the consensual view of power, pursued by Hannah 
Arendt (1970), Talcott Parsons (1963) and Barry Barnes (1988) among others, 
constituted an influential strand of the power literature. These scholars saw 
power as the opposite of coercion and as a prerequisite for agency and society. 
This kind of consensual power is the form of power that many planners would 
like to see arising from participatory planning processes.  
Simultaneously, the Hobbesian notion of power as domination was 
reformulated by many, including Robert Dahl (1957), Peter Bachrach, Morton 
Baratz (1962) and Steven Lukes (1974). In contrast, Michel Foucault (1979, 1982) 
took the Nietzschean view of power as systemic and constitutive of reality further. 
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Both the agent-specific and the systemic understandings of power are necessary in 
a tool box for researching and rethinking power in participatory planning.  
4.1.2 Why does it matter what kind of concept power is? 
From the brief genealogy of power, it is evident that there is no consensus on 
how to define and study power. The differences matter, since the ways in which 
scholars and practitioners think about power influences what they can explain 
and what actions they take. How we think about power might have very real 
consequences for power relations in participatory planning.  
[…] how we think of power may serve to reproduce and reinforce power structures 
and relations, or alternatively it may challenge and subvert them. […] To the extent 
that this is so, conceptual and methodological questions are inescapably political. 
(Lukes, 2005, p. 63) 
How do we then think about power? Which notions of power are we focusing 
our gaze on? The most common way to approach power is to equate it with 
domination (Haugaard, 2015). This is the way that power is most often defined 
in theory as well as used in everyday speech. Power is then seen as carrying an 
essential meaning, which signifies social relations where powerful actors get it 
their way in an unfair fashion. This is also largely how power is approached in 
communicative planning theory (see Chapter 2). 
Steven Lukes (1974, 2005) is one of the most prominent representatives of 
the view of power as domination. He argues that power is an “essentially 
contested” concept in the sense that “reasonable people, who disagree morally 
and politically, may agree about the facts but disagree about where power lies” 
(2005, p. 64). This view of power leads Lukes to argue that his radical definition 
of power as domination is superior to other ways of defining power (Haugaard, 
2010a). According to Lukes, a definition of power must include the hidden 
aspects of power, and must allow for agency since this provides possibilities to 
attribute responsibility to actors (Lukes, 2005). 
Lukes is surely right in emphasising the hidden aspects of power and the need 
for attributing responsibility. These are crucial aspects of power, not least in 
participatory planning. Yet, his claim that his definition of power is better than 
the rest (Haugaard, 2010a) suggests the kind of singular view of power that I 
have chosen to move away from. Thinking that we have, or in the future might 
find, a single best way to define power does not fit with the aim of this thesis. 
Given the multiple ways in which power is operating in planning processes, I 
find a singular view of power too reductionist, in view of my interest in enabling 
reflective practice.  
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Instead, I concur with Haugaard’s claim that power is not a single entity, 
rather it represents a cluster of related concepts, each of which might validly 
represent power (Clegg and Haugaard, 2009; Haugaard, 2010a). The advantage 
with this plural view of power is that the zero-sum debates about the best 
definition of power can be replaced by plus-sum reflections, where we gradually 
refine our understanding of the linked empirical phenomena related to social 
order. I thereby find that a plural view of power is useful for researching and 
rethinking notions of power in participatory planning. 
4.1.3 What is a family resemblance view of power? 
To operationalise a plural view of power, I follow Haugaard’s (2010a) develop-
ment of Wittgenstein’s (1967) work on family resemblance concepts. As 
Haugaard (Ibid.) explains, Wittgenstein argued that concepts, which could be 
thought to be connected by one essential common feature, may in fact be 
connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common 
to all.  
The word “game”, was the example Wittgenstein (1967) used to explain this 
idea. To make his point, he discussed common features that all the usages of the 
word “game” might include. He concluded that it is impossible to identify any 
common features. For example, he said that winning and losing could perhaps 
be a common feature to all usages of game. Although, this is not the case, since 
what a solitary kid is doing when bouncing a ball towards a wall could validly 
be called a game, without involving winning and losing. Thus, the word game is 
like the members of a family in which there are many overlapping characteristics 
without a single one being common to all: Maria has her father’s mouth and her 
mother’s eyes, while her brother has his father’s hair and mother’s temper and 
so on (cf. Haugaard, 2010a and Wittgenstein, 1967).    
In line with this definition, power in this thesis is treated as a family resem-
blance concept. This means that power concepts might signify different empirical 
phenomena, all of which are related to the reproduction of social order, but not 
necessarily united by one common feature. Thus, I see power as consisting of a 
cluster of concepts, each of which might accurately qualify as “power”.  
Following Haugaard (2010a), this means that power can be represented 
through alternative concepts, all of which might be valid as members of the same 
family. This includes the Athenian and Habermasian interests in power and 
legitimacy, the Machiavellian focus on leaders’ power to rule through strategic 
action, the Nietzschean and Foucauldian emphasis on power as constitutive of 
social reality, the enabling and concerted power à la Arendt, as well as the 
Hobbesian emphasis on coercive power as a precondition for peace. Hence, a 
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family resemblance view of power is a useful basis for researching and 
rethinking power in participatory planning.  
Importantly, a family resemblance view of power does not entail a relativistic 
position, in which any definition of power is as good as the other. Instead, I agree 
with Haugaard’s (2010a) assertion that criteria can and ought to be established 
for separating better from worst usages of the concept. Applying a pragmatic 
approach, I suggest that usages of concepts can be evaluated according to how 
well they fulfill their purposes. This means that I see alternative concepts of 
power as conceptual tools intended to help us fulfil certain purposes.  
Viewing concepts as a set of conceptual tools entails that one moves away from any 
kind of reified views of essences, which usually entail evaluative judgements 
concerning correct and incorrect usages. If a certain usage enables the social scientist 
to explain complex ideas well, then that is all that matters. (Haugaard, 2010a, p. 427) 
I concur with Haugaard’s pragmatist position, even if my purpose is different 
from his. My task is to enable reflective practice. Hence, if concepts of power 
support critical reflection on routinised ways of understanding and enable 
situated judgements, this is what matters to me.  
4.2 Developing a family of power concepts 
After having decided to treat power as a family resemblance concept, I now 
develop a family of power concepts intended to be used to research and rethink 
power in participatory planning. At the end of this section the power family will 
include power to, power with, illegitimate power over and legitimate power 
over. These concepts have been selected and connected in a family since they 
carry the potential to: i) explicate the basic notions (constitutive, consensual and 
conflictual) of power in participatory planning; ii) to explain power empirically 
and appraise power normatively and iii) relate different notions of power in a 
manner that enables reflective practice.8 By fulfilling these criteria the power 
family is suitable for the tasks to first research notions of power in participatory 
planning and then provide a basis for rethinking power in the same practice. 
The following four subsections provide an elaborated discussion and 
definition of each of the four power concepts and relate them as members of the 
same family of concepts. Since, illegitimate power over signifies the most 
established notion of power in everyday language, as well as in planning, it is to 
this member we turn first.   
                                                     
8. For an elaborated discussion of these three criteria see Chapter 2. 
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4.2.1 Illegitimate power over  
Power is most often seen as reprehensible domination, through which powerful 
actors get their way through undesirable means. As I have already argued, to 
exclusively define power as equated with domination, as an evil, would not 
suffice for enabling reflective practice. Instead, I follow the family resemblance 
view and explicate this notion of power as one of the members of the power 
family, which I coin as illegitimate power over. According to Giddens (1984), 
this notion of power, which is zero-sum (one actor’s loss is another actor’s gain) 
and conflictual, underlies virtually all major traditions of Western social and 
political theory. 
In participatory planning the family member illegitimate power over is needed 
because of the potential it provides for reflections on the kind of power that works 
to deceive and dominate through participatory processes (i.e. for normative 
appraisal). For this task the power literature provides rich conceptual tools for 
planners to scrutinise powerful actors’ behaviour, as well as for engaging in self-
reflection over their own exercises of power. Importantly, the work on illegitimate 
power over also provides conceptual tools to unmask the hidden and less agent-
specific power processes, which enable some planning actors to grow strong and 
manipulate others by subtly setting the agenda or by securing consent for 
domination through making desires and realities (Lukes, 1974, 2005).    
The famous debates about the faces of power provide a window into how this 
family member has been dealt with in the power literature. The key issue in this 
debate was to identify and describe the different dimensions, or faces, of power. 
Robert Dahl (1957) opened up this debate in the 1950s when he set out to define 
power more clearly. He did that by developing a nuanced vocabulary of power 
revolving around power as the ability of actor A to prevail over actor B, by 
making B do something which B would not otherwise have done. This has later 
been coined as the first dimension, or face, of power. In this dimension power is 
observable and exercised directly between actors. 
As a critique towards Dahl´s definition, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
introduced another dimension, the second face of power. Here, the strong actor 
A devotes their energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and 
institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration, only of those issues that are comparatively harmless to A 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Normatively, this can be seen as domination or as 
reprehensible illegitimate power, if the institutions cannot be generalised to 
include the perspective of B and, as a consequence, B becomes a means to A’s 
ends (Haugaard, 2012). Starting to explore two-dimensional power broadened 
the discussions and allowed for including more subtle forms of power over and 
also started to challenge the agent-specific view of power. 
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Lukes (1974), broadens the inquiry into illegitimate power over even further 
by introducing yet another dimension, the third face of power. He argues that the 
third face of power is often even more difficult to spot than the second face. He 
claims that power frequently works through false consciousness, which makes 
subordinates consent to power relations that are not in their interest. Lukes’ (1974) 
argument is that it is useful to think about power broadly and to pay attention to 
those aspects of power that are least accessible to observation. As he explains, 
A may exercise power over B by getting him (sic) to do what he does not want to do, 
but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very 
wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have 
the desires you want them to have - that is, secure their compliance by controlling their 
thoughts and desires? (p. 23) 
Lukes sees how power over works to impose internal constraints, and explains 
how those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaptation 
to domination, by either coercive or non-coercive means (Haugaard, 2012). 
Lukes has been criticised on several points: for holding on to an agent-specific 
view of power; for using false consciousness in an elitist way and for his reliance 
on a realist view of interests (Haugaard, 2010b). Yet in my view, his third 
dimension of power still usefully signifies the important power process, whereby 
certain assumed norms make some planning actors emerge big and strong. The 
kind of deeper normative critical analysis, enabled by the work on three-
dimensional power, provides a backbone for the thinking of a reflective planner. 
In combination with the work on one- and two-dimensional power it provides 
planners with rich conceptual tools for understanding processes of power over. 
I define illegitimate power over as an exercise of power through which actors 
get other actors to do what they would otherwise not have done, in a manner 
which is seen as unacceptable. I thereby take a view of legitimacy as contested 
and situated in a specific context (Campbell, 2006; Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio 
and Harkki, 2014). In this view it becomes apparent that the same empirical 
process of power over might be seen as legitimate or illegitimate by different 
actors. It is therefore the formulation “which is seen” is included in the definition 
of illegitimate power over. 
Even if the three dimensions of power provide useful food for planning thought 
and action, the manner in which these conflate power with domination is 
problematic. To merely define power over as illegitimate is a common mistake in 
both the planning and power literature (Friedmann, 1998; Haugaard, 2010a). It is 
this way of thinking about power that might lead to attempts to escape from power 
over, even if such an escape does not exist in contested planning processes. Hence 
my power family also includes a notion of power over as acceptable, which I 
explain as the concept legitimate power over (see Section 4.2.4). 
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4.2.2 Power to 
Besides the predominant view of power as conflictual domination, illegitimate 
power over, other scholars have theorised power as an outcome of social order, 
which cannot be reduced to domination (Arendt, 1970; Barnes, 1988; Haugaard, 
1997; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963). In this view, power is understood as the 
ability to act derived from social order. These notions of power, are in my family 
expounded as the concept power to.   
Power to is included in the power family since notions of power as 
constitutive of society are needed for reflective practice. Planners need to grasp 
how their practice requires “a particular order of things and the settling down of 
governing into subtle, day-to-day, taken for granted reproduction of power 
relations by disciplined subjects” (Richardson and Cashmore, 2011, p. 107). 
Understanding the established order, which is to empirically explain power, is a 
necessary basis for making normative judgements about accepting or attempting 
to change this order (Haugaard, 2003).   
The creation of power has been approached in a multitude of ways in the power 
literature. In order to access and make commensurable some of the more 
influential and relevant contributions, I draw on Haugaard’s work (2003). I thereby 
follow in the footsteps of other planning scholars who have demonstrated how 
useful Haugaard’s theory is to understand power to in planning (Richardson and 
Cashmore, 2011).  
Haugaard’s starting point for theorisation is that power, in a basic sense, is 
the ability to act, the power to. The premise for many scholars in the power 
literature is the idea that a society gives actors power to through the production 
of social order (Arendt, 1970; Barnes, 1988; Giddens, 1984; Luhmann, 1979; 
Parsons, 1963). For if social life were entirely contingent, if there was no social 
order, social power would not exist. Social order renders actors’ behaviour 
predictable and hence both constrains and enables their actions.  
Haugaard (2003) has outlined a theory of power creation, which renders 
commensurable several different accounts of how power to is derived from 
social order. In general terms he posits that power is an ability to do something, 
which actors can derive from two sources: nature and society. Basically, natural 
power comes from the body and from humans’ ability to harness resources from 
nature. According to Haugaard (2003, p. 89) “If one individual treats another as 
a physical object, through violence, the source of power is nature (biceps or 
explosives) and, as a consequence, the power can be regarded as natural”. In its 
raw form, violence only creates two forms of predictability: mutilation and 
death. However, in most complex societies, violence is blended with social 
power and then we get the kind of power that is covered by legitimate or 
illegitimate power over in my power family. In a relationship were power is 
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created in this form, the less powerful actors are unwilling to accept social order, 
which releases threats or incentives used to induce them to do so (Ibid.).  
However, Haugaard confirms Arendt’s (1970) observation that a state that 
has to resort to violence frequently is actually quite weak. This is because 
conflictual power is costly, both for the powerful and for the less powerful.  
[…] physical power is not the ultimate form of power. Quite the contrary, its use 
represents the failure of social power. Once the Sovereign has to draw their sword it 
is because the Leviathan has failed to create social power. In a well-functioning 
Leviathan, this is a relatively infrequent occurrence compared with routine 
compliance. (Haugaard, 2003, p. 108) 
According to Haugaard, in modern societies the subtler forms of power, linked 
to the production of social order, “outstrip the quantity of power attributable to 
the sword” (Ibid.).  
The image of Hobbes’ Leviathan wielding the sword is replaced by a more complex 
vision of actors reproducing social order which constrains and is responsible for 
relations of power and powerlessness, but also facilitates by conferring upon actors a 
capacity for social action which enables them to make things happen which would not 
otherwise occur. (Haugaard, 2003, p. 88) 
The ability to act, power to, is created through a range of socialisation mechanisms, 
which reproduce social order. To further explain the notions of power covered 
within the concept power to, I have, in Table 6, summarised and adjusted 
Haugaard’s synthesis of how power scholars have theorised the mechanisms 
associated with the reproduction of social order. The table briefly explains how 
power to is created through shared meaning (Barnes, 1988; Giddens, 1984; 
Haugaard, 1997; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963), system bias (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962), systems of thought (Foucault, 1979), tacit knowledge (Lukes, 
1974), reification (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1979), discipline (Foucault, 1979) and 
coercion (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974).  
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Table 6. How power to is created (adjusted from Haugaard, 2003 and Richardson and Cashmore, 2011) 
Forms of power creation Description 
Power to created through shared 
meaning 
Societal structures provide shared meaning, which renders people’s actions 
predictable and thereby provides them with the ability to act.  
Power to created by system bias Certain actions are excluded as not being meaningful and thereby actors are 
empowered and disempowered to act. 
Power to created by tacit 
knowledge 
Powerful actors are provided with power to due to their positions being taken 
for granted. Less powerful actors are empowered when they become aware 
of how tacit knowledge underpins an arbitrary social order, which is to their 
disadvantage. 
Power to created by systems of 
thought 
Shared systems of thought render actions commensurable or 
incommensurable with actors’ tacit knowledge and thereby enable and 
constrain their actions. 
Power to created by reification Social order appears non-arbitrary due to tradition or religious and scientific 
truths, which provide certain actors with power and others less so. 
Power to created by discipline The internalisation of routines leads to predictable behaviour by blocking 
actors from reflecting on the legitimacy of social order. Thereby some actors 
are provided with power and others less so. 
Power to created by coercion Some actors resist social order and other actors restore it by exercising 
power over based on a mix of social incentives, threats and physical force in 
order to get the actors who resist into compliance. 
The forms of creation of power to in the table include several of the socialisation 
mechanisms, which power scholars have pointed to as key for reproducing social 
order. The first six forms all work to create power to through routinised 
behaviour and consensus on meaning. Whereas the seventh form, coercion, 
includes open conflict and resistance.  
Drawing on the work of Haugaard (2003; drawing on Clegg 1989) I define 
power to as a dispositional ability to act derived from social order (cf. Morriss, 
2002). This ability enables some actors to, episodically, exercise power over 
others and also provides the social predictability needed for actors to, in other 
episodes, act in concert towards shared objectives, power with (the family 
member described in the next section). Thereby illegitimate  and legitimate 
power over (Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.4) as well as power with are in my family 
seen as subsets of power to (cf. Haugaard in Clegg et al., 2014).  
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4.2.3 Power with 
In contrast to the conflictual zero-sum view of power in everyday language, 
advocates of participatory planning often prefer consensual notions of plus-sum 
relationships. These are, for example, expressed in the Habermasian desire to 
replace or complement hierarchical power relations with dialogues in 
participatory planning. Most often such notions are not explicated in a language 
of power. For my purposes, I chose to explain these notions as the concept power 
with, which I define as exercises of power where actors engage in concerted 
action towards shared goals. Notably, power with is present when the 
reproduction of social order works, when the routinised assumptions of power 
relations are accepted by actors. 
 In the power literature, Hannah Arendt is seen as a prominent contributor to 
the notion of power as consensual plus-sum, as  “the human ability not just to act 
but to act in concert” (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). Other feminist scholars, such as Amy 
Allen (1998, 2008), continue to develop this broader view of the exercise of power 
beyond domination. The key interest among these scholars is in collective power, 
which enables concerted action and the achievement of shared goals. 
The difference between an understanding of power as zero-sum power over 
and as plus-sum power with is clearly demonstrated in the work of Talcott 
Parsons (1963) and Niklas Luhmann (1979). Parsons observed that, power, like 
wealth, is not necessarily zero-sum. For Parsons power, like money, is a 
circulating medium by which obligations are exchanged within the political 
system (Göhler, 2009). Through this medium the possibility of concerted action 
is created and increased. Thereby Parsons (Ibid., p. 108) saw power as “the 
generalised medium of mobilising resources for effective collective action.” 
Parsons’ view is overwhelmingly positive: power is creative, it accomplishes 
acts and it changes the nature of things and relations (Clegg et al., 2006). 
Adding to the view of power as power with is the work of Luhmann (1975; 
2000). For Luhmann, power is a symbolically generalised medium of 
communication. As Göhler (2009) explains, via the medium of power, credit is 
given and performance is anticipated: the high performance expected of leaders 
by those being governed demands an “investment” in the form of increased 
support. The result is a joint increase in power, power with.  
For many scholars in this camp of the power literature, power is equated with 
empowerment. For example, for Arendt (1970, p. 56) power is the opposite of 
violence and coercion.  
[…] politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the 
same. Power and violence are opposites: where one rules absolutely the other is absent. 
Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course ends in power’s 
disappearance. 
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 Following Arendt’s line of thought, “power with scholars”, often tacitly 
distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate power by contrasting consensual 
power (seen as legitimate power) with conflictual power (assessed as illegitimate 
power). Such notions of power resemble the predominate views of power in 
communicative planning theory à la Habermas’ (1985) ideas of replacing power 
distortions with communicative rationality.  
This thought figure, to contrast power with to power over and deem the latter 
illegitimate, might be valid in certain situations in participatory planning. 
However, in other situations, it will not be sufficient for planners to merely 
assume that power over is illegitimate and strive to replace it with legitimate 
power with. In these episodes, reflective practice requires access to notions of 
power as legitimate in spite of lack of consent. These notions are in my power 
family deemed as the fourth member: legitimate power over. 
4.2.4 Legitimate power over  
The notion of conflictual power as legitimate is rarely present in planning theory. 
It is mainly residing in the criticised ideas of rational planning. Yet, planning 
cannot do without the kind of power over that is needed to democratically settle 
disputes in and through planning, unless we are to give up altogether on the ideas 
of representative democracy and hierarchical organisations, such as munici-
palities with their planning offices.  
Hence, we cannot in the contemporary understanding of democracy, imagine 
a practice such as planning, without a notion of acceptable conflictual power. In 
the power family I clarify this notion of power as legitimate power over. This 
concept covers the same empirical processʊthe process by which actors get 
other actors to do what they would otherwise not have doneʊas signified by the 
concept illegitimate power over. The difference between these siblings is in the 
manner in which the empirical process is normatively appraised.   
Why then is legitimate power over needed to enable reflective practice? It is 
because it will not suffice to merely think about legitimate power as consensual 
power with. Participatory planning, as with all democratic practices (Mansbridge, 
2012, p. 1), requires a concept of legitimate conflictual power. 
[…] solving collective action problems […] requires coercion – getting people to do 
what they else would not otherwise do through threat of sanction and the use of force. 
The work of democracy is to make that coercion somewhat more legitimate.  
In line with Mansbridge’s thinking, it is evident that planners need a concept of 
legitimate power over both for assessing process and outcome legitimacy. As we 
learn from legitimacy theory, process legitimacy is concerned with the 
procedures through which participatory planning is performed and outcome 
 80 
legitimacy reffers to the problem solving capacity of such procedures (cf. 
Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and Harkki, 2014; Scharpf, 1999).  
Regarding process legitimacy, participatory planning will, in certain 
episodes, include the exercise of power over by planners and other planning 
actors. It might well be that these episodes are deemed as instances of 
illegitimate power over, but it is equally possible to imagine reasons for deeming 
such exercises of power over as acceptable. For example, planners might want 
to include marginalised actors in the participatory process, even when other 
actors would not like to. Regarding outcome legitimacy, planning decisions that 
are seen to be in the advantage of weaker actors might well be assessed as 
legitimate, even if such decisions require the exercise of power by elected 
officials and/or planners over well-off actors who might resist such outcomes. 
But how can illegitimate power over be separated from legitimate power over? 
This is a very difficult question due to the contested nature of conflictual power. 
According to Haugaard (2012), most of the influential contributors to the power 
literature (e.g. Dahl, 1957; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974, 2005; 
Foucault, 1979) leave us without an answer to this question. These contributors 
have not, for various, more or less explicit reasons, seen their task as theorising 
legitimate power over. Instead they have mainly focused on critiquing power over 
as illegitimate domination. For example, as summarised in Section 4.2.1, the 
famous debate about the faces of power was all about understanding illegitimate 
power over. But, I follow Haugaard and posit that conceptualising legitimate 
power over is necessary. 
If, as observed by Foucault, there is no escape from power, then we need a set of 
criteria for distinguishing desirable from undesirable power – a task which neither 
Foucault, nor most of the other protagonists in the power debate, has adequately 
equipped us for. (Haugaard, 2010b, p. 52) 
When is power over legitimate? To provide a window into how this question can 
be reflected upon, I turn to Haugaard’s (2012, 2015) rethinking of power over 
as a dual process, which can constitute domination (illegitimate power over) and 
empowerment (legitimate power over). The focus on Haugaard’s work is not 
because I assume that his theorisation of legitimate power over is always valid 
or the universally best option for reflective planning practice. Instead I have 
chosen to engage with this piece of work, since it provides a somewhat novel, 
and in my view, promising way of thinking about power over in participatory 
planning. Empirically, Haugaard mainly uses examples from representative 
democracy and the power literature. In this section, I will not do more than 
provide some hypothetical reasoning for translating Haugaard’s thinking to 
participatory planning. This choice is justified since Chapters 5-8 will elaborate 
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on the extent to which Haugaard’s rethinking can be modified to fit into a 
broader rethinking of power in participatory planning.  
Haugaard’s rethinking of power over is premised upon the assumption that: 
“[…] power over constitutes a duality whereby the very same process, which 
leads to domination also constitutes the conditions of possibility for democracy, 
and thus is normatively desirable” (Haugaard, 2015, p. 147). 
In spelling out his rethinking of power over, Haugaard (2012, 2015), in line with 
legitimacy theory (Beetham, 1991; Bernstein, 2004), separates sociological 
legitimacy from normative legitimacy. The former marks an interest in the way that 
actors in a particular context assess the desirability of power relations. In contrast, 
the latter is about the assessment from the observing scientist, who employs certain 
criteria for separating legitimate from illegitimate power. Haugaard strives to move 
from sociological analysis of legitimacy towards normative assessment of 
legitimacy and to clearly separate the two in his analysis. 
Haugaard (2012) chose to structure his rethinking around the three dimen-
sions of power over in the original power debates (see Section 4.2.1) and add a 
fourth dimension based on the work of Foucault (Dahl, 1957; Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1982). In the following, I will only discuss 
Haugaard’s work on the three original dimensions, since the level of sophisti-
cation offered by introducing a fourth dimension is not needed for my intention 
to demonstrate the manner in which Haugaard’s rethinking might be useful in 
participatory planning. 
Haugaard starts with rethinking the first dimension of power, where power is 
understood as the direct ability of actor A to get actor B to do what A wants 
(Dahl, 1957). Here, Haugaard challenges the mainstream idea that one-
dimensional power over by necessity constitutes domination. He claims that this 
idea needs to be modified since “in complex democratic political systems, 
routine power over is not reducible to domination or coercion, as is frequently 
assumed” (Haugaard, 2012, p. 36).  
To explain, Haugaard uses the distinction between zero-sum and plus-sum 
power. Zero-sum power is power in which one party gains at the expense of the 
other. Plus-sum power is power in which the power of both is expanded. 
Haugaard asserts that power over might sociologically be viewed as legitimate 
if A’s short-term zero-sum power over B in the long run can be turned into plus-
sum power also for B. Haugaard (2012, p. 37) exemplifies by referring to the 
democratic process. 
[…] in a structured democratic contest A’s gain is not B’s loss in the long-term. In the 
short-term B has sacrificed a goal. However, as a largely unintended consequence of 
this interaction, structures have been reproduced which give B a chance to prevail over 
A at some future date. Hence, A’s gain is not entirely B’s loss. If B is a democrat, 
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through compliance he/she has gained the benefits of reproducing certain structures 
that he/she endorses.  
Thus, Haugaard distinguishes intermittent exercises of power that are effective 
due to the reproduction of social structures, from those which do not depend 
upon such structures. The key to sociologically legitimate one-dimensional 
power over is thus that structures that B feels they can benefit from later on, is 
produced or reproduced through an episodic power relation. If structures that are 
beneficial to all are (re)produced, it might in the long run result in the 
transformation of zero-sum power into plus-sum power. 
In a generic sense, this reasoning might be transferable to participatory 
planning. For example, even if planning actor B loses an episode of participatory 
planning to actor A, it might still be in B’s interest to comply if B finds that a 
fair planning process is thereby reproduced and will be available for repeat play. 
A caveat is that participatory planning episodes tend to be less clearly structured 
than, for example, elections in representative democracy. Hence, repeat play is 
perhaps more unlikely. 
Turning to the second dimension of power over (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), 
Haugaard questions the mainstream idea that the process of excluding certain 
issues from policy always constitutes domination. Bacharach’s and Baratz’s 
(1962), negative assessment of two-dimensional power was due to the 
assumption that the exclusion could not be generalised to include the issues that 
B prefers to discuss and, as a consequence, B became a means to A’s ends.  
In order to demonstrate how this negative normative assessment can be 
modified, Haugaard draws on Giddens (1984) and argues that while structural 
constraints exclude certain forms of interaction, it facilitates other forms. 
Paradoxically, structures both limit interaction, and create possibilities for 
interaction (as discussed regarding power to in Section 4.2.2). If the action of 
others is predictable, collaborative endeavours or actions in concert, become 
easier (Haugaard, 2012, p. 39). This is in line with the reasoning around power 
to in Section 4.2.2. Haugaard (Ibid.) explains this as follows. 
By excluding random reactions, structural constraint makes structurally-based political 
power possible. The reproduction of social systems and social order in general, 
presupposes that certain acts of structuration are routinely excluded as invalid. When a 
social actor finds their interventions either ‘politely ignored’ or eliciting hostile 
responses, their structuration practices are excluded from having conferred legitimacy 
and, in so doing, structural constraint is enforced through the agency of others.  
This way of reasoning is highly relevant for planning practice since in every 
planning process certain issues will by necessity be excluded in the dialogue 
while other issues will be included (Connelly and Richardson, 2004; Wiberg, 
2016). Haugaard argues that two-dimensional power over is not inherently 
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reprehensible domination. Instead, it can also constitute the precondition of 
politics as something more sophisticated than domination and can therefore be 
assessed as normatively desirable.  
Haugaard claims that what makes the second dimension of power, as 
described by Bachrach and Baratz (1962), normatively reprehensible is not 
simply that issues are excluded from the of policy processes. Instead, it is that 
they are excluded to the systematic disadvantage of B. This means that power is 
made into a zero-sum phenomenon.  
Although, if structures allow issues to be organised in and out in a fashion that 
is, by actors deemed sociologically legitimate, zero-sum power over can be turned 
into plus-sum; since repeat play, over longer periods, includes the possibility that 
B can win. Thus, Haugaard argues that the second dimension of power can be 
understood as an empirical process, which can either be normatively assessed as 
domination or as empowerment. 
I will return to the question about how this, somewhat abstract, reasoning 
might be applied in participatory planning (Chapter 8). Suffice to say, that 
generically speaking, it makes sense, as Mouffe (2005) tells us, to think about 
the organising in and out of issues in participatory planning as an inevitable 
empirical process, that might be normatively or sociologically assessed as either 
legitimate or illegitimate. 
Turning to the third dimension of power, Haugaard (2012, p. 42) sets out by 
clarifying the general referent, the empirical phenomena, of three-dimensional 
power as, 
[…] the relationship between the social consciousness of social actors and the 
reproduction of relations of power. In essence, what is proposed by Lukes’ concept of 
three-dimensional power (Lukes 1974), and much of Foucault’s work on the 
relationship between power and knowledge (1980), is that there is a direct mapping 
between the tacit social knowledge that actors use to reproduce social structure and 
the reproduction of relations of domination. 
Thereby, to Haugaard three-dimensional power is defined as the relationship 
between an actor’s social consciousness and the (re)production of power 
relations. Notably, this way of re-theorising three-dimensional power bares 
resemblance to the role of social consciousness discussed in Section 4.2.2 where 
the family member power to is discussed.  
It might well be that this social consciousness, people’s habits, leads to 
systematic exclusion of the interests of some actors, but it can also be that it 
underpins normatively legitimate power relations. For example, if we sub-
consciously exclude physical violence from participatory planning, it would by 
most be seen as both normatively and sociologically legitimate.  
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Thereby, Haugaard follows through on his task to rethink power over, by 
claiming that three-dimensional power can constitute domination, but that it can 
also be the key to empowerment. Thus, as with one- and two-dimensional power, 
the same empirical processes have both positive and negative normative potential. 
Again, I would like to point to the possibilities of applying this idea to 
participatory planning. The planning culture might make us tacitly exclude 
repressive behavior, as well as include it in participatory planning. Thus, there 
is a strong argument for viewing the relationship between social consciousness 
and (re)production of power relations as an empirical process, rather than 
exclusively define it as legitimate or illegitimate. 
 […] this [the view of power over as dual] has significant implications. It is not 
sufficient to identify processes of domination and try to deconstruct them. Rather, the 
task is the more complex one of deciding when the very same process of power is 
desirable and when it constitutes domination. (Haugaard, 2015, p. 147) 
Based on this engagement with Haugaard’s work, I define legitimate power over 
as exercises of power through which actors get other actors to do what they 
otherwise would not have done, in a manner that is seen as acceptable.  
4.3 Assembling the power family 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the power literature in order to answer the 
question: what conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and 
rethinking power in participatory planning? 
Drawing on the work of Haugaard (2010a) and Wittgenstein (1967), I started 
out by proposing that it is useful to treat power as a family resemblance concept 
in participatory planning. This plural view of power means that power is seen as 
a cluster of overlapping concepts, which are all related to the reproduction of 
social order, but not necessarily united by one common feature. I argued that this 
view of power carries potential for researching and rethinking notions of power 
in planning theory, policy and practice. 
Next, I substantiated this claim by developing the family of four power 
concepts which is displayed in Table 7.  
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Table 7. The power family in participatory planning 
Concept Definition 
Power to The ability to act derived from social order. 
Power with Actors engage in concerted action towards shared goals.  
Illegitimate power over Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner 
that is seen as unacceptable. 
Legitimate power over Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner 
that is seen as acceptable. 
Power to explicates notions of power as constitutive and productive. In my 
power family, power to is seen as a dispositional ability, which can be exercised 
by planning actors episodically. When the ability to act, the power to, is 
exercised, normative questions come forth. The legitimacy of power in 
participatory planning is situated in a specific context and frequently contested. 
Legitimacy can be approached with sociological interest or normative interest 
and can be concerned with process and/or outcome of an planning episode. 
Normative notions of power are, in the power family, conceptualised through 
the family members power with, legitimate power over and illegitimate power 
over. Notably, I thereby correct the mistaken idea that power over is equated 
with domination and instead distinguish two kinds of power over. 
In line with the interpretative research design of this thesis (see Chapter 3), 
the concepts in the power family are not intended to signify the essence of power, 
rather they are ideal typical conceptualisations of alternative notions of power, 
which can potentially enable reflective practice. 
Some might critique the family of power concepts for having a bias towards 
agent-specific notions of power. To them I would first respond that agent-
specific notions are important in planning practice, since they stress both the 
responsibility and possibility for planners and other actors to make a difference. 
Secondly, I would point to how systemic, “faceless” notions of power, are 
included within power to as well as in illegitimate and legitimate power over. 
Within power to I have included Haugaard’s (2003) theory of power creation, 
which synthesises the work of key contributors to the less agent-specific views 
of power. My discussion of the two forms of power over includes Lukes’ (1974, 
2005) third dimension as well as Haugaard´s (2012) rethinking of it.  
I would also like to explicitly acknowledge that notions of power in actor 
network theory and similar “post human” theories (Callon and Latour, 1981; 
Latour et al., 1988), which are increasingly influential in planning thought 
related to power (e.g. Metzger et al., 2016), have not been included in the power 
family. This is not because I find them irrelevant for participatory planning 
practice. Instead I have, for reasons of feasibility, decided to leave this body of 
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theory outside of the family of power concepts. I recognise the future need to 
include these kinds of sophisticated tools for power analysis in attempts to 
further broaden the conceptual support for reflective practice.  
Some scholars might fault me for merely including one concept of 
unacceptable power in the family, illegitimate power over. Let me therefore 
explain that this choice does not mean that I assume that power with and power 
to are legitimate by definition. Crucially, I define power to as dispositional. I 
find it logical to argue that the need to assess if this kind of power is legitimate 
arises only when it is exercised, which I conceptually cover with the other 
members in the family. Regarding power with, it is important to acknowledge 
that this form of power can lead to the exercise of illegitimate power over by one 
group over another group(s).   
Finally, it is crucial to understand that the four members of the power family 
are ideal types. In any real world interaction, the concepts might be useful for 
distinguishing features of a situation, but this does not exclude the possibility 
that all four forms of power might be present in the same situation and that actors 
might come to alternative sociological and normative conclusions about what is 
actually “going on with power” (cf. Allen, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2004).   
In the following chapters, the power family will first be applied and tested 
through investigations of the treatment of power in communicative planning 
theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice (Chapters 5-7). 
Then, in the concluding Chapter 8, I will synthesise the findings in view of 
validating the usefulness of the power family.   
 87 
In a world of conflicting interestsʊdefined along lines of class, place, gender, 
organization, or individualsʊhow are planners to make their way? (Forester, 1989, p. 5) 
[…] in the fine grain of planning practice, planners not only bring power relations into 
being, […] they also have the choice to change them. (Healey, 2003: 117) 
[Habermas] focuses his attention on the development of critical or emancipatory ways 
of knowing that are designed to get past the embedded power relations in a society. 
These ideas are attractive to planners. (Innes, 1995, p. 186) 
This chapter presents the findings from a frame analysis of the notions of 
power in communicative planning theory. The findings feed into answering 
Research Questions 2 and 3: which basic notions of power are embedded in 
participatory planning? To what extent are these notions enabling reflective 
practice? The findings presented in this chapter pertain to the notions of power 
in the communicative planning theory, which underpins participatory 
planning. While notions of power in Swedish participatory planning policy and 
practice are clarified and assessed through separate investigations presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
The first section presents and discusses the analysis of the work of three 
leading communicative planning scholars: John Forester, Judith Innes and Patsy 
Healey. A consensual process frame is identified as informing all three scholars’ 
approaches to power. In contrast, the scholars’ framing of the planners’ roles in 
power relations is more diverse. Here the analysis finds three alternative identity 
frames: the facilitator, the critically pragmatic planner and the reflexive planner. 
It is thereby revealed how communicative planning theory has more to offer than 
some of its critiques acknowledge. Yet, it is also demonstrated how the treatment 
of power in this theory suffers from a lack of attention to productive and 
constitutive notions of power to and a conflation of power over with domination.  
5 Notions of power in communicative 
planning theory  
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Hence, communicative planning theory is assessed as providing useful tools 
for reflective practice, but as falling short of supplying the broad conceptua-
lisation needed for planners’ scrutiny of their assumptions of power. 
5.1 Frame analysis of the work of Forester, Healey and 
Innes 
5.1.1 About communicative planning theory and the analysis 
In order to conduct frame analysis into notions of power in communicative 
planning theory, I have chosen to focus on three of the leading scholars in this 
tradition: John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. These three scholars 
have been and are active within different planning contexts in Europe (Healey) 
and the US (Forester and Innes). Pursuing their own approaches, they also share 
a common orientation and have over the years been part of a community of 
scholars who frequently meet and exchange ideas. These three scholars exercise 
influence over the development of communicative planning theory by mentoring 
younger scholars, and are widely cited within communicative planning theory. 
They share ambitions to be useful for practitioners and strive for their research 
to be practice oriented. 
John Forester is a scholar working in a US planning context, who is widely 
recognised as one of the prominent contributors to communicative planning. He 
has persistently focused on the everyday practices of planners through his 
method for eliciting practitioner profiles (Forester, 1999, 2009). In his early 
work, he combined American pragmatism (Dewey, 1954; Schön, 1983) with 
Habermas’ (1984) critical theory, to suggest how planners could work in “the 
face of power” to minimise power distortions (1989). In his later work, he has 
been more inclined to solely employ American pragmatism and has thereby 
suggested that power can be seen as a practical problem, which planners can 
handle through situated judgements (1999, 2009). 
Patsy Healey is a scholar working in the British/European context, who, 
through a career spanning over five decades, has made influential contributions 
under the broad umbrella of communicative planning theories. Her work is 
diverse and covers a wide range of issues within planning. In the context of this 
study her work to combine Habermas’ theories of communicative action with 
Giddens’ structuration theory is highly relevant (1997, 2003). She uses 
Habermasian discourse ethics to critique power and suggests that planners use 
their agency to transform everyday practices to minimise the misuse of power 
and transform planning cultures. 
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Finally, the US scholar Judith Innes, who frequently collaborates with David 
Booher, draws on her own and others’ practical experiences and combines these 
with Habermas’ (1984) and lately Castells’ (2009) ideas. Thereby, she critiques 
hierarchical power relations and advocates for consensual practices in planning. 
She has throughout her career combined scholarly work with hands on work to 
facilitate consensus building and collaborative planning processes. 
In the next section I present the analysis of the three scholars’ work, starting with 
John Forester.9  
5.1.2 John Forester’s framing of power 
Forester has throughout his career critiqued the misuse of power and sought to 
build up a vision of planning as the organisation of hope. In the earlier stages of 
his career Forester frequently used Habermas’ version of critical theory to define 
power as a distortion for authentic communication. In contrast, in his later work 
he has leaned more towards American pragmatism and focused on planners’ 
“dirty-hands” experiences of working in the “face of power”. In the following 
sections, I report on the analysis of how Forester has framed the two topics: 
power in participatory planning and planners’ roles in power relations.    
Forester’s framing of power in participatory planning 
Forester has throughout his career consistently critiqued the misuse of power, 
which I interpret as a focus on the family member illegitimate power over. His 
earlier work during the 1980s and 1990s (1980, 1989, 1993) appears heavily 
inspired by Habermas, and set out to theorise power as a distortion. During this 
period, Forester leaned towards universal theorising of how the power of the 
“system worlds” of a capitalist economy and bureaucracy shaped attention and 
distorted peoples’ “life worlds”. He thereby made salient how planning 
organisations are embedded in the system worlds of the market economy and 
bureaucracy and thus reproduce power relations. “Thus, planners can expect 
(with a few exemplary, democratically structured exceptions) that the 
organisations in and with which they work will systematically reproduce socio-
political relations […]” (Forester, 1989, pp. 78–79).  
Characteristically, for this Habermasian thought style, Forester is making the 
universal diagnosis that organisations will reproduce “socio-political relations”. 
Thereby, the emphasis is on the ways in which power operates to create 
distortions, which prevent authentic communication. 
                                                     
9. See Section 3.3. for a discussion of the methodology. 
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The analysis shows how the work of early Forester mirrors the predominant 
tendency, in the power literature as well as in everyday speech, to conflate power 
and domination, i.e. to implicitly and exclusively define power as illegitimate 
power over. Thereby, even if his critique of power certainly is valid, the early 
Forester’s diagnosis comes with the confusion associated with conflating power 
with domination and overlooking how power to, which precedes power over, is 
created through the predictability of social order (see Chapter 4).  
In his later work, Forester (1999, 2009, 2013) maintains his focus on 
critiquing illegitimate power over in participatory planning, but downplays the 
universal theorising à la Habermas, and instead relies more on the situated 
analysis of American pragmatism. He coins his brand of pragmatism as “critical” 
and thereby wishes to convey a more power sensitive version, as an answer to 
the critique for power blindness, which is often levelled towards pragmatists.  
What Forester means by “critical” is exemplified by his suggestion (2009, 
pp. 16–17) that differences “of interests, values, and power […]” must be taken 
into account in participatory planning and “structured biases related to ethnicity 
and culture, race, class, gender, and more” should always be anticipated. Yet 
Forester’s pragmatism also comes with the characteristic trust in practical 
problem solving and scepticism towards theorising without action.  
Just chanting “power, power, power” won’t help us, and neither will sincerely 
appealing to “dialogue, dialogue, dialogue.” So we need to ask, how can we do better 
than we have, when interests and values, perceptioQV DQG SHUVSHFWLYHV FRQÀict? 
(Forester, 2009, p. 3) 
Forester’s brand of critical pragmatism thereby opens interesting avenues for 
planning thought and action. Yet it is suffering from the same conflation of 
power and domination as the early Forester’s work. It is still the critique of 
illegitimate power over that is the focus for Forester’s diagnosis. He thereby 
largely leaves us without an elaborated understanding of how power to, arises 
from the predictability derived from social order. Clearly this leaves a blind spot 
for those who employ Forester’s work to understand power in participatory 
planning practice. 
Further, Forester’s one-sided emphasis on power as domination hides the 
necessity of legitimate power over in planning. “We really need less often to keep 
rediscovering politics and ‘power’, and more often to carefully assess forms of 
power and their specific types of vulnerabilities, for only where dominating power 
is vulnerable is critical resistance possible” (Forester, 2000, p. 915). 
As illustrated in this quote, Forester is focusing on supplying tools for 
assessing oppressive power, but leaves us without the conceptualisation of 
acceptable forms of power over.  
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When Forester moves from diagnosis of power towards action bias, he sees 
participatory planning as capable of empowering citizens and thereby carrying 
potential to play a “[…] counterhegemonic or democratising role [through]: the 
exposure of issues that political–economic structures otherwise would bury from 
public view, the opening and raising of questions that otherwise would be kept 
out of public discussion […]” (1993, p. 6). It is this persistent framing of 
participatory planning as the “organisation of hope” (2009, p. 6) that Forester 
has maintained throughout his career. His hope is, interpreted through the family 
of power concepts, to replace illegitimate power over with power with, the 
process where people are acting in concert towards shared objectives. 
The early Forester sought to realise this vision through importing Habermas’ 
ideas into participatory planning. Forester (1980, 1989) developed tools intended 
to make participatory planning capable of minimising power distortions. His 
action bias was at that time for participatory planning to “[…] work […] toward 
the correction of the needless distortions, some systematic and some not, that 
disable, mystify, distract, and mislead others: to work toward a political 
democratization of daily communications” (Forester, 1980, p. 21). 
This quote is expressive of how the earlier Forester employed Habermas’ work 
to develop analytical tools that could be applied within participatory planning 
with the intention, not to remove, but minimise the distorting effects of power. 
In my interpretation, the early Forester’s action bias can be understood as a 
call for minimising illegitimate power over and maximising power with. Even if 
this intention seems sympathetic, it leaves us without the conceptualisation of 
power to and legitimate power over. Thus, his emphasis on minimising power 
distortions does not provide us with an elaborated answer to two crucial question 
in the power literature, as well as in planning practice: how is power created and 
what is a legitimate exercise of power when there are conflicts?  
In Forester’s later work, the action bias is instead more inspired by American 
pragmatism and his affinity with Habermas is downplayed. Yet, he maintains his 
view that participatory planning is about correcting or minimising the negative 
effects of illegitimate power over. But now he refrains from theorising power 
and instead stresses that problems arising from the misuse of power can be dealt 
with practically. 
So when we read critical analyses, we need to learn how, in the face of power and deep 
difference, our lives can be better, not just to hear once again that who gets what is 
political, that the ruling rule, the powerful have power, that racism and sexism shatter 
lives, that environmental injustice is widespread. (Forester, 2009, p. 11) 
This quote illustrates the later Forester’s pragmatic scepticism towards 
theoretical analysis and preference for incremental actions in participatory 
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planning in view of dealing with the contextual problems created by illegitimate 
power over. 
Thereby, the critically pragmatic Forester, pays attention to eliciting and 
analysing planners’ own stories of (allegedly) successful encounters with power 
in participatory planning (Forester, 1999, 2009). He provides interesting food 
for thought, but he largely refrains from theorising power. This leaves us with 
an account of how incremental improvements might lead towards power with in 
participatory planning, but we are kept in the dark when it comes to explaining 
what power to and legitimate power over might be in participatory planning.  
Forester’s framing of planners’ roles in power relations 
At the core of Forester’s framing of planners’ roles in power relations, lies the 
diagnosis that planners work in contexts distorted and/or shaped by illegitimate 
power over “in the face of power”, as Forester (1989) characteristically puts it. 
Thereby, his account of planners and power is usefully critical, yet it might lead 
to confusion caused by conflating power and domination.   
When Forester leans on Habermas, working in the face of power means that, 
“[…] planners serving the public face particular special, private, or class 
interests (e.g., corporate development interests), which may work systematically 
to violate these norms of ordinary communication” (1980, p. 278). He then 
makes salient how this pressure influences planners’ dealings with power. “[…] 
planners will often feel compelled to be less frank or open than they might wish 
[…]” (1980, p. 279). 
When Forester leans more towards American pragmatism, he instead poses 
critically informed questions about planners and power. 
In a world of conflicting interests – defined along lines of class, place, gender, 
organization, or individuals – how are planners to make their way? In a society 
structured by a capitalist economy and nominally democratic political system, how are 
planners to respond to conflicting demands when private profit and public well-being 
clash? When planners are mandated to enable “public participation” even as they work 
in bureaucratic organizations that may be threatened by such participation, what are 
planners to do? (Forester, 1989, p.  5) 
This quote captures the essence of both the early and more contemporary 
Forester’s diagnosis of planners in power relations: planners are restricted and 
influenced by illegitimate power over, yet they desire to make a difference and 
are capable of doing it. Forester (2013, p. 7) tells us that planners “may be 
conservative, resistant to change, captured by conventions and language, habits 
and frameworks that may not truly reflect ‘all they can do’”.  
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Useful as his framing may be for planners, Forester refrains from supplying 
us with an elaborated understanding of how planners’ power to “make a 
difference” is derived from a social order. Instead he conflates power and 
domination, which confusingly leave us without a theorised account of how 
planners’ power to make a difference is created. We are also left without 
conceptual support for appraising when planners’ attempts to make a difference 
should be seen as just or acceptable: when is their exercise of power legitimate?  
Forester’s action bias is towards hope; the hope that planners will make a 
difference by minimising power distortions or by incrementally addressing 
misuse of power, illegitimate power over. He tells us to “spend less time 
rediscovering that power of course matters, and let’s spend more time exploring 
how we can do better-less time presuming impossibility and more time exploring 
actual possibility” (Ibid.). This quote illustrates both Forester’s optimistic 
orientation and his use of “power” as a negatively loaded term, equivalent to 
illegitimate power over. To tell us that power equates to domination and at the 
same time suggest that planners ought to make a difference, is somewhat 
confusing. For how can planners, within a democratic planning system, make a 
difference if legitimate power is conceptually excluded?    
Hence, Forester does not elaborate theoretically on what legitimate power 
might be. Yet it could be said that his accounts of planners’ allegedly successful 
practices are full of examples of when planners use their ability to act, their 
power to, to get people to do what they otherwise would not have done. This is 
in the analytical language of the power family, the exercise of illegitimate or 
legitimate power over. As Forester explains in his book about planners working 
with conflict mediation,  
[…] the mediators whose work we examine here make few claims to neutrality but 
many to serving all parties in a nonpartisan way […] to show how planners and 
community leaders might work practically in the face of power and value differences 
to achieve such endsʊmore just and beautiful, sustainable, and liveable places and 
spaces. (Forester, 2009, p. 6) 
Thereby, it could be argued that what Forester is doing is to, by way of 
instructive examples, show us when the exercise of power is legitimate. Even if 
I find this move to be useful, it does not fulfil our need for conceptualising power 
in a way which can transcend context. Even if power relations are situated, I do 
not believe that we can do without a more general language of power. I also think 
that, without widely accepted legitimacy criteria, it will be difficult to justify 
planners’ exercises of power beyond the rational ideas of value-neutral experts. 
Still, the later Forester’s task is not to theorise power, but to draw attention 
to the possibility for planners to incrementally address the injustices created by 
the negative effects he attributes to “power”. 
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So let us explore how we can do better than we have, how planners and policy shapers 
might not be ideal, but might take seriously ambitious aspirations, to be less callous 
and blind, less racist, sexist or classist, less apolitically technocratic […]. (Forester, 
2013, p. 7)  
This way of reasoning illustratates Forester’s long-standing engagement with 
critiquing power and providing hope that planners can minimise domination. 
This demonstrates how Forester has dedicated most of his work to addressing 
illegitimate power over and thus left the task of theorising power to and 
legitimate power over aside. Therefore, his account of planners and power is 
usefully critical and hopeful, yet leaves planners without elaborated conceptual 
tools for reflecting on the legitimacy of power over and the creation of power to 
through social order.  
5.1.3 Patsy Healey’s framing of power 
When Patsy Healey approaches power, she draws on Giddens' structuration 
theory and Habermas’ theory of communicative action. She frames power as 
produced and reproduced by the interplay of social structures and human agency 
and uses criteria for authentic communication to critique the resulting exclusion 
of discourses and people. In the following sections, I report on the analysis of 
the way she frames power in participatory planning and planners’ roles in power 
relations.  
Healey’s framing of power in participatory planning 
Healey frames power in participatory planning from a critical stance and 
emphasises the necessity to transform unjust power relations through agency. 
Her approach is inspired mainly by the work of Giddens and Habermas. With 
Giddens (1997) she draws attention to how power is embedded in social 
structures through “implicit and explicit principles about how things should be 
done and who should get what” (p. 45). Thereby, she makes salient how 
structuration practices “carry power relations from one period to the next” 
(Ibid.). She characteristically sees how “power over the formation of rules of 
behaviour, and power over the flows of material resources” shapes human 
actions and thoughts (Ibid.).  
To Healey structuration practices result in assumptions, which constrain, but 
do not determine, the ways in which agency works in human relations because,  
[…] some [taken for granted assumptions] may endure and get […] inscribed in 
routine. […] Structuring power is carried through the medium of these ideas and 
routines, shaping how agency invents ways to use, develop, and distribute the material 
resources available in any situation. (1999, p. 1132) 
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This shows how Healey’s framing of power, in contrast to Forester’s, includes a 
route towards explaining the creation of power to beyond Habermasian 
distortions. Her affinity with Giddens and sociological institutionalism provides 
tools for a much more elaborated analysis of power. Yet she has mainly paid 
attention to illegitimate power over and, thereby, her account of power in 
participatory planning is constrained by the same tendency to conflate power 
and domination as Forester’s.   
Healey emphasises how illegitimate power over can be transformed through 
human agency since people can be reflexive, with the capacity, 
[…] to penetrate below direct interpersonal and deliberate strategic manipulation, to 
access an awareness of deeper cultural concepts and practices, and the relations of 
power that they embody. […] people can become aware that what they do in routine 
ways is not inherently ‘natural’, but has become ‘natural’ through a social history of 
acceptance and embedding. If so, it can also be disembedded, though this may involve 
a long process of cultural readjustment […] to a different kind of governance 
organization. (Healey, 2003, pp. 113–114)  
Healey combines this Giddensian dynamic and situated diagnosis of power with 
Habermas’ more dualistic and universal theory of communicative action. 
Drawing on Habermas, she diagnoses power through a critique of how the 
Enlightenment, in spite of removing other forms of inequalities, created “new 
bastions of power” by which “people are made unequal” (1997, p. 39). This 
quote exemplifies how Healey’s Habermasian diagnosis of power conflates 
power with domination. 
Healey (1992, p. 145) explains how a “logic coupled with scientifically-
constructed empirical knowledge, was unveiled as having achieved hegemonic 
power over other ways of being and knowing, crowding out moral and aesthetic 
discourse”. Thus, she draws attention to how instrumental rationality, the 
“competitive market” and the “hierarchical bureaucracy”, are responsible for the 
reproduction of inequality (Healey, 1997, p. 40).  
This infinity with Habermas provides Healey with conceptual tools to 
critique power, yet the following conflation of power over with domination blurs 
Healey’s explanation of what power is, of power to, and suggests that we perhaps 
should escape from power over in participatory planning.  
Healey takes difference and inequality as the starting point when she frames 
power in participatory planning, maintaining a critical diagnostic focus on 
illegitimate power over: “[…] multiple dimensions of potential social division, 
and the inequalities that are generated through them, raise enormous problems 
for efforts in managing co-existence in shared spaces, as the potential social 
diversity is substantial” (Healey, 1997, p. 118). Healey (Ibid.) also makes it 
apparent how the historical structuration practices in planning have resulted in 
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repression and damage to nature. Such are the starting conditions in Healey’s 
diagnosis of power in participatory planning. 
Drawing on structuration theory, Healey explains how planning processes 
will be based on certain modes of thought that get “a privileged ‘sound’ through 
the foghorns and babble of the wider political culture in which they exist” 
(Healey, 2012, p. 28). Thereby certain ways of thinking and acting become taken 
for granted. “Infused with systems of meaning and carry[ing] cultural references 
forward in time. It is these abstractions from our social lives which filter back 
into the fine grain of our everyday lives, our life as human agents” (Healey, 
1997, p. 46).  
Based on this critical diagnosis of power, Healey draws attention to how 
certain modes of thinking and acting seem natural, and thereby reproduce power 
relations in planning processes. Characteristically, she does not think that social 
structures determine planning processes, instead she stresses how the “fine grain 
of planning practice […] involves delicate day-to-day choices about whether to 
‘follow the rules’, or whether to change them, to transform the structure” 
(Healey, 1997, p. 47). 
This reasoning illustrates how Healey, in contrast to Forester, provides a 
route to explaining the creation of power to. By drawing on the vocabulary of 
structuration theory she provides an approach to power potentially capable of 
guiding empirical analysis. Yet, her own analysis is somewhat confused due to 
the tendency to smuggle normatively negative assessments into the sociological 
explanation of power. 
Healey’s action bias is to use “Habermas’ evaluative concept of the qualities 
of ‘speech situations’ [as] a valuable tool of critique in […] [power] struggles” 
(Healey, 2003, p. 113). So, she suggests critiquing power by way of argument, 
and thereby opening up possibilities for reflexivity and change of illegitimate 
power over. Healey stresses how instances of reason carry the capacity for 
changing culture and thereby power relations. “The micro-practices of everyday 
life are thus key sites for the mobilisation of transformative forces” (Healey, 
1997, p. 49).  
In this way, Healey’s emphasises how reflexivity can expose illegitimate 
power over and how changes in micro practices might lead to the kind of power, 
which is consensual and concerted: power with.  
Following Habermas, Healey argues that the transformation of planning 
cultures should create a more communicatively rational public realm because, 
“If based on principles of honesty, sincerity, and openness, to people's views and 
to available knowledge, then these truths and values can transcend the relativism 
of different perspectives” (Healey, 1997, p. 53). This Habermasian line of 
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thought can, through my family of power concepts, be interpreted as a call for 
participatory planning to transform illegitimate power over to power with.  
This line of reasoning resembles that of some of the contributors to the power 
literature (e.g. Arendt, 1970; Parsons, 1963) who define power to and power with 
as the only legitimate forms of power. Clearly this is a necessary part of the 
answer to the question, when is power legitimate? Yet, it leaves us without a 
concept of legitimate power over, which is necessary in planning if we are to 
make decisions when planning processes and outcomes are contested.   
True to her relational perspective, Healey further emphasises that 
participatory planning involves building cultures. “Firstly, to recognise the 
potential cultural dimensions of differences […] and secondly, actively to make 
new cultural conceptions, to build shared systems of meaning and ways of 
acting, to create an additional ‘layer’ of cultural formation” (Healey, 1997, p. 
64). Not being blind to the difficulties, Healey sees such transformation as 
“utopian in reach, since in real societies, some always emerge more powerful 
than others, and the morality of majorities rejects some behaviours” (Healey, 
1997, p. 44).  
This reasoning demonstrates how Healey strives towards a consensual 
planning practice where power is obsolete or turned into power with. This shows 
how her account of power in participatory planning conflates power over with 
domination and largely by definition excludes legitimate power over.  
Healey’s framing of planners’ roles in power relations 
Healey diagnoses planners in power relations by emphasising how planners’ 
micro practices can reproduce or transform social power structures because 
“[…] in the fine grain of planning practice, planners not only bring power 
relations into being, as Foucault describe. For Giddens, they also have the choice 
to change them” (Healey, 2003, p. 117). In this way, Healey’s account of 
planners in power relations, in contrast to Forester’s, provides a theorised 
understanding of how planners’ ability to act, their power to, is created “in the 
fine grain of planning”.  
In line with structuration theory, Healey explains how planners’ identities are 
shaped through social relations. At the same time, she also emphasises how 
planners carry the capacity to transform the same power relations, which shape 
their identities. In this manner, her analysis goes beyond Forester’s reliance on 
the Habermasian emphasis of power distortions, and his later preference for 
accounts of planners’ work, without elaborated theorisation of power.  
Following her preference for reflexivity, Healey frames planners as capable 
of seeing through assumed relations and practices. But Healey (1997, p. 85) also 
acknowledges that for planners,  
 98 
[…] to change systems, and to re-make structures, requires an effort to challenge the 
relations of power on all three of Lukes' levels, the formal, the 'behind the scenes' and 
the embedded dimensions of power, and a recognition, as Foucault argues, of the 
power relations of the fine grain of practices. 
This reasoning demonstrates the strength of Healey's analysis of planners and 
power, but also its limits. She leads us to pay attention to the different 
dimensions of power and recognise the ubiquity of power and thereby provides 
useful tools for power analysis. Yet she makes the same problematic conflation 
of power with domination as Forester does.  
Based on her diagnostic focus of critiquing power, Healey’s action bias is to 
urge planners to develop the ability to be reflexive.  
[…] to reveal when communicative and collaborative processes are likely to […] 
improve life conditions for the diverse groups and communities of interest in cities 
and regions, and when they are likely to be merely mechanisms to sustain old and 
well-established power relations. (Healey, 2003, p. 112) 
Even if Healey recognises that established structuration practices, which include 
injustices, will make it challenging for planners to induce change, she maintains 
a positive view of the possibility of agency. “Because people are inventive and 
creative, and because structuring forces cannot precisely determine events, there 
is always some scope for innovation” (Healey, 2003, p. 105). Thereby, she 
suggests that planners, by being reflexive, can transform power relations in the 
micro practices of planning. She is then usefully directing attention to how 
planners’ (and others) presumed practices might result in exclusion and how they 
hold the capacity to change their own habits.  
Healey’s offering to planners is thus to provide analytical resources for 
critiquing illegitimate power over. Healey suggests tools, such as Habermas’ 
discourse ethics, for this purpose. Thereby, interpreted through the power 
family, she suggests that planners should critique illegitimate power over, by 
contrasting it to power with, exercises of power when actors engage in concerted 
action towards shared goals. This is certainly an important task for planners, but 
this action bias largely leaves them without conceptual tools for what to make 
of situations when power over is inevitable. Healey is thereby, as Forester, 
inclined to overlook legitimate power over in her understanding of planners’ 
roles in power relations. 
5.1.4 Judith Innes’ framing of power 
Judith Innes’ framing of power is based on a combination of Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action (1984), and more recently Castell’s (2009) ideas of 
communicative power (Innes and Booher, 2015), and the insights generated 
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from Innes’ (and her long-term companion, Booher’s) practical experiences of 
participatory practices. In the coming sections I discuss my analysis of Innes’ 
account of the two frame topics: power in participatory planning and planners’ 
roles in power relations.  
Innes’ framing of power in participatory planning  
Following Habermas, the early Innes (1995, p. 186) diagnoses how power 
relations construct “concepts [which] can colonise the lifeworld, blinding us to 
the deeper reality of our own experience”. Later in her career she pursues a 
similar diagnostic focus on “communicative power” by drawing on Castells’ 
work (2009, 2011) since he “shares Habermas’ view that communication itself 
is a form of action that changes the realities of the social world, including power 
relations” (Innes and Booher, 2015, p. 200). My analysis shows that Innes’ 
elaboration of what Habermas’ and Castells’ work means for the theorisation of 
power in participatory planning remains incomplete.  
Instead Innes’ preference is for practice. She, argues that her own and others’ 
practical experiences, shows how “old” hierarchical forms of power lose ground 
to the kind of power that “springs out of collaborative practices” since “the world 
is too complex, too rapidly changing, and too full of ambiguities for this sort of 
mechanical power to produce consistently what the player wanted or to produce 
sustainable results” (Booher and Innes, 2002, p. 222). 
As demonstrated in this quote, Innes’ explanation of power is based on the 
same kind of conflation between power over and domination as Forester’s and 
Healey’s. Additionally, we can also see that her explanation does not go deeper 
into theorising power. Instead she, as exemplified in the quote, tends to use 
inaccurately defined key concepts such as “old forms of power”, “network 
power” and “mechanical power” to draw generalised conclusions without 
supplying much in terms of evidence.  
When diagnosing power in participatory planning, Innes consistently 
employs a distinction between “power around the table and power outside the 
dialogue” (2004, p. 12). To Innes, this distinction is a crucial one, as it enables 
her to diagnose power relations outside the planning process as illegitimate 
power over, in contrast with the possibility of “consensus building” (Innes, 2004; 
Innes and Booher, 1999) and “collaborative rationality”, her versions of power 
with, inside participatory planning (Innes, 2016; Innes and Booher, 2010). This 
demonstrates how Innes’ diagnosis of power in participatory planning resembles 
Forester’s and Healey’s, by focusing on critiquing illegitimate power over and 
replacing it with power with.  
While Forester provides us with useful windows into planning practices and 
Healey elaborates on how these practices are embedded in social structures, 
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Innes leaves us with much less to reflect on. Her theorisation of power and her 
practical accounts of it lack the detail needed for providing usefully thick 
descriptions of power in planning practice.  
Innes’ diagnosis of “old” forms of power as inefficient and illegitimate leads 
to an action bias to create power-free conditions for communication, or towards 
producing what she calls “network power” (Booher and Innes, 2002) and 
“communicative power” (Innes and Booher, 2015), which resemble power with. 
Her fundamental idea is that striving towards the ideal of  “authentic” or 
undistorted communication can create conditions under which “emancipatory 
knowledge [can] transcend […] the blinders created by our conditions and 
institutions” (Innes and Booher, 1999, p. 418).  
To Innes (Ibid.), such knowledge can be “achieved through dialogue that 
engages all those with differing interests around a task or a problem”. To create 
such conditions, Habermasian criteria for comprehensibility, sincerity and 
inclusivity must be fulfilled, as exemplified in her later work. “The group meets 
face to face for authentic dialogue, where all are equally empowered to speak, 
all are listened to and all are equally privy to data and other forms of knowledge 
on the issues” (Innes, 2016, p. 2). This way of reasoning leads to the same 
preference for power with as Forester and Healey, and the same kind of 
conceptual exclusion of legitimate power over by definition. 
Innes, with a remarkable consistency in the analysed publications, argues for 
an action bias where process design and facilitation should provide conditions 
for dialogue and consensus inside participatory planning processes. She 
describes the work that is needed to achieve such processes as “skilful 
management of dialogue”, “well-designed processes”, “skilled process and 
meeting management” and “well-run consensus building projects”. These 
concepts appear intended to build a narrative around the possibilities to change 
relations of illegitimate power over into power with, but leave us wanting when 
it comes to explaining the power to and the legitimate power over necessary for 
achieving this result. 
Innes suggests Habermasian criteria for “consensus building” and 
“collaborative rationality” to guide process design. The criteria are reformulated 
slightly in the analysed publications, but the essence is that all relevant interests 
are represented and that their communication is “[…] undistorted by power 
differentials and information differences” (Innes, 2004, p. 9). Though Innes 
(1995) initially wrote about undistorted communication as a potential reality in 
participatory planning, she later (2004; 2010) recasts this as an ideal to strive 
towards. She then argues that “[…] the point to keep in mind is that 
FRPPXQLFDWLYH UDWLRQDOLW\ OLNH VFLHQWL¿FPHWKRG LVDQ LGHDO W\SH ,W LVQHYHU
fully achieved even in the most rigorous practice” (Innes, 2004, p. 10). This 
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largely resembles a vision of power in participatory planning reduced to power 
with. By definition, legitimate power over is excluded and we are left wondering 
both how the power to engage in power with is created and how conflicts can be 
handled in planning without a conceptualisation of legitimate power over. 
Innes’ framing of planners’ roles in power relations 
When Innes turns to frame planners’ roles in power relations the confusion 
thickens. In her early work, Innes identifies planners not as neutral experts 
following the rules of scientific inquiry, but as designers of social processes. She 
claimed that planners exercise power beyond established planning norms. Based 
on this diagnosis, she identified a particular need for ethical principles to guide 
planners (Innes, 1995). By applying the family of power concepts her reasoning 
can be understood as a critique of planners’ exercise of illegitimate power over 
and a call for criteria to distinguish legitimate power over. 
Instead of supplying such criteria, Innes at that time developed a narrative 
about planners who were 
[…] uncomfortable with the expert role for themselves, recognizing that they have 
their own biases and that expertise has its limits. They have strong beliefs about the 
kind of society that is desirable, but they do not know how to work toward this within 
their professional roles (Innes, 1995, p. 186).  
Based on this claim about the perceptions of a whole profession, she turns 
towards an action bias by linking the work of “innovative planners” with 
Habermas’ ideas of communicative rationality.  
[Habermas] ideas are attractive to planners because, rather than forcing them to try for 
a value-neutral, expert role in which they do not believe, they offer planners the 
possibility of an ethical stance within the world as they experience it. The principles 
for emancipatory knowing fit with the basic inclination of many planners. (Innes, 
1995, p. 186) 
Characteristically, Innes knits a narrative based on claims about planners’ views 
of themselves and their practices. What she offers seems to be a critique of the 
rational planners’ exercise of illegitimate power over, and a suggestion to turn 
to Habermasian criteria as an alternative. But these criteria do not help planners 
to ethically assess when their exercises of power over are legitimate, since they 
are designed to describe an undistorted, power-free state in planning. 
Innes, over the years, gradually modified this framing of planners as 
facilitators of communicative rationality, and in her contemporary work has a 
more pessimistic view of the role of planners. “[…] planners themselves often 
stand in the way of collaboration, preferring to keep control, without recognising 
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how collaboration can reduce conflict, prevent mistakes, enrich their thinking, 
offer new options and reframe difficult problems” (Innes, 2016, p. 1). 
Based on this more sceptical view of planners, Innes is, in her contemporary 
work, placing her trust in professional facilitators, coming in from outside the 
planning system, to create conditions for power-free communication and/or 
“network power”. This move does not solve the problems with her original 
framing, but instead adds another layer of confusion. For her suggestion does 
not rest on an elaborated idea of where these facilitators get their ability to 
create fair planning processes, their power to, and she is refraining from 
theorising the legitimate power over required when planning processes and/or 
outcomes are contested.   
After having reported on the analysis of Forester’s, Healey’s and Innes’ 
work, I will next synthesise the findings. 
5.2 The findings 
Through the analysis I have pursued two research questions: 
• Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning? 
• To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice? 
The analysis of communicative planning theory provides part of the answer to 
these two questions. The research tasks to analyse Swedish planning policy 
(Chapter 6) and practice (Chapter 7) will provide additional findings and enable 
a full answer to the questions (Chapter 8).   
In the analysis of communicative planning theory, I researched the first 
question by identifying process frames pertaining to power in participatory 
planning and identity frames pertaining to planners’ roles in power relations. 
Concerning power in participatory planning, the analysis showed variety in the 
three scholars’ framings over the years. Yet, in spite of the differences, my 
conclusion is that they draw on similar notions of power, originating from the 
same frame, which I conceptualise as the consensus frame.  
The consensus frame diagnoses power as domination. Thereby, it draws 
attention to the family member illegitimate power over. The action bias flowing 
from this diagnosis is towards “network power”, “empowerment” and “authentic 
dialogue”, which in the family of power concepts is explicated as power with. I 
will explain how I have arrived at this finding by summarising the analysis of 
the three scholars’ work. 
Forester’s framing of power shifted over the years. In his earlier work he 
relied on Habermas to diagnose how power distorted authentic communication, 
and suggested that discourse ethics should be applied to minimise these 
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distortions in and through participatory planning. Whereas in his later work he 
leaned more heavily on American pragmatism to diagnose how the misuse of 
power creates situated problems that ought to be addressed incrementally 
through participatory planning. In spite of supplying two distinct generic 
narratives about power in participatory planning, Foresters’ work takes shape 
through the same basic consensus frame. His interest lies in finding out when 
“power is vulnerable” and he sees planning as the organisation of hope for 
empowerment, which is, in the analytical language of this thesis, a hope for 
power with. 
Healey’s framing is similar yet distinctively different. She also makes use of 
Habermas’ work to critique how power relations result in the exclusion of people 
and issues. Yet her move to draw on structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) 
provides the seeds for theorising power beyond distortions, which is largely 
lacking in Forester’s work. Still, she is, as Forester is, mainly concerned with 
how planning can lead to more consensual power relations. To Healey, the hope 
is for agency in the micro practices of planning to transform planning cultures 
from illegitimate power over into power with.  
Finally, Innes’ framing of power relies on Habermas’ and Castells’ work, 
combined with her practical experiences of participatory practices. The analysis 
showed how this combination leads her to critique power distortions and “old 
forms” of power, and suggest that participatory planning can and ought to 
replace these with “network power” or “authentic communication”. Innes’ 
approach to power thereby differs from Forester’s and Healey’s, yet it originates 
from the same basic frame. Her core preference is also to turn illegitimate power 
over into power with. The process frame identified through the analysis of the 
three scholars’ work is summarised in Table 8.  
Table 8. The consensus frame 
 Consensus 
Diagnosis Power over is illegitimate. 
Action bias Participatory planning ought to transform illegitimate power over into power with. 
 
The analysis revealed a broader repertoire in the scholars’ framing of planners’ 
roles in power relations. I argue that the analysis shows that their notions of this 
topic can be conceptualised as three distinct identity frames: the facilitator, the 
critical pragmatist and the reflexive planner.  
The facilitator frame guides all three scholars’ framing of planners, though 
Innes has relied most consistently and heavily on this frame. In her work, the 
idea of the facilitator is ever-present. The generic narrative is about skilful 
practitioners who, through mastering process design and facilitation, are capable 
 104 
of turning illegitimate power over outside planning processes into power with 
inside of the processes. 
Forester’s framing of planners shares the preference for power with, but is 
much more situated. His narratives are about planners who, through practical 
judgement and critical ethos, act to make a difference for those who are left 
outside the process and subject to repressive powers. Through the analysis of 
Foresters’ work I have identified the critical pragmatist frame, which suggests 
that planners ought to work incrementally to shift the power balance to the 
advantage of those who lack power. 
Healey has, as her fellow scholars, seen planners as change makers, towards 
more inclusive planning cultures of power with. Yet, her framing of planners is 
different since she supplies what Forester and Innes are missing: a theorised 
account of planners’ roles in power relations. Her framing is informed by, what 
I call, the reflexive planner frame, originating from structuration theory. This 
frame leads to an understanding of how social structures carry past power 
relations into the present and how planners are shaped by these structures and 
yet capable of reflexivity and agency.  
The three identity frames are summarised in Table 9.   
Table 9. Identity frames in communicative planning theory 
 Facilitator Critical pragmatist Reflexive planner 
Diagnosis Planners are working in contexts 
of illegitimate power over. 
Planners are confronted with 
situated dilemmas in power 
relations. 
Planners can reproduce or 
transform power relations 
through their everyday 
practices. 
Action bias Planners ought to use their  
skills to design and facilitate 
planning processes, which  
enables power with. 
Planners ought to make  
situated judgements in view  
of minimising illegitimate  
power over and maximising 
power with. 
Planners ought to be 
reflexive and transform 
illegitimate power over into 
power with. 
 
Let us turn to the findings pertaining to the second question. To what extent are 
the notions of power in communicative planning theory enabling reflective 
practice? This question will be responded to with a short and somewhat 
theoretical answer, which I will return to elaborate and illustrate more concretely 
through an analysis of Swedish planning practice (Chapters 7 and 8). 
The findings show that the communicative planning scholars’ core notion is 
that illegitimate power over ought to be criticised and turned into power with 
through participatory planning. Conflictual power is largely defined as 
illegitimate and consensual power seen as desirable. The constitutive and 
productive notion of power, power to in my family, is largely missing. Regarding 
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the planners’ roles in power relations, the theory provides three basic 
alternatives: the facilitator, the critical pragmatist and the reflexive planner.  
Thereby, communicative planning theory provides planners with a vocabulary, 
which usefully turns the gaze towards how planning actors, including planners’ 
themselves, might misuse their power to get it their way. It also provides a vision, 
power with, for how things could be different.  
The most obvious constraint with this way of framing power is that it reduces 
power over to domination, to an evil. This way of thinking leads to, by definition, 
excluding the legitimate power over, which will be frequently needed to achieve 
both the communicative planning vision of power with and for settling contested 
planning issues. The second constraint is that more elaborated tools for 
understanding how power to is derived from social order are largely missing. 
These gaps in the conceptualisation of power are what might cause an attempt 
to escape from power altogether in participatory planning, even if such an escape 
does not exist (cf. Haugaard, 2010a).  
The two following chapters complement this engagement with scholars’ 
meaning-making by contextualising the research in Swedish planning policy and 
practice. First, in Chapter 6, I present the analysis of notions of power in 
planning policy and then in Chapter 7, I provide a look into planning practice 
and planners’ “dirty hands” experiences with power.  
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Citizens’ engagement in societal development and participation in planning can vitalise 
the municipal democracy. Participation can result in curiosity and interest, which can 
lead to broader engagement in society as well as in politics. […] But the dialogue ought 
not to invalidate the rules of representative democracy, where elected representatives 
have the right to make decisions on behalf of citizens. (Boverket, 2018, p. 18)  
This chapter presents the findings from analysing notions of power in Swedish 
participatory planning policy. Two research questions are pursued: which basic 
notions of power are embedded in participatory planning? To what extent are 
these notions enabling reflective practice? Chapter 5 addressed the same 
questions and presented findings pertaining to the domain of theory. This chapter 
supplements those findings by explicating the notions of power in Swedish 
participatory planning policy. 
In the first section the research is contextualised in Swedish planning policy. 
The second section presents the analysis. Participatory planning guidance from 
two influential Swedish planning authorities is analysed. When the findings are 
summarised in the closing section, it is stressed that power is not explicitly 
discussed in the guidance. Instead notions of power tacitly inform the advice and 
directions provided to Swedish planners. Underneath the surface of guidance, 
the consensus frame, identified already in the analysis of communicative 
planning theory, informs the guidance alongside a more influential authority 
frame. The guidance employs two of the identity frames, which were found in 
the analysis of communicative planning theory: the facilitator and the reflexive 
planner. Importantly, the analysis also identifies an additional expert frame, 
which legitimises planners’ use of power over. 
6 Notions of power in Swedish planning 
policy 
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6.1 Frame analysis of Swedish planning policy 
6.1.1 About Swedish planning and the analysis 
The Swedish planning system is shaped by different ideals and ideas. Notably, 
Swedish planning policy is still strongly influenced by the rational 
Enlightenment ideals, which traditionally have been relatively strong in Sweden 
(Strömgren, 2007). These ideals suggest that power relations are structured from 
the top-down in the planning system. Perhaps its strongest manifestation is the 
municipal “planning monopoly” and an established view of planning as an 
expert-lead, yet political endeavour. These ideals were particularly strong during 
the period of social democratic dominance in Swedish policy from the 1950s to 
the 1970s (Strömgren, 2007), but still exercise considerable influence over 
contemporary Swedish planning (Gradén, 2016; Storbjörk and Isaksson, 2005; 
Strömgren, 2007).  
Yet, since the 1960s, Swedish democracy and planning policy also includes 
participatory ideals (Boverket, 2018; Isaksson et al., 2009; SKL, 2013; SOU 
2000:1). Based on the same kind of critique towards rationality as levelled by 
communicative planning scholars, ideals of participation and deliberation have 
made imprints on Swedish planning policy. These ideas push for more bottom-
up, inclusive and consensual power relations in planning. 
Finally, the neoliberal ideals have gained ground since the 1980s. This has 
led to an increased emphasis on market mechanisms in the planning system 
(Grange, 2017; Loit, 2014; Metzger et al., 2014). In terms of power, these ideals 
suggest that planning leads to the undesirable centralisation of power in the 
hands of politicians and bureaucrats. Instead, neoliberal ideals stress that private 
actors and market mechanisms should play a more prominent role. 
Thus, Swedish planning is arguably influenced by a struggle between 
competing ideals, which include different notions of power. This situation makes 
Swedish planning relevant for my study. Since the rational, participatory and 
neoliberal ideals all are present, it can be assumed that frame analysis will 
provide access to a variety of notions of power. 
To access notions of power in Swedish planning policy, I have chosen 
planning guidance as the study object. Planning guidance documents are suitable 
study objects in view of my interest in identifying and assessing different notions 
of power in participatory planning. Governments and agencies use guidance to 
influence planning practices in the direction they prefer. Thus, as Cashmore et. 
al., (2015, p. 85) argue, “guidance play[s] a prominent role in contemporary 
governance”. Given my interest in reflective practice, guidance is especially 
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relevant to study, since it is intended to help planners make sense of the 
difficulties they face.  
I have chosen to focus the analysis on guidance issued by the National 
Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket) and the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR). These organisations 
are arguably two of the most important norm-setting organisations for 
participatory planning in Sweden.  
Boverket is the central authority commissioned by the Swedish government 
to review developments within the fields of housing, building and planning. 
Boverket supervises town and country planning in Sweden, from legislative, 
procedural and architectural perspectives. The agency holds a special responsi-
bility to develop Swedish planning processes and its instruments, including 
pointing out best practices and providing planning guidance.  
SALAR represents the governmental, professional and employer related 
interests of Sweden's 290 municipalities and 20 county councils/regions. All of 
Sweden's municipalities, county councils and regions are members of SALAR. 
Since the early 2000s, SALAR has been one of the most influential actors when 
it comes to promoting citizen dialogue (medborgardialoger), which is one of the 
key terms used for participatory planning processes in Sweden. Their work is 
guided by a special commission from SALARs congress, which is made up of 
municipal and regional politicians from Swedish parties. SALAR has a division 
in their organisation that takes responsibility for democracy and co-creation. 
They work intensively through networks with politicians and civil servants, 
organise training programmes, provide web support and produce publications to 
further citizen dialogue. 
In the following section I present and discuss the analysis of Swedish 
planning policy.10 
6.1.2 Boverket’s framing of power  
The frame analysis explicates and assess the notions of power Boverket, as the 
national agency responsible for planning, draws on when issuing guidance for 
their planners. Thereby, the analysis provides a window into how the Swedish 
state suggests planners deal with power relations in participatory planning.  
                                                     
10. See Section 3.3 for a discussion of the methodology for the analysis. 
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Boverket’s framing of power in participatory planning 
Boverket’s guidance draws attention to problems with the legitimacy of Swedish 
democracy by pointing at the need to increase citizens’ trust in politics and 
politicians. The unspoken diagnosis is that there are legitimacy problems, due to 
low levels of citizen participation in democratic practices. “Citizens’ engagement 
in societal development and participation in planning can vitalise the municipal 
democracy. Participation can result in curiosity and interest, which can lead to 
broader engagement in society as well as in politics.” (Boverket, 2018, p. 18). This 
quote illustrates an inferred problem formulation in Boverket’s guidance: levels of 
engagement and participation in Swedish democracy are too low. Boverket 
thereby links their planning guidance to the broader discussions about the state of 
Swedish democracy. The choice of the word “vitalise” suggests an underlying 
diagnosis of a Swedish democracy in need of change. 
Boverket suggests that decisions taken through representative democracy can 
be legitimised if citizens are increasingly included in participatory democracy. 
More specifically the agency suggests that increased participation will legitimise 
planning decisions.   
Citizens’ participation and engagement increases the legitimacy of planning. It can be 
about placement of new housing or new neighbourhoods in relation to existing 
building. A good dialogue creates mutual trust between the municipality and those 
who live and work in the area. A well implemented dialogue process gives increased 
understanding for decisions, even if all cannot agree. (Ibid.) 
From this action bias, we learn that Boverket implicitly identifies lack of 
legitimacy and trust as problems that challenge representative democracy in 
Sweden. We can also see that Boverket suggests that reinforcing participatory 
democracy through planning will legitimise decision-making within 
representative democracy.  
Underneath this framing of representative democracy in need of more 
participation lies unstated notions of power. My interpretation is that Boverket 
draws on a narrative that claims that citizens tend to view the exercise of power 
by politicians and planers as illegitimate power over, if they are not included in 
planning processes. The logic is that an increase in participation will provide 
politicians with access to local knowledge and opinions that can inform their use 
of power. If the exercises of power through planning are made more inclusive of 
citizens’ views, they will find the exercises of power over legitimate and consent 
to them, even if they might not agree with the outcomes.   
Boverket’s framing is thereby different to the one in communicative planning 
theory. The main framing in communicative planning theory is that illegitimate 
power over ought to be transformed to power with. Even if Boverket shares the 
critique of illegitimate power over, the agency suggests another solution: to 
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restore the legitimacy of power over by making the exercises of power over more 
sensitive to citizens’ opinions and knowledge.  
In their guidance, Boverket makes a basic distinction between consultation 
(samråd) and citizen dialogue (medborgardialog). For Boverket, the term 
consultation signifies a legally regulated hierarchical relationship, where the 
municipality asks citizens to comment on municipal plan proposals. In contrast, 
the concept of citizen dialogue is used to signify a more horizontal and informal 
relationship where parties on an equal footing jointly make sense of planning 
options.  
Consultation is the legally binding concept in the Swedish Planning and 
Building Act (2010:900), while citizen dialogue is not used as a regulatory 
concept in the national planning framework. Interestingly, Boverket chose to use 
citizen dialogue as the core concept in their guidance: their guide is titled as a 
guide for citizen dialogue (medborgardialog) and not for consultations 
(samråd). This indicates how Boverket advocates for participatory planning that 
goes beyond the letter of the law, in terms of providing space for participation.   
Boverket explains that following the formal consultation procedure is not 
sufficient if municipalities aspire for better decisions through dialogue with 
citizens (Boverket, 2008). This standpoint is illustrative of the most prominent 
action bias in Boverket’s guidance: municipalities ought to initiate participatory 
planning in the early stages of the planning processes or even before the formal 
start of planning.  
From Boverket’s reasoning, we learn about the implicit diagnosis behind this 
action bias. The agency problematises the formal consultation procedure (samråd) 
because it stipulates that municipalities prepare analysis and plan proposals prior 
to interactions with citizens. Boverket finds that if the municipality prepares draft 
plans, prior to dialogue with citizens, the risk is that citizens might not find the 
procedure legitimate, due to their limited possibility to influence the agenda.  
Thus, the underlying diagnosis is, in the language of this thesis, that 
municipalities exercise illegitimate power over if they go too far in preparing 
plans and decisions prior to inviting citizens to participate.  
If the municipality instead initiates citizen dialogue long before these standpoints are 
established, the citizens’ knowledge, experience and needs can improve the basis for 
decision considerably. […] The residences often have better knowledge about the local 
circumstances than the planners and decision makers. People who lead everyday lives 
in a place might see things differently compared to planners. It is important to harvest 
this knowledge and use it as a basis for the planning […]. (Boverket, 2018, p. 9) 
The logic expressed in the quote is that dialogue between planners, politicians 
and citizens leads to increased understanding of local knowledge and needs. This 
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way of reasoning leads Boverket (2018, p. 17) to stipulate that “citizen dialogue 
ought to give increased citizens’ influence”. 
The underlying notion of power seems to be that the exercise of power over 
might be made redundant, since plus sum solutions can be identified through 
increased (early) participation. Through the family resemblance view, this can 
be seen as a hope for power with or perhaps again an expectation that the use of 
power over might be accepted if it is seen as informed by citizens’ knowledge 
and views.  
A red thread runs through the guidance of Boverket’s acceptance of the 
necessity of legitimate power over, both for process and outcome legitimacy. 
First, Boverket argues that inclusive planning processes will not arise without 
purposeful design.   
It is important to engage a broad spectrum of participants to the meetings and the 
dialogue fora. Special activities might be required to attract people who represent other 
interests than those next to the planned area. It is an art to distribute the talking space 
fairly equal and to get everyone to express their opinion. (Boverket, 2018, p. 18) 
This reasoning shows how Boverket sees problems with the exclusion of people 
in citizen dialogue as prominent. The agency emphasises how inclusive and fair 
dialogue might not happen without purposeful design.  
Besides arguing for focused process design, Boverket also draws attention to 
the limits of participatory planning as a means to legitimise planning outcomes 
and decisions. It is stressed that “there is an apparent risk that the people who 
participate in the dialogue get unproportioned influence, compared to those who 
do not participate, in spite of being concerned with the issue.” (Boverket, 2018, 
p. 18). This clarifies how Boverket sees representative democracy as a guarantee 
for planning to be capable of realising the common good (allmänna intresset), 
which can be understood as an interest in outcome legitimacy.  
Thereby, the analysis shows how Boverket recognises the tension between 
representative and participatory democracy. Boverket chose to explicitly address 
how municipalities ought to tackle such tensions. 
A well-designed citizen dialogue gives inhabitants possibilities to express their 
concerns and exercises more concrete influence than otherwise. But the dialogue 
ought not to invalidate [kullkasta] the rules of representative democracy, where 
elected representatives have the right to make decisions on behalf of citizens. 
(Boverket, 2018, p. 18)  
In this quote Boverket advocates both representative and participatory 
democracy, while also making clear how there are tensions between the two. 
Boverket chose to stress that participatory planning ought to provide citizens 
with a “more concrete” voice and influence than they usually have. Importantly, 
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Boverket also clearly states that it is the elected politicians who hold the right to 
make decisions on behalf of citizens.  
Notably Boverket uses the strong word invalidate (kullkasta) when they 
discuss the tension between participatory planning and representative 
democracy. The strongly negative connotations of the word (and the Swedish 
metaphor) seem to indicate that Boverket finds it important to get their point 
across: participation might undermine representative democracy and if this 
happens, there should be no doubt that the representative model should dictate 
“the rules of the game”.   
Thus, in my interpretation, Boverket frames power in participatory planning 
by firmly placing it within the boundaries of representative democracy. The 
emphasis is then on how legitimacy can be strengthened through increased and 
earlier participation by citizens in the planning processes.  
This framing is tacitly informed by notions of power. Increased participation 
is seen to carry potential for creating legitimacy through plus-sum processes 
where consensus is possible. This line of thought can be explained as an interest 
in power with, yet at the same time Boverket also recognises that legitimate 
power over, derived from democratic mandates and expertise, is still necessary 
in order to assure process and outcome legitimacy. Power to, the ability to act 
derived from social order, is present under the surface of the text, but is merely 
seen as arising from democratic mandates and expertise. Less visible links 
between power and social order, such as socialisation and discipline are absent 
from the guidance.    
Boverket’s framing of planners’ roles in power relations 
The guide emphasises that planners have the right to and are responsible for 
making choices regarding the design of participatory planning processes. It is 
thereby stressed how planners (commissioned by politicians) ought to take the 
lead in participatory planning and clarify what is possible for citizens to 
influence. 
If it is not about dialogue, but about pure information, you [the planner] ought to make 
that clear. […] Tell the citizens early how they can influence the planning. Explain the 
planning conditions, why the municipality wants to do this and clarify what can be 
influenced. (Boverket, 2018, p. 15)  
Boverket suggests that it is up to the planners to clarify if the purpose with 
interactions with citizens is dialogue or “pure information”. Behind this action 
bias is a concern that citizens will lose trust if they are given a false sense that 
they can influence, when the actual space for influence is limited.  
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When it comes to process design, the guidance is placing the planners in the 
driver’s seat. They are firmly put in charge, “Clarify the preconditions and plan 
the process […] How much the citizens are to be involved and in which parts of 
the process” (Boverket, 2018, p. 34). Notably Boverket constructs the process 
design as an internal municipal affair intended to clarify the purpose of 
participatory planning. 
In my interpretation, this framing of planners as in charge of citizen dialogue, 
is based on the notion that legitimate power over is derived from democratic 
mandates and expertise. Planners, due to being experts in process design or in 
more technical areas of planning, and due to their position in the democratic 
planning system, hold authority that makes their exercise of power over 
legitimate. Boverket views power over as an inevitable process in planning. 
Power over, exercised by politicians and planners, is needed both to secure 
process and outcome legitimacy. 
Yet Boverket also draws on the reflexive planner frame (identified in the 
analysis of communicative planning theory) to advise planners to critically 
scrutinise if their practices might be seen as exercise of illegitimate power 
over. This is indicated by how planners’ habitual practices are criticized. “[…] 
activate more of the participants and get away from the traditional larger 
assembly meetings, where citizens have a passive role” (Boverket, 2018, p. 
41). Here the implicit analysis is that planners (and politicians) prefer 
“traditional larger assembly meetings” and this is problematic since those 
practices make citizens “passive”.  
Employing the reflexive frame, Boverket (2018, p. 36) is also questioning 
presumed modes of communication. “Consider that all might not be comfortable 
with reading maps and understanding statistics”. So here planners are encouraged 
to pay attention to how their practices might exclude certain people. Boverket is 
also paying attention to how planners ought to compensate marginalised groups.  
Chose a dialogue method which really facilitates participation, also from people or 
groups who do not have background knowledge in planning. It is useful to make a 
designated invitation to people or groups who might be difficult to engage in the 
dialogue. […] Also think about that people with disabilities ought to be able to enter 
into the premises.  They might need special aids to participate […] Think about that 
all might not be comfortable with reading maps or understand statistics. (Boverket, 
2018, p. 106) 
Notably, Boverket is implicitly problematising planners’ everyday practices 
because these might be seen as exercises of illegitimate power over. The following 
action bias is for planners to employ alternative modes of communication and 
more inclusive physical design of the premises where participatory planning is 
taking place.  
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In my interpretation, this framing is tacitly informed by a critique of 
illegitimate power over. By critiquing three-dimensional power over, Boverket 
suggests that planners ought to question their habitual ways of exercising power. 
At the same time, the agency assumes that planners must actively use legitimate 
power over to achieve the process and outcome legitimacy needed to restore the 
trust in the planning system.  
Boverket uses neutrality as a key concept in their framing of planners’ roles 
in relation to citizens. The agency argues that facilitators of citizen dialogue 
ought to be neutral.   
Chose a communicator or facilitator who can be neutral in relation to the opinions 
raised in the discussion […] consider if there might be reasons for having an external 
meeting leader. A professional dialogue leader might be needed and it might be good 
for the balance with a totally neutral person. (Boverket, 2018, p. 36) 
Boverket claims that a facilitator of dialogue is needed here and argues that they 
ought to be neutral. Boverket suggests that the facilitator might be a planner, but 
also emphasises that there might be good reasons for bringing in a professional 
facilitator who can be “totally neutral”. Underlying Boverket’s neutrality 
narrative is the assumption that the advantage of the behaviour and position of a 
neutral facilitator is that he or she will not have a stake in the planning. The 
facilitator will thereby be seen as legitimate due to his or her “neutrality”.  
The narrative about neutrality is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the 
notion, discussed previously, that facilitators/planners ought to make purposeful 
design choices. Practitioners who make design choices, which inevitably will be 
to the advantage of certain actors, might not be accepted as neutral by other actors 
who oppose these choices. Perhaps Boverket deems it necessary for facilitators to 
be neutral towards the outcome of planning, while they advise planners and 
facilitators to make purposeful design choices to assure process legitimacy? This 
interpretation makes sense as a way to reconcile the two narratives. Yet it is still 
difficult to see how the distinction between making (often contested) process 
design choices and being neutral towards planning outcomes can work in practice, 
since process design choices most frequently influence the outcome. 
The difficulties to reconcile these two narratives, about purposeful design 
choices and neutral facilitators, can perhaps be explained by the lack of vocabulary 
of power in the guidance. For underneath the surface of Boverket’s reasoning are 
notions of power, which remain implicit. The advice that planners ought to make 
process design choices can be seen as a call for planners to use legitimate power 
over. In contrast, the argument for neutrality is rather difficult to conceptualise 
within a vocabulary of power. Neutrality seems to imply that facilitators can be 
positioned outside a system of power, i.e. outside a social order. If facilitators are 
conceptualised in this way, it is difficult to explain why planning actors would 
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accept their attempts to exercise power. From where would facilitators’ power to 
arise and why would their attempts to exercise power with or power over be 
accepted by other planning actors? Hence, the tension, between the narratives of 
process design choices and neutrality, might be due to the former being consistent 
with a vocabulary of power and the latter less so. In other words, neutrality is a 
difficult concept to fit into a family of power concepts. 
6.1.3 SALAR’s framing of power 
SALAR is the political association, which organises the local level in the 
Swedish planning system. Analysing SALAR’s guidance provides access to 
another kind of organisational framing compared to that of Boverket, who 
represents the national level.  
SALAR’s framing of power in participatory planning 
The analysis shows that SALAR frames power in two similar, yet distinct ways. 
First, the organisation frames along the same lines as Boverket: Swedish 
democracy suffers from a lack of legitimacy, which ought to be restored through 
increased participation within the boundaries set by representative democracy. 
In the second framing, SALAR instead suggests that complex and contested 
issues cannot be handled through the conventional decision-making procedures 
offered by representative democracy, due to the risk that decisions taken would 
not be accepted by the conflicting parties. This diagnosis leads SALAR to argue 
that politicians and planners “must be brave” and “accept that they do not solely 
hold the right to make decisions.” (SKL, 2013, p. 17). In my interpretation, this 
framing originates from the notions of power expounded as the consensus frame, 
which was identified through the analysis of communicative planning theory 
(see Chapter 5).  
I will start by discussing the analysis of the more authoritative framing, the 
one similar to Boverket’s reasoning. The intention is to shed additional light on 
the underlying notions of power. 
SALAR’s diagnosis points to how the space available for citizen influence is 
frequently unclear in citizen dialogue. 
Experiences show that participants think that the decision will be taken through the 
dialogue. The reason for this might be that the purpose of the meeting and its’ role in 
the decision-making process are unclear. This has to be crystal clear when 
municipalities implement citizens’ dialogues as part of the governing process. (SKL, 
2009, p. 16) 
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The action bias flowing from this diagnosis is that politicians and planners ought 
to clarify the level of influence. To do that, the guidance points towards an 
adjusted version of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation, as a tool for 
deciding the level of citizens’ influence in participatory planning. Notably, 
Arnstein’s original idea, the normative desirability of climbing the ladder, is 
replaced with a view of the ladder as a value neutral heuristic device. SALAR 
thereby suggests that the ladder can be used in order to provide clarity about the 
level of influence. It is argued that politicians and planners ought to stipulate 
what is possible to influence in a specific episode of participatory planning. 
Experiences show that elected officials too often have to defend themselves, 
sometimes because the dialogue is implemented to late in the process or because the 
space for influence has not been clearly delineated. (Ibid.) […] In order to systematise 
the choice of methods for citizen dialouge, the purpose of SALAR’s stair is to create 
awareness of the scope and depth of participation, which the municpality/county 
wishes to offer its citizens in dialogues. (SKL, 2019a, p. 16) 
Hence, this part of the analysis shows how SALAR, just as Boverket, suggests 
that participatory planning ought to be firmly anchored within the boundaries of 
representative democracy. The idea is that municipalities hold the right to use 
legitimate power over resulting from their democratic mandate. This kind of 
power is needed to clarify the scope of influence in citizen dialogue. Notably, 
SALAR (and Boverket) are thereby, in contrast to communicative planning 
scholars, emphasising how power over is necessary in participatory planning.  
In their publications with specific guidance for participatory planning on 
“contested and complex issues”, SALAR frames power in a somewhat alternative 
manner (SKL, 2013; SKL, 2019b). The core diagnosis is then that conflicting 
issues do not lend themselves well to be decided through representative 
democracy.  
There are a number of issues, which are so complex, and thereby potentially 
conflictual, that it is really difficult to handle through ‘the conventional way’. […] the 
choice is to make a decision, which will be very unpopular among some groups or not 
to make a decision at all. Unfortunately, also non-decisions can have negative 
consequences. Non-decisions can lead to inefficient use of resources, which might hurt 
vulnerable groups, groups with little voice or lead to protests, which can result in riots. 
(SKL, 2013, p. 7) 
This excerpt shows how SALAR draws on another kind of frame, which is 
affiliated with the consensual notions of power in communicative planning 
theory (see Chapter 5). It is no longer seen as sufficient for municipalities to 
exercise power over. Instead, SALAR now implies that power over might not be 
complied with since it might be viewed as illegitimate by citizens. 
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The principle, which it all starts with is to ‘open up’. This means that more people 
need to be included in the formulation of the problem and the work to handle it. The 
municipality needs to work with an “inclusive approach”. This approach is active, 
curious and all participants are treated equally. (SKL, 2013, p. 28) 
Notably, in this framing an alternative metaphor of “levels” replaces the formerly 
used ladder metaphor and now “Dialogue is the highest level where the intention 
is to agree on solutions, which all can accept” (SKL, 2013, p. 15). In contrast to 
the ladder image, where the steps were seen as value neutral, “dialogue” is now 
given a higher value than “discussion”, “rule-based procedure” and “run over”. 
Specifically, the latter metaphor comes with a distinctively negative connotation. 
“For some issues there is no solution, instead ‘run over’ is applied. Run over means 
that those who hold the formal power make a decision, even if other groups oppose 
the decision” (SKL, 2013, p. 15).  
In my interpretation, SALAR is now tacitly informed by the consensual way 
of seeing power, the same frame that was previously found in the analysis of 
communicative planning theory. Power is then implicitly seen as illegitimate 
power over and ought therefore to be replaced by power with. Thereby, SALAR 
opens a critique of prevailing power hierarchies, at the same time as running the 
risk of suggesting that there might be an escape from power over. This framing 
is clearly illustrated by the metaphor “run over”, which dramatically underscores 
how reprehensible it is to exercise power over.  
Yet, under the surface of SALAR’s guidance, there is simultaneously 
recognition of the necessity of legitimate power over. 
The work is finalised by the signing of an agreement with the help of the mediator. 
The purpose is to clarify what has been achieved, what has been agreed, what the 
parties disagree on, what to do if parties cannot agree, how the parties ought to relate 
to each other, how unresolved issues will be resolved in the future and how the 
respective group is responsible for holding the agreement. (SKL, 2013, p. 27) 
It is emphasised how the agreement should include a clear division of power and 
responsibility. “Agreements rarely last forever, therefore the agreement period 
and how to follow up ought to be clearly stated in the agreement. Who is 
responsible, how to follow up, the feedback results of following up […]” (SKL, 
2013, p. 28). Interestingly, SALAR is also suggesting that a higher authority 
might be needed to oversee the agreement. “Finally, the agreement also ought to 
stipulate if another body, for example the municipal council, needs to make 
decisions about its validity” (SKL, 2013, p. 28).  
This reasoning, in my interpretation, implies a return of legitimate power 
over through the back door. Thereby, the analysis reveals tensions between 
notions of power as conflictual and as consensual. 
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SALAR’s framing of planners’ roles in power relations 
The two alternative frames identified above, the consensual and the more 
authoritative, are reflected in how SALAR approaches planners’ roles in power 
relations. SALAR employs the already identified facilitator frame and the 
reflexive planner frame,11 but the guidance is also informed by an additional 
frame, which stresses planners’ legitimate right to exercises power over, due to 
expertise and democratic mandates.  
Drawing on the latter frame, SALAR emphasises how planners are 
positioned in the democratic system and thereby hold the authority to exercise 
legitimate power over in participatory planning. Planners are encouraged to use 
this authority to tackle the problems that SALAR has identified in the practice 
of participatory planning. This includes the diagnosis that politicians need better 
knowledge about citizens’ values; that there often is a lack of clarity regarding 
the space for influence and that there is a problem with the “usual suspects” in 
participatory planning.  
SALAR’s action bias, in relation to these problems, is mainly that planners 
ought to clarify the space available for citizens to influence and that planners 
ought to actively work to reach out to those who are rarely participating to 
include them in participatory planning. Underlying this narrative is the notion 
that planners ought to exercise legitimate power over in order to assure process 
and outcome legitimacy. 
In an alternative framing, it is in contrast argued that planners, to some extent, 
ought to question their habitual practices, including the tendency to use 
exclusionary language and organise meetings in the city hall. I interpret these 
suggestions as derived from the reflexive planner frame (see Chapter 5).   
When SALAR is employing the facilitator frame, they rely upon the concept 
neutrality, just as Boverket. The diagnosis is then that “successful conflict 
management requires […] a neutral party (mediator) who drives, and is 
responsible for, the process” (SKL, 2013, p. 17). SALAR’s argument seems to 
be based on the idea that a “neutral mediator” is necessary in order to establish 
trust from all participants.  
In order to be trustworthy when one opens up and issue, those who work with citizen 
dialogue need to be seen as neutral. Neutrality is here defined as impartial, not 
valuing and compassionate. Neutrality is a role and a tool, which municipal 
employees can be trained to assume, but it can be difficult and requires practice and 
awareness. (SKL, 2019b, p.13) 
                                                     
11. These frames were identified in the analysis of communicative planning theory in Chapter 5. 
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Neutrality is seen as important in order to achieve trust in the participatory 
planning process. 
All those who are concerned or will be concerned within the organization, must be 
involved; foremost in order to get knowledge and understanding of the necessity to 
give an independent role to the mediator in order to make the process successful. This 
means that those who are politicians or civil servants cannot expect to influence the 
mediator to take the road that directors, politicians and others might think is the best 
one. The reason being that the municipality/county also has a perspective/s, which 
should not have more weight than other perspectives. (SKL, 2013, p. 18) 
From this we learn that SALAR stresses that the involved parties must be 
convinced to see the mediator, which is a similar position to that of the facilitator, 
as independent. SALAR stresses how this means that the municipal directors and 
politicians should not expect the mediator/facilitator to look after their interests.  
From further elaboration in the guidance (SKL, 2013), we learn that planners 
can, under some (unspecified) conditions, play the role of neutral facilitators, 
while under other (again unspecified) conditions will be seen as representatives 
of the municipality and thereby as a party to the conflict and thus unable to act 
as neutral facilitators. SALAR discusses the role of the mediator/facilitator as 
follows:  
The mediator’s assignment is to create a safe forum for open dialogue between the 
concerned parties. The mediator can contribute with a “neutral energy” to the process. 
This neutrality creates the basis for increased trust and confidence between the parties. 
(SKL, 2013, p. 18) 
Yet the municipality is still given a special role as the commissioner of a 
mediator/facilitator, either from outside or from inside the municipal organisation.  
To give the mandate is a brave and necessary action in order to progress the process. 
[…] The municipality’s/county’s civil servants and elected politicians are often 
involved parties. Thus, the mediator must be able to talk also to them – as parties in 
the conflict – even if they at the same time are the commissioners of the mediator. It 
is important that the mediator’s neutrality always is respected. (SKL, 2013, pp. 18-19) 
Just as for Boverket, neutrality is a key concept in SALAR’s narrative of 
planners’ role in power relations. But it is difficult to reconstruct the underlying 
logic in a language of power. It seems as if SALAR’s intention is similar to 
Boverket’s: the facilitator’s role is to turn illegitimate power into power with. 
Through the vocabulary of the power family, we can see that this task requires 
that the facilitators are accepted by participants as having a position in a power 
system, which entitles them with the power to act as facilitators. Yet, the concept 
of neutrality suggests that facilitators are positioned unbiased outside of such 
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power systems. Why would participants accept that the holder of this position is 
entitled to power to act as facilitators?  
SALAR’s and Boverket’s neutrality narrative also leaves us puzzled when it 
comes to legitimate power over. When participatory planning is conflictual, 
meaning and goals are no longer shared. Under such conditions the facilitator 
will need to make design choices and facilitate processes, which will frequently 
be contested. In the language of power, such conflictual situations require the 
use of power over by some actors to restore a social order, which enables 
coordinated action (Haugaard, 2003). Hence the use of power over is inevitable 
in the kind of planning processes where SALAR and Boverket make the case for 
neutral facilitators. But how can the neutral facilitator justify the use of power 
over? When would a neutral facilitator’s use of power be deemed as legitimate 
and complied with? These key questions are difficult to answer based on the 
guidance provided by SALAR and Boverket.  
6.2 The findings 
This section summarises the findings pertaining to the two research questions. 
• Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?  
• To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice? 
The analysis of Swedish planning policy complements the findings from the 
analysis of communicative planning theory (Chapter 5). The final research task 
to analyse Swedish participatory planning practice (Chapter 7) will provide 
additional findings and enable a complete answer to the questions (Chapter 8).   
First, it is important to stress that Boverket’s and SALAR’s guidance offers 
little in terms of explicit vocabulary for reflections on power relations. Instead the 
analysis revealed inferred notions of power underneath the surface of the text. 
Regarding the first frame topic, power in participatory planning, the analysis found 
that the consensus frame, identified in the analysis of communicative planning 
theory, informs the guidance. But also, and more prominently, there is another 
kind of frame, which I conceptualise as the authority frame. In contrast to the 
consensus frame, the authority frame does not suggest that illegitimate power over 
is to be replaced by power with, instead the action bias is for participatory planning 
to restore the legitimacy of power over by improved communication between 
politicians, planners and citizens.  
Through the authority frame, both Boverket and SALAR draw attention to a 
lack of trust in Swedish democracy, which participatory planning ought to 
address by providing space for communication between the “rulers” and the 
“ruled”. Yet this frame also leads to setting clear boundaries around 
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participation. For participation should not “invalidate” (kullkasta) representative 
democracy. In my interpretation this reasoning originates from a diagnosis 
questioning the legitimacy of power over, which leads to an action bias to restore 
the legitimacy of power over through participatory planning. This authority 
frame is summarised in Table 10. 
Table 10. The authority frame 
 Authority 
Diagnosis The legitimacy of power over is questioned in planning. 
Action bias Participatory planning ought to restore the legitimacy of power over. 
 
Regarding the second frame topic, planners’ roles in power relations, the 
analysis revealed how the guidance drew on two of the three identity frames 
offered by communicative planning theory: the facilitator and the reflexive 
planner (see Chapter 5).  
Additionally, another kind of framing of planners in power relations was 
present in the guidance. Here it was stressed that planners hold a special position 
as experts and civil servants in the planning system and this position requires 
that they use their authority to make design choices, to settle conflicts and to 
ensure that planning meets not only the interests of those who participate, but 
also the common good. 
Underlying this reasoning is an expert frame. Seen through this frame, 
planners’ roles in power relations are to exercise legitimate power over based on 
expertise and democratic mandates. This frame is summarised in Table 11.  
Table 11. The expert frame 
 Expert 
Diagnosis Planners are experts positioned in a democratic system and thereby entitled to exercise 
legitimate power over. 
Action bias The planner ought to exercise power over to assure process and outcome legitimacy. 
What does the analysis tell us about the extent to which the notions of power in 
the guidance enables reflective practice? First, the analysis shows that the planning 
guidance does not offer much in terms of explicit vocabulary for planners’ 
reflections on power relations. Power is rarely mentioned explicitly in the 
guidance and hence a vocabulary for critical reflections on power is not provided.  
However, the family of power concepts, which was applied and tested in the 
analysis, showed capable of explicating the tacit notions underneath the text. 
Thereby, some conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which the notions 
of power in the guidance enable reflective practice. I will here point to the core 
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observations, which will be complemented through findings from the analysis of 
participatory planning practice (Chapter 7) and finally be used as a basis for 
rethinking power (Chapter 8).  
The manner in which the consensus, facilitator and reflexive planner frames 
are applied in the guidance can enable useful critical reflection on illegitimate 
power over. Here, the guidance is suggesting a similar kind of critical scrutiny 
of hierarchical power relations as communicative planning theory (Chapter 5). 
The critical scrutiny of hierarchical power relations offered by the guidance is 
certainly an important asset for reflective planners. 
But the way that these three frames are applied in the guidance also leads to 
constraints for reflective practice. The three frames rely on the basic thought figure 
that power over ought to be turned into power with. This might be a useful way to 
understand and normatively appraise certain situations in planning, but this 
thought figure falls short of supplying a vocabulary suitable for reflecting on 
contested planning situations, where there might be no plus-sum solution. Hence, 
there is a conceptual void when it comes to conflictual, and yet acceptable, power 
over, which in the power family is conceptualised as legitimate power over. Hence 
the consensus, facilitator and reflexive planner frames leave us with a vexing 
question: how should planners make sence of planning when it is conflictual, when 
a language of consensual power does not suffice?  
A linked problem, which the guidance shares with communicative planning 
theory, is the lack of vocabulary for reflections on power as constitutive and 
productive. These are the notions of power, which are covered by power to in 
my power family. 12 This gap in understanding is, for example, causing tension 
in the narrative of facilitators who both make (potentially contested) process 
design choices and are neutral. The former requires exercises of power, which 
are accepted by planning actors, while the latter suggest that facilitators are 
positioned outside a power system. Why would participants accept the use of 
power from a facilitator positioned outside of a power system? Is the language 
of neutrality sufficient to justify what will inevitably be the use of power? In my 
view, the language of neutrality risks confusing reflective practice. Instead, a 
vocabulary of power is more suitable as is demonstrated by the way in which the 
power family is applied in the analysis. 
Finally, the analysis also shows how the authority and the expert frame 
bridges some, but not all, of the gaps in the understanding offered by the three 
“power with frames”. The authority and expert frames offer an understanding of 
power over as a necessary part of participatory planning. This conflictual notion 
                                                     
12. See Section 4.2.2 for a more elaborate discussion of power to. 
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of power is a much-needed addition to the consensual framing in communicative 
planning theory.  
Through the family resemblance view of power, we can see how alternative 
understandings can, sometimes, be seen as complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive. This points to the possibility of seeing power as a plural concept. 
The notion of legitimate power over in the guidance stresses justification of the 
use of power through a representative democracy model. Expertise and democratic 
mandates are implicitly seen as sources for legitimacy. This is a useful addition to 
communicative planning theory, which largely lacks a conceptualised account of 
the legitimacy of power. Yet, it is too reductive to merely conceptualise legitimacy 
by referencing the ideas of representative democracy. Participatory planning takes 
place at the intersection of representative and participatory democracy and hence 
requires a broader conceptualisation of legitimacy. In this way, the guidance might 
supply planners with some but not all of the conceptual tools they need to reflect 
on legitimacy.  
I will return to elaborate on these observations when the rethinking of power 
is presented in Chapter 8. But first, the next chapter takes us to Swedish 
participatory planning practice.      
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One of the reasons that I decided to resign was my concern about the municipality’s 
apparent unwillingness to prepare for social conflicts that I knew were coming our 
way. (Planner in Gothenburg Municipality) 
Yes, I think that is the 10 000-crown question: what is right to do when people have 
different opinions? (Planner in Uppsala Municipality) 
This chapter presents the findings from analysing notions of power in Swedish 
participatory planning practice. Two research questions are pursued: Which 
basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning? To what extent 
are these notions enabling reflective practice? The previous investigations into 
communicative planning theory (Chapter 5) and Swedish participatory planning 
policy (Chapter 6) have already provided findings pertaining to the questions. 
This chapter complements these by providing insights about the experiences of 
Swedish planners. In the analysis, I elicit and analyse stories about participatory 
planning episodes from two Swedish planners.  
The first section presents the stories and the frame analysis. The first story 
gives an account of participatory planning when stakes are high and the planner 
is crisscrossed by power relations, which block the possibility to do what he 
wishes to. In contrast, the other story offers insights into what a planner might 
do when resources are less scarce, planning issues not as controversial and there 
is more space to reflect and make purposeful choices. 
In the closing section, I draw together the findings. At this point, it is 
emphasised that the planners find it difficult to deal with the complexity of 
power relations. Both the consensus and the authority frames figures under the 
surface in the stories. In their different ways the planners are challenged by the 
tension arising from the competing notions of power in these frames. Is power 
with always preferable? When is power over legitimate? The planners’ struggles 
7 Notions of power in Swedish planning 
practice 
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with those kinds of question shows the value of the broad conceptualisation of 
power developed in this thesis. 
7.1 Frame analysis of Swedish participatory planning 
practice 
The planners I have interviewed13 share the same desires for revitalising 
democracy and for empowering citizens through planning as the scholars and 
policy makers, whose framing I analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. Their stories show 
us how planners are confronted with situations, which require hard thinking and 
questioning of presumed notions about what power is and when it is legitimate.  
Yet, just as in the Swedish planning guidance (Chapter 5), notions of power 
mainly remain tacit in the stories. Underneath the surface, the planners’ meaning-
making is guided by the process and identity frames, which were identified in the 
analysis of communicative planning theory and Swedish planning policy. The 
stories demonstrate how these frames are constraining and enabling the planners’ 
attempts to deal with power.  
7.1.1 Dialogue or information meetings?  
- The story of a contested planning process 
During the spring of 2016, Bernard le Roux was working as a dialogue strategist 
in Gothenburg Municipality. He was responsible for designing and facilitatating 
participatory processes and for providing advice and support to other 
departments in the municipality. This story focuses on Bernard’s work with a 
series of citizen meetings on suggested locations for temporary housing for 
refugees in Gothenburg. The increased number of refugees had resulted in a need 
to swiftly build houses for the newcomers. The municipality had identified 
potential sites where houses could be built. After having identified the sites, the 
municipality decided to arrange a series of, what they called, “information 
meetings” with the intention of presenting their plans for suggested locations 
and answering citizens’ questions. 
Bernard is an experienced facilitator specialising in designing dialogue 
processes and facilitating meetings, often those with a great deal of conflict. His 
chief interest is in conflict management and he has a background as a mediator 
in interpersonal and social conflicts. An important basis for Bernard’s 
motivation is his upbringing in South Africa during the conflictual period prior 
                                                     
13. See Section 3.3 for a discussion of the methodology I have developed and applied. 
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to democratisation. During this time, he learned that if people are empowered to 
work through conflicts, solutions tend to be more sustainable.  
Therefore, he believes that it is important to create, what he calls, “real 
meetings” where humans “really meet each other” so that “something new can 
be created”. He explains, 
To me dialogue is more than simply an exchange, it goes deeper than only the head. 
In a dialogue something new and bigger is created. I have seen how people can 
become locked into positions and how damaging the effects are. South Africa is an 
example of this. That is why we talk so much about creating a flow in the context 
of dialogue. (le Roux, 2016) 
Bernard has been inspired by Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela, as they “show 
that we can be better than we normally are and leave our natural instinct to 
revenge aside”. Theoretically he draws on three areas: firstly, conflict and 
mediation theory, especially Folger and Bush (2004) and their “Transformative 
Mediation”. “I always return to their way of looking at conflict, dialogue and 
communication”. Secondly, he is inspired by Myrna Lewis’ work on Deep 
Democracy (www.deep-democracy.net), which has helped him to “see what is 
under the surface in group processes”. Thirdly, he refers to design thinking as 
inspiring an approach to open up and listen, “to listen, reflect and concretise, 
prototyping on small scale inspires me in my work”. 
A key event in his life that has led him into process design and facilitation 
was when he freed himself from his father.  
My father was a judge in South Africa. I studied law, but felt instinctively that this 
was not the path for me. I realised how law melted into repressive hierarchical 
structures, which resulted in me not becoming a lawyer. Instead, I became a teacher 
and saw how children ended up being the real victims in conflicts between the parents. 
I thought to myself that there must be another way, thus leading to becoming a 
mediator. After seeing how relationship conflicts often simply went around in circles, 
I started to think that there has to be a better way to deal with differences and conflict. 
I turned to Myrna Lewis who taught me that there are always issues under the surface 
related to the unconscious in a group and in the self. I was also inspired by the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. (le Roux, 2016) 
Bernard and I decided to focus the interview on his work with a series of citizen 
meetings on temporary housing for refugees in Gothenburg in February 2016. 
Bernard was at that time working in Gothenburg Municipality as a “dialogue 
strategist”. What follows is Bernard’s own story of the difficulties he 
confronted.14  
                                                     
14. See Section 3.3.5 for a description of the method I have applied to elicit Bernard’s story. 
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This was the last job I did before leaving Gothenburg Municipality. One of the 
reasons that I decided to resign was my concern about the municipality’s 
apparent unwillingness to prepare for social conflicts that I knew were coming 
our way. One issue was the refugee crisis and another was the problems arising 
in our schools. We talked a lot about preventing damaging conflicts and training 
politicians and civil servants in dialogue and when the municipality was 
suddenly faced with the challenge of building temporary houses resulting from 
a new law that came into force in February or March. It was almost a sense of 
panic, since there were not enough houses in the current stock. I saw the need 
for dialogue but there was no receptiveness on the part of the municipality. 
The Communication Department took responsibility for ten information 
meetings and we were not asked to contribute. Although, the Thursday before 
the first meeting (on the following Tuesday), the person who would lead these 
meetings felt that they could not lead the meetings. We were then asked if we 
could step in and help to lead the meetings. First, we considered saying no 
because we felt the approach of using one-way communication to be 
inappropriate, but we were ordered by our superiors to do the job. 
I was frustrated by the limited possibilities to influence the design of the 
process. To me the whole process design is highly important; it has to do with 
how you invite people and how you think about the meeting. The Communication 
Department were worried that people might become angry and violent and they 
thought that we were able to deal with conflict. We were given a tight leash and 
it was deemed unnecessary for us to meet those from the city who would face the 
public. Instead we met with a coordinator at the communication department. We 
raised concerns that if the meetings became too one-sided, focused only on 
information, that would increase the risk for conflict. We also said that our 
experience is that one should not expect people to politely ask questions at such 
meetings; it is not that people need more information, many would attend the 
meetings to protest. The more one-sided the meeting is, the higher the risk of 
tension. We attempted to prepare the directors who would be on stage, to 
influence them to maintain a receptive and open attitude. 
I was not present at the first meeting, but facilitated the second and third 
meetings. Part of my preparation was to work with myself, as a facilitator. I am 
my own instrument. I need to be very clear with myself about how I function. We 
were told about security arrangements and that guards would be present. 
Unfortunately, I did not get much possibility of speaking to the directors who 
would be at the meetings. We had a brief exchange just before the meeting. The 
form was pre-determined. This did not feel right to me. I felt that I was taken 
hostage in someone else design process.  
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If they ask me to come and handle conflicts then I will do it to my best ability. 
For me there is a big difference between one-way communication and an 
exchange or dialogue. If we were to do a dialogue process there would not only 
be people standing on a stage talking and repeating information that had 
already been published in the papers. The design would be entirely different. If 
you are about to make decisions that concern people, they have a right to be part 
of the process. If you only tell them that this is the way we will do it you risk 
turning those who are affected against you, since they will see the “dialogue” 
as a phony process. You need to understand people’s concerns. There is a 
difference between only giving information and having a dialogue to understand. 
Nobody thought about including the refugees in the meetings. They were viewed 
as objects. Some participants saw them as potential rapists. 
Prior to the meetings, I felt a lot of pressure. I was nervous because there 
was a lot of activity on Facebook, you know racist stuff. To prepare for the 
meetings, we said that we needed a team of trained facilitators with microphones 
on the floor. They would be a part of the facilitation team. This was important. 
This had worked well for us previously. They would have the responsibility to 
identify “hot spots” and identify participants who are angry and wanted to speak 
and to let them know that we knew that they wanted to speak. This was not to 
prevent people from speaking, it was rather to assure that those who want to say 
something would have a chance to do so. We talked about three things before 
the meeting: firstly, if someone stood up and shouted comments we would ask 
them to wait for their turn and use the microphone. If someone just took the 
microphone and continued talking we had the possibility of cutting the sound. 
We also talked about what to do if violence occurred. 
In this kind of meeting, you have a lot of power as facilitator. Potentially you 
can direct the flow of the meeting. There are simple things you can do: make 
sure that you have eye contact with everybody. This communicates that you are 
aware of what is occurring and this creates a sense of security or safety. Then 
you can slow down the pace of the conversation and you can ensure that the 
microphone reaches those who want to speak. These things can make a real 
difference.  
At the meeting, there were many expressions of power in the room. There 
were people using their phones to film those who were positive to the refugees 
and asking them who they were. Uniformed men stood at the back of the hall 
with flags. At one stage it almost became violent. It was when a young anarchist 
had been provocative. When he left, some people followed him out. The guards 
were alerted and needed to ensure that he would remain safe. 
 At the first meeting, politicians were sitting in the audience and they were 
asked questions by the public. This resulted in a debate between the politicians; 
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they expressed different views on the issue. Some of them said things that went 
against what the directors had said. Then those who were in charge signaled to 
them that they should not respond. This was very interesting. But the civil 
servants were very concerned about this. In the break all the politicians, except 
the Swedish Democrats [the far-right wing party], were told that they should not 
participate in the meeting nor answer questions. I was very surprised by this. I 
have never experienced anything like it before. I knew that they would be in the 
audience and for me it was obvious that if politicians were asked questions they 
should be allowed to respond.    
I left the city administration two or three days after the meetings I facilitated. 
After that there were more meetings in other districts. I did not get any real 
feedback directly after the meetings from those in charge other than that they 
said that they were pleased that we had kept the meetings calm. The only 
substantive feedback I got was by coincidence when I did a study, months after 
and met with some of the politicians and directors. Then they reasoned that it 
had not been possible to influence the decisions about the refugee houses and 
that this meant that it was important to clarify that the meetings were merely 
intended for informing and answering questions. They told me that as civil 
servants their job was to enable political decisions. The intention was not to have 
a dialogue.  
If I had been in charge and could have decided on the way this should have 
been dealt with in the first place. Then I would design a process where power is 
shared between the decision-makers and those who are affected by the decision; 
between me as facilitator and those who participate. Then we should talk about 
how to set up the meeting. For me process design is also part of gathering of 
perspectives. Prior to the meeting I want to ask people what is important for you, 
how and with whom would you like to talk about it. I would have mapped the 
different perspectives prior to the meeting and instead of a big meeting we would 
have designed smaller group processes. You know, you can’t try to solve this 
kind of thing with 300 people at the same time. This is what I would have 
proposed. But if they had insisted on a big meeting I would have organized it in 
a different way. Not as an information meeting, instead I would have given space 
for dialogue. 
7.1.2 Analysing the story 
This story provides a window into an episode of planning where stakes are high 
and process and outcomes contested. The story is about a frame contest where 
time is short and those in charge are unable to talk things through. In my 
interpretation, the core narrative is about Bernard’s desire for real dialogue 
 131 
originating from the consensus frame and the communication departments’ 
intention to inform citizens, based on the authority frame. In line with Bernard’s 
preference for dialogue, he mainly draws on a facilitator frame to position 
himself in the power relations. But, when under pressure, he switches into a 
critically pragmatic position to do what is necessary in a difficult situation.   
The planner’s framing of power in participatory planning 
The main narrative is about a confrontation between two opposing camps, it is 
Bernard and his colleagues versus the communication department. Bernard’s 
fraction is making the diagnosis that citizens will not find the process for 
deciding on sites for refugee houses legitimate if they are not included in 
participatory planning. His preference is for inclusive dialogue. Bernard’s 
argument is that there is a link between an inclusive planning process and 
citizens’ acceptance of planning decisions.  
The results after the Gothenburg meetings was, for example, that one of the houses were 
set on fire as a protest. So, the risk is that the end result will not be good if meetings are 
aimed only at providing information. People reason: ‘If I can´t influence the decision, I 
will go back to other means such as threats and violence’. They feel that they are not 
listened to, marginalised and lack power in relation to politicians and civil servants who 
can make decisions without even listening to those concerned. (le Roux, 2016) 
To Bernard the action bias is for participatory planning to be inclusive and 
provide space for dialogue. In my interpretation this understanding originates 
from the consensus frame with the core idea that illegitimate power over outside 
participatory planning ought to be turned into power with inside the participatory 
process.  
In the story, we also learn about Bernard’s interpretation of the intentions of 
those he was up against, the ones who were in charge of preparing the meetings. 
He tells how they were determined to make sure that the meetings were only 
about information and answering questions. The argument they gave Bernard 
was that their job as civil servants is to implement a political decision and not to 
have dialogue. 
Here the story provides us with insight into the reasoning of those who 
preferred to see the meetings as information meetings rather than dialogue 
meetings. I interpret their way of reasoning as informed by the authority frame, 
which was identified in the analysis of Swedish planning guidance (Chapter 6). 
In this frame it is suggested that representative democracy provides politicians 
and planners with legitimate power over and that citizen will comply to power 
over if they are included in a participatory planning process where reasons are 
given for politicians’ and planners’ decisions.  
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Thereby, the narrative of the two camps can be interpreted as a frame contest 
between the consensus frame and the authority frame. Bernard’s side suggests 
that dialogue, inclusion and consensus, power with in my family of concepts, is 
the preferred kind of power. In contrast, those who want to see the meetings as 
supplying information draw on the notion that politicians hold the authority to 
make decisions and that the meetings are only supposed to be about legitimising 
decisions taken through power over.  
The planner’s framing of his role in power relations 
Bernard mainly sees himself as a facilitator charged with a mission to create 
conditions for inclusive dialogues towards consensus. This is a preference for 
power with based on a critique of illegitimate power over. Yet, when he finds 
his path blocked by the communication department, he turns to another kind of 
identity as a critical pragmatist. He then seeks to realise his ambitions not merely 
by open communication, but also through strategic incremental action.  
When Bernard draws on the facilitator frame, the core diagnosis is that there 
is a need for politicians and planners to share their power with citizens. The 
rationale is that if the meetings become one-sided the risk for conflict increases. 
Bernard explains by sharing his experience, that people rarely want to ask 
questions when they are upset, they want an opportunity to voice their concerns. 
Therefore, the more one-sided the meeting is, the higher the tension.  
This diagnosis leads towards an action bias where Bernard sees his task as being 
about facilitating processes of power with. “I would design a process where 
power is shared between the decision-makers and those who are affected by the 
decision; between me as facilitator and those who participate.” (le Roux, 2016). 
This action bias includes questioning the established norm to organise large 
assembly meetings. 
I would have mapped the different perspectives prior to the meeting and instead of a 
big meeting we would have designed smaller group processes. You know, you can’t 
try to solve this kind of thing with 300 people at the same time. This is what I would 
have proposed. But if they had insisted on a big meeting I would have organized it in 
a different way. Not as an information meeting, instead I would have given space for 
dialogue. (le Roux, 2016) 
When Bernard found his preferred path blocked, he had to rely on an alternative 
identity as a critical pragmatist. In the story, he tells us how it was difficult to 
talk to anyone in charge of the meetings and he and his colleagues were “put on 
a tight leash”. So here Bernard finds himself unable to engage in his preferred 
mode of working: co-design and dialogue. In my interpretation, he is unable to 
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draw on his favoured identify frame as a facilitator. Instead he tacitly turns to an 
alternative way of understanding his role in power relations.  
First, he tried to refuse to do the job, but when he was ordered by his boss, 
he explored other possibilities. He then strategically prepared for handling what 
he foresaw was to be challenging meetings. One strategy was to bring together 
a team of facilitators who would help each other in handling the meeting. 
We talked about three things before the meeting: Firstly, if someone stood up and 
shouted comments we would ask them to wait for their turn and use the microphone. If 
someone just took the microphone and continued talking, we had the possibility of 
cutting the sound. We also talked about what to do if violence occurred. (le Roux, 2016) 
Bernard here employed an alternative diagnostic focus. Attention is now drawn 
to the risk that the meeting will be conflictual and hostile. The action bias arising 
from this shift in attention is, not towards power sharing, but towards pragmatic 
action to manage the meeting and to prevent violence by employing facilitation 
skills. Pragmatically, the planner is now tacitly acknowledging the need for 
power over.  
You have a lot of power as a facilitator. Potentially you can direct the flow of the 
meeting. There are simple things you can do: make sure that you have eye contact with 
everybody. This communicates that you are aware of what is occurring and this creates 
a sense of security or safety. Then you can slow down the pace of the conversation 
and you can ensure that the microphone reaches those who want to speak. These things 
can make a real difference. (le Roux, 2016) 
In this manner we can see how Bernard, when finding his preferred identity 
frame blocked, turns to the alternative critically pragmatic frame, which he 
employs to make sense of the difficult situations he is confronted with.  
7.1.3 What to make of power differences? - A story about ambivalence 
During 2017 and 2018, Henrik Ljungman, a planner at Uppsala Municipality in 
Sweden, led a participatory planning process around the development of Lina 
Sandells Park in Gottsunda, Uppsala. The park development was part of a larger 
planning process with the purpose of achieving a socially and ecologically 
sustainable Gottsunda district. This district is one of the challenged 
neighbourhoods that suffers from relatively high unemployment and crime rates. 
Uppsala municipality secured funds from Boverket to develop new methods for 
inclusive dialogues in planning. 
Henrik works as a city planner in Uppsala Municipality. He is interested in 
dialogue processes, but had limited experience with leading dialogues with 
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citizens prior to his work with the park development. He is trained as a landscape 
architect, with an interest in urban development. What follows is his story.15 
I like to understand connections and different perspectives and yet reach a 
conclusion that is reasonable. There are a lot of people with ideas that are in 
opposition. I find this exciting. What is the right thing to do when people have 
different perspectives on the same issue?  
I want to focus on the humans in the city and the human experience of the 
city. What is the human scale and to what extent are people valuing different 
things? I am interested in what kind of city we are building and for whom we 
create it. One will have to try to understand the different perspectives that people 
represent. But to give precedence to a certain perspective is a totally different 
thing. Because then there are other different priorities and people will be upset 
in almost all projects. Even in park planning. That is the way it is. Everything 
that happens in the public environment and all development will result in 
reactions.  
The whole idea of dialogues is interesting. It is extremely difficult to measure 
what kind of standpoints that exists. I mean, one will not make opinion polls for 
every single question to learn about the representation. Instead, there will be 
elderly people with a lot of time who will get a strong influence, at least in the 
media. That is why I find it interesting to try to include kids and youth and other 
groups who do not have the same access, time or ability to express their views. 
We need to bring them in. Else there will be groups with strong voices who will 
set the agenda for the public conversation. I guess that is not per definition 
something bad, but it is something to think about in its context. I mean, the group 
who have a strong voice does not necessarily have bad arguments. They can 
have really good arguments, but one need to always think about that there are 
different perspectives. Yes, I think that is the 10 000-crown question: what is 
right to do when people have different opinions?  
My work with Lina Sandells Park started when I entered into the working 
group for the comprehensive plan for Gottsunda. That work was ongoing since 
there were a lot of discussions about how to approach this area. Our master 
plan is pointing to this area as a future city node, which means that its function 
is to relieve the inner city from traffic. In the future, the intention is that this will 
be a much more urban place than it is now. At the same time, the residents see 
living in the area as a quality lifestyle choice, where they can let their kids run 
free without fences and worries over cars. This is a key question: how can we 
make Hugo Alfvéns väg into an urban passage with perhaps even tram traffic? 
                                                     
15. See Section 3.3.5 for a description of the method I have used to elicit the story. 
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If we are to include several thousand work places in Gottsunda and Ultuna (an 
area nearby) 2050, the changes will not be small.     
That’s when we thought that Lina Sandells Park, which is perhaps not a 
signature place today, could be a very green place in the new urban context. The 
mission from the politicians was to develop a plan programme for social 
sustainability, but Lina Sandells Park was not mentioned explicitly. As this is the 
entrance to Gottsunda, it is very important to set the image of Gottsunda; the 
physical image, as well as media image. We also need to consider the house 
owning structure. Where does the municipality own land? Where do we think we 
can progress something? How can we bring the green character, the Gottsunda 
people want? So that’s why we ended up with Lina Sandells Park. We thought 
that we could make a major investment there and it was very much me who 
lobbied for this to happen.  
When we wrote the application to Boverket, we decided that the project 
would be about creating a green meeting place with a focus on activity. We know 
that these kinds of places are 70-80 percent of the time used by guys. That’s why 
our point of departure was: how can we get the girls to use the park more? We 
will try to see if there are differences in preferences for the park development 
among guys and girls and place some extra emphasis on the girls’ preferences. 
We already have focus groups in Gottsunda, intended to provide a broader 
representation and a better gathering of perspectives. There is the youth centre, 
school, preschool and other organisations who work with girls, who are subject 
to honour oppression. There are cultural associations and so on. All these focus 
groups include groups that I rarely see in any formal city planning dialogue. It 
is kids, youth and there are girls. There are different cultural backgrounds. This 
has felt really good. We have chosen to work locally, and it is the people in the 
area we ought to work with, those who live nearby the park and those groups 
that we think normally do not get much representation.  
Gathering perspectives has been an important part of the work and the focus 
groups has also been important. We draw a lot of conclusions: it is really 
important that we go out in the area to work, that we come to their places and 
meet them there. This breaks up the formal power structures. I mean, here you 
come as an educated guy and talk to kids off course, then you do not like to 
follow the formal way of being a municipal person. You like to find ways to 
communicate that works for them and where you feel that you get engagement 
and response.  
In one of the dialogue meetings at the school, I had the feeling that they guys 
took a bit more space. We decided to lead the conversation and divide the time 
more equally between guys and girls. In this school some of the kids speak great 
Swedish and are super engaged, whereas others are relatively new arrivals and 
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think it is truly embarrassing to speak. Some also thought it was embarrassing 
to speak to me since I am a guy.    
That’s why we wanted to work with groups of girls. We did some research 
and saw how there are both pros and cons with homogenous and heterogeneous 
groups. We formed a core focus group with girls in order to find out if they had 
other needs than the mixed groups. 
Then we also had dialogues with kids in preschool and that was a different 
thing altogether. These were 4 to 5-year-olds. We brought lemons and oranges, 
which we painted with the kids. There were happy faces on the oranges and sad 
faces on the lemons. Then we asked the kids to place the fruit on places that they 
saw as good and bad in the park. Sad lemons on bad places and happy oranges 
on good places.  
We also worked with those who lived close to the park. But the representation 
at this meeting did not turn out that well. There are a lot of people with foreign 
backgrounds living there, but it was mainly those with Swedish background who 
turned up.  
At this meeting the debate became a bit heated. Some thought that a lot of 
construction could be done in the park, while others wanted to preserve the 
nature. One extreme was, ‘you should not even touch a branch’ and the other 
extreme was a guy who spoke about safety and said that Bandstolsvägen is a hot 
spot for crime and youth gangs and those kinds of things. Therefore, he 
originally suggested that we ought to blow up the hill where there were trees, 
and make something entirely new like sports or soccer fields.   
For us it was all about asking questions. Actually, we were the ones who 
facilitated. We kind of had to create an image of what the park could be. Then 
we provided space for participants to sketch and draw together. We wanted them 
to identify what they had in common. At dialogues I have attended before, it has 
often been that the municipality comes in and presents something. This often 
leads to protests and anger towards the municipality. But when you talk to 
people you realise that they are not a homogenous group, where everybody 
desires the same thing. Instead people have different interests and some are very 
focused on what is happening outside my window. Therefore, I thought, from a 
dialogue and democracy perspective, that it would be good to create 
understanding of the different perspectives on the park. It is easier to agree that 
the municipality is doing the wrong thing, compared to present solutions for how 
to do it instead. I mean, since this would require that citizens agree.    
We had municipal staff who attended the group discussions at the meeting. 
They helped with sketching, since not all people are comfortable with maps and 
sketches. What happened was that when participants could say their things, it 
became clear that they had different views and then they could start to align 
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them. The main example is that the lady who wanted to protect everything kind 
of saw the need. ‘Yes, I guess it will have to be a bit more accessible, but perhaps 
it can be done without ruining the whole nature feeling and the woods.’ The guy 
who wanted to blow up the hill, saw that there were other needs and could 
approach some kind of compromise. I think it ended with him drawing a butterfly 
hotel at the sketch. 
Our working assumption has been that a dialogue does not mean that a wish 
list will be created and all will get what they want. If all can wish freely, we will 
not be able to gratify it. Instead we wanted to catch the perspectives and kind of 
place them next to each other in order to get some kind of understanding of how 
to approach the park.  
At a later stage, we worked with “Ronjabollen”, which is a girl’s group for 
those who are subject to honour oppression. The first thing I was asked by the 
leader of the group was: ‘why are you building a park here?’ She explained that 
the participants in her group get governed and controlled when there are a lot 
of people moving around. She talked about the old men sitting on benches 
monitoring and keeping watch. So, for those girls it is better to have their 
activities in a closed premise where they can be left alone. This means that there 
is a divide between different girl groups; for some it is really important with 
secluded places without surveillance. But to follow that suggestion would run 
counter to our purpose: to create a cross generational meeting place.  
When we approached the different groups of girls, I kept in mind that we, the 
planners, will be perceived as authorities. We are educated, we hold positions, 
we can participate in change and so on. So, if we are to talk to 13 and 14-year-
old girls we need to kind of use another language.  
After these meetings and some more, it was time to produce a first sketch of 
the new park. We had been very clear in the application to Boverket that it is the 
dialogues that should inform the park development. At the same time, we have 
made assumptions about what kind of place we would like to create. It is to be 
cross generational, activity friendly, a green place and we wanted to focus on 
the needs of the girls. But we did not want project leaders and the architects to 
start with what they themselves wanted. Instead we wanted to be guided by what 
was brought up from the groups we had spoken to.  
We tried to bring together a comprehensive view of our own assumptions and 
the most common suggestions from citizens. Thereafter, we brought in an 
architect to make a sketch, on which we later made some changes, in order to 
make sure that the ideas from the dialogues were reflected. 
This is where we stand now, we are to put together a proposal and feed it 
back to the dialogue groups. In the proposal we have some alternatives and have 
pointed to some concrete choices. It is important to hold the budget and we need 
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to weigh the perspective towards how feasible they are. It is easy for all to wish, 
but difficult to be architects and to grasp the whole thing. There is also a lot of 
experience among those who have worked with parks for a long time. They know 
a lot about what works. 
7.1.4  Analysing the story 
This story has a different feel to it compared with the previous. Instead of a frame 
contest between two opposing sides, this story takes shape through ambivalence, 
tensions and dilemmas. It is about a planner who is interested in dialogue, but 
with limited previous experience. He is provided with extra funds and stakes are 
not as high as in the contested Gothenburg meetings. The planner pays attention 
to power differences, which he is ambivalent to. Is it justifiable that some are 
more powerful than others? 
To understand power relations, he switches between the consensus and 
authority frame. At times, he strives towards inclusivity and consensus, power 
with. In other sequences of the story he is instead acknowledging the necessity 
of power over and seeks to establish when this form of power is legitimate. To 
position himself in power relations he switches between the identities of 
facilitator, expert and reflexive planner.  
The planner’s framing of power in participatory planning 
The core diagnosis in the story is that power is unequally distributed in society 
and in participatory planning. It is argued that gender, age, ethnicity, position 
and knowledge create unequal opportunities for certain voices. It is said that 
well-educated and elderly people have better possibilities to get their voices 
heard. The planner is also drawing attention to the fact that those with a foreign 
background have fewer possibilities to influence the dialogue. He additionally 
problematises power differences between pupil groups at the school. He is 
drawing attention to how men can mobilise more power than women, for 
example, when he describes the meetings at the school. He is equally aware that 
his own position comes with certain privileges. 
In my interpretation, his interest is directed towards power over and he is 
concerned with separating legitimate from illegitimate power over. Perhaps the 
ambivalence in the story arises from the difficulty of this task. “That is the 
10 000-crown question: what is right to do when people have different 
opinions?” (Ljungman, 2018). The planner seemed to be faced with a core 
dilemma in this story: what am I, as a planner, to make of situations where people 
cannot agree?  
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Let us look more closely into how the power disparities are understood in the 
story. The differences between politicians and civil servants are most often seen 
as legitimate. The planner acknowledges that democratic mandates provide 
politicians with legitimate power and that his role is to see to it that the political 
will is reflected in the planning of the park. Yet, he also draws attention to how 
there is space for planners to manoeuvre inside the political framework. 
When it comes to differences between municipal planners/civil servants and 
citizens the story is more ambivalent.   
[…] it is really important that we go out in the area to work, that we come to their 
places and meet them there. This breaks up the formal power structures. I mean here 
you come as an educated guy and are to talk to kids, off course then you do not like to 
follow the formal way of being a municipal person. You like to find ways to 
communicate that works for them and where you feel that you get engagement and 
response. (Ljungman, 2018) 
This quote exemplifies how, in certain parts of the story, power differences 
between planners and citizens are deemed illegitimate. Yet in other parts of the 
story these differences are viewed as legitimate. “It is easy for all to wish, but 
difficult for all to be architects and grasp the whole thing” (Ibid.). Here it seems 
as if the assessment shifts towards acknowledging expert authority as a basis for 
legitimate power over to weigh citizens’ different desires and produce a 
comprehensive plan. 
There is also ambivalence in the way that the narrative diagnoses power 
differences between citizens.  
[…] there will be groups with strong voices who will set the agenda for the public 
conversation. I guess that is not per definition something bad, but it is something to 
think about in its context. I mean, the group who have a strong voice does not 
necessarily have bad arguments. They can have really good argument, but one need to 
always think about that there are different perspectives. (Ljungman, 2018) 
This quote illustrates the ambivalence. On one hand, powerful citizens have 
good arguments; on the other hand, it is not fair if these people set the agenda.  
The ambivalence regarding the judgement of power differences is mirrored 
in the planners’ action bias. One prominent idea is that participatory planning 
ought to provide possibilities for inclusive dialogue that leads to a better 
understanding of different perspectives. Perhaps participatory process can even 
lead to alignment of different desires? This way of reasoning is prominent in the 
description of the meeting near the park. “What happened was that when 
participants could say their things it became clear that they had different views 
and then they could start to align them” (Ljungman, 2018). This quote illustrates 
a preference for achieving shared meaning by aligning perspectives.  
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But there is also an alternative action bias in the story. Then the planner 
suggests that there are differences between citizens that cannot be reconciled 
through participatory planning. “But when one talk to people one sees that it is 
not a homogenous group where all want the same. Instead people have different 
interests” (Ibid.). This quote illustrates how the planner in this action bias sees 
limits to how participatory planning can reconcile differences. The differences 
in citizen’s interests require that the municipality step in and make decisions. 
Participatory planning is not only about moving towards consensus but also 
making decisions when issues are contested.  
Our working assumption has been that a dialogue does not mean that a wish list will be 
created and all will get what they want. If all can wish freely, we will not be able to 
gratify it. Instead, we wanted to catch the perspectives and kind of place them next to 
each other in order to get some kind of understanding of how to approach the park. (Ibid.) 
As illustrated by this quote in this action bias, participatory planning is intended 
to increase the communication between decision makers and citizens, but not 
necessarily lead to agreement.  
In my interpretation, the ambivalence in the story originates from tensions 
between the consensus and the authority frame. Drawing on the former, the 
planner is deeming power over illegitimate and seeks to achieve power with. In 
contrast, when the authority frame is guiding the planner he recognises the 
necessity of power over. Consequently, he instead casts participatory planning 
as an arena for legitimising power over.  
Thereby, the ambivalence in the story is essentially about the difficulty of the 
task to separate illegitimate from legitimate power over. To the planner the 
purest source of legitimate power over is a democratic mandate. Whereas, the 
planner is increasingly ambivalent regarding the legitimacy of planners’ and 
citizens’ exercises of power over each other. 
The planner’s framing of his role in power relations 
The ambivalence in the framing of power in participatory planning is reflected 
in how the planner frames his identity in power relations. In my interpretation, 
the planner is switching between three of the different identity frames I have 
found in the previous sub studies (Chapters 5 and 6). He interchangeably sees 
himself as an expert, a facilitator and a reflexive planner.   
When the planner frames his identity as an expert he takes charge over the 
planning process.   
This is the entrance to Gottsunda, which is very important to set the image of 
Gottsunda. The physical image as well as media image. Then we also need to consider 
the house owning structure. Where does the municipality own land? Where do we 
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think we can progress something? How can we bring the green character, the 
Gottsunda people want, to the forth? So that’s why we ended up with Lina Sandells 
Park. We thought that we could make a major investment there and it was very much 
me who lobbied for this to happen. (Ljungman, 2018) 
The planner is here seeing himself as an expert. He demonstrates his knowledge 
about how planning is done and what the social results of the physical changes 
to the area might be. He tells us about the kind of informed questions that 
provided the rationale for the choice to focus on this particular park and not 
another. Importantly, he also lets us know that the choice of this particular park, 
and not another, was his making, i.e. he explains how he exercised what he sees 
as legitimate power over based on expert authority. 
Then again, in other parts of the story the planner is also drawing on the 
reflexivity frame. He pays attention to how his presumed habits risk reproducing 
power relations, which he finds undesirable.  
When we approached the different groups of girls I kept in mind that we [the planners] 
will be perceived as authorities. We are educated, we hold positions and we can 
participate in change and so on. So, if we are to talk to 13 to 14-year-old girls we need 
to kind of use another language. (Ibid.)  
This demonstrates the kind of understanding offered by the reflexivity frame. It 
directs attention to how planners’ micro practices matter and suggests that the 
planners make small changes in how they act in order to shift the power balance. 
In other parts of the story, the planner sees himself as a facilitator, for 
example in the narrative about the meeting with the neighbours of the park.  
The main example is that the lady who wanted to protect everything kind of saw the 
need: ‘Yes, I guess it will have to be a bit more accessible, but perhaps it can be done 
without ruining the whole nature feeling and the woods.’ The guy who wanted to blow 
up the hill, he saw that there were other needs and could approach some kind of 
compromise. I think it ended with him drawing a butterfly hotel at the sketch. 
(Ljungman, 2018) 
In this sequence the planner and his colleagues designed and facilitated a meeting 
with citizens, in view of creating possibilities for aligning their perspectives. They 
worked to create an inclusive process and the narrative leads towards a resolution 
in the form of consensus or perhaps compromise. In my interpretation, this is an 
example of how the planner frames his identity as a facilitator who is striving 
towards turning illegitimate power over into power with. 
After having analysed the two stories, I will now summarise the findings by 
returning to the two research questions. 
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7.2 The findings 
The analysis of the two stories was guided by two research questions. 
• Which basic notions of power are embedded in Swedish participatory 
planning? 
• To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice? 
The analysis shows, regarding the first question, that the planners pay attention 
to power and find it difficult to deal with. Even if power is mentioned explicitly 
in both stories, the planners do not supply elaborated explanations of how they 
define and appraise it. Instead, notions of power are mainly present underneath 
the surface of the texts.  
In my interpretation, the planners are tacitly informed by the two already 
identified alternative process frames: the consensus and the authority frames. 
The former leads them to an assessment of power over as illegitimate and 
suggests that participatory planning ought to replace power over by creating 
conditions for power with. In contrast, through the authority frame the planners 
see how illegitimate power over, might not be possible to replace with power 
with. Instead this authority frame portrays participatory planning as intended to 
legitimise the use of power over through improved communication.  
The tensions between these two frames surface in different ways in the two 
stories. The Gothenburg story takes shape as a frame contest between two camps, 
where one is advocating for authority and the other for consensus. In contrast, in 
the Uppsala story the tensions instead lead to ambivalence. The planner sees the 
validity of both frames and struggles to make sense of which frame to draw upon 
in the complex situations he faces.  
Also, when the planners pay attention to the second frame topic, their roles 
in power relations, the reasoning mainly takes place underneath the surface of 
the stories. In some parts of the stories, the planners sparsely discuss their roles. 
Yet, the identity framing is mainly implied by the way the planners are 
positioned in the stories. 
Underneath the surface, the two stories provide us with two alternative 
accounts of planners’ roles in power relations. In the Gothenburg story, the 
planner clearly prefers to see himself as a facilitator. He sees his role as 
designing and facilitating planning processes where actors can engage in power 
with. In the story, this framing is made clear by way of contrast with the expert 
frame, which alternatively allows the communication department to view power 
over as legitimate. The planner is refuting this idea by suggesting that his mission 
ought to be to level power and achieve power with. Yet, when the planner finds 
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this path blocked, he is forced into drawing on the critically pragmatic frame and 
do the best he can to mitigate the difficult circumstances. 
In the second story, we meet a planner who is less certain about his preferred 
identity. We see how he, at times, employs the reflexive planner frame to 
question how his habits might be exercises of illegitimate power over; while he 
in other instances relies on an expert frame, which charges him with legitimate 
power over. Yet he is also framing along the same lines as the Gothenburg 
planner, notably at the meeting with the residents close to the park, and he 
employs the facilitator frame with its preference for power with.  
To what extent are these notions of power enabling reflective practice? In the 
Gothenburg story, the planner is struggling to stick to his preferred consensus 
frame and the identity as facilitator. The story illustrates the limits of these two 
frames. When stakes are high and planning is contested, it might be too reductive 
to rely on the thought figure that power over ought to be turned into power with. 
The story also underscores how the facilitator frame, with its notions of “neutral” 
and “power-free” planners, is a weak basis for action in a situation where time 
is short, stakes are high and planning contested. In contrast, when the planner 
switches to pragmatic action, he seems to be more able to cope with the 
challenging meetings. 
The Uppsala story provides other insights into how notions of power are 
playing out in practice. Here the planner’s preferences are less clear and the 
stakes are not as high. Yet, the planner is still challenged by the workings of 
power. He pays attention to power differences, but find it difficult to know 
what to make of them. The different notions of power come to a head when 
people are not agreeing about what the right thing to do is. It is in these 
situations that the use of power over becomes inevitable. When the planner 
draws on the authority frame and sees his identity as an expert, he is enabled 
to make sense of what to do. He can legitimise the use of power over by 
referring to authority and expertise. In the situations where he finds that these 
frames do not fit, he is ambivalent without clear guidance on how to proceed. 
This underscores how planners find themselves “on thin ice” if they wish to 
go beyond the conventional reliance on authority and expertise in contested 
planning processes.   
Hence, my analysis shows that both the consensus and the authority frames 
might be capable of guiding planners’ actions in certain situations, but neither 
of them supply the broad conceptualisation of power needed for reflective 
practice. In the following closing chapter, I synthesise the findings from the 
entire research process as a basis for rethinking power in participatory planning.   
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The aim of this thesis is to rethink power in participatory planning by developing 
concepts that can enable reflective practice. The previous Chapters 4-7 have 
reported on the review of the power literature and the analysis of notions of power 
in communicative planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and 
practice. In this concluding chapter, I synthesise the findings, discuss these in view 
of previous research and thereby clarify the contribution the thesis makes.  
The first three sections answer the research questions. In these sections, I 
integrate the findings from the review of the power literature and the empirical 
investigations. Section 8.1-2 provide the evidence underpinning the rethinking and 
Section 8.3 outlines the rethinking by developing a family of four power concepts.  
In Section 8.4, I conclude by explaining how the thesis contributes to 
planning theory and environmental communication by problematising reductive 
notions of power and, as an alternative, rethinking power as a family 
resemblance concept. This theoretical contribution matters to planning practice 
since it can enable planners to develop their ability to be sensitive to what a 
situation requires, i.e. to acquire practical wisdom (phronesis). 
 
8.1 RQ1: developing conceptual tools from power theory 
What conceptual tools can power theory provide for researching and rethinking 
power in participatory planning?  
Through the abductive research process, I developed, applied and tested 
conceptual tools from power theory. To answer RQ1, I moved back and forth 
between reviews of the power literature and investigations into communicative 
planning theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice.  
8 Rethinking power in participatory 
planning  
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I gradually zoomed in on work in the power literature, which had as its 
purpose to synthesises and render commensurable alternative notions of power 
(Allen, 1998; Clegg, 1989; Haugaard, 2003, 2010a, 2012, 2015). Thereby, I 
decided to treat power as a family resemblance concept (Haugaard, 2010a; 
Wittgenstein, 1967). In this plural view, power is not a single entity, but a cluster 
of concepts, which are all related to the reproduction of social order, yet not 
necessarily united by one common feature. I deemed a family resemblance view 
of power as particularly useful for my aim to develop concepts that can enable 
reflective practice.  
Through the continued empirical investigations and reviews of the power 
literature I gradually developed a family of four power concepts. These four 
concepts were established in view of i) explicating the basic notions 
(constitutive, consensual and conflictual) of power in participatory planning, 
ii) fulfilling the two tasks that planners need concepts of power for (empirically 
explaining and normatively appraising power) and iii) relating different 
notions of power in a manner, which enables reflective practice. The family of 
concepts includes one concept for the creation of power, power to, and three 
concepts for the exercise of power: power with, illegitimate power over and 
legitimate power over.  
Table 12. The power family 
Family member Definition 
Power to The ability to act derived from social order 
Power with Actors engage in concerted action towards shared goals 
Illegitimate power over Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner 
that is seen as unacceptable 
Legitimate power over Actors get other actors to do what they otherwise would not have done, in a manner 
that is seen as acceptable 
 
Hence, I answered RQ1 by importing the idea from power theory that power is 
a family resemblance concept and by developing a family of four power 
concepts. The extent to which this power family can enable reflective practice 
was, in the next step of the research, tested through empirical investigations into 
notions of power in participatory planning.  
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8.2 RQ2 & 3: analysing notions of power in participatory 
planning 
• Which basic notions of power are embedded in participatory planning?  
• To what extent are these notions enabling reflective practice? 
These two research questions guided the empirical investigations. I pursued the 
questions by conducting the three research tasks to analyse notions of power: in 
communicative planning theory (Chapter 5), in Swedish planning guidance 
(Chapter 6) and in Swedish participatory planning practice (Chapter 7). The study 
objects in these investigations were publications from the leading communicative 
planning scholars John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes, planning guidance 
from two Swedish planning authorities and interviews with Swedish planners. In 
the empirical investigations I tested the usefulness of the family of power concepts 
developed through the review of power literature (see Section 8.1).  
In this section, I answer RQ 2 and 3 by synthesising the findings from the 
empirical investigations and discussing these in light of previous research. I 
structure the text according to the analytical distinction between process and 
identity frames, which guided the empirical investigations. 
8.2.1 Two process frames: consensus and authority  
Through frame analysis (van Hulst and Yanow, 2016; Schön and Rein, 1994) I 
explicated the notions of power in participatory planning as two process frames. 
It is the consensus frame that suggests that illegitimate power over ought to be 
replaced by power with and the authority frame, which alternatively points to 
how participatory planning ought to restore the legitimacy of power over. The 
analysis confirms that the consensus frame stands strong in communicative 
planning theory. Even if the ways in which Forester, Healey and Innes have 
applied this frame varies, they largely adhere to the same kind of preference for 
consensus and implied rejection of power over. In contrast, even if the consensus 
frame is present in Swedish planning guidance, it is the authority frame, which 
is most prominently used as a basis for guiding planning action. In planning 
practice these two frames were found to interplay in ways that created tensions, 
ambivalence and conflict. 
Table 13. Two alternative process frames 
 Consensus Authority 
Diagnosis Power over is illegitimate in planning The legitimacy of power over is questioned in planning 
Action bias Participatory planning ought to  
transform power over into power with 
Participatory planning ought to restore the legitimacy of 
power over 
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Turning to RQ 3, I will now discuss the extent to which the notions of power in 
the two frames enable reflective practice. I argue that both the authority and the 
consensus frame provide relevant perspectives on power, yet individually and 
combined fall short of supplying the broad understanding needed to enable 
reflective practice. Let me explain this claim by linking back to the scholarly 
discussion about power in participatory planning (Chapter 2). 
The authority frame is affiliated with the ideas of rational planning (Faludi, 
1973). Rational planning is inspired by positivistic science and concerned with 
generating alternatives, prior to making optimal choices. A basic thought figure 
is to separate ends from means and suggests that the former is value-loaded and 
the latter value-free (Allmendinger, 2009). Thereby, power is, if discussed at all, 
seen as derived from democratic mandates and essentially about deciding the 
ends, the “what”. The practice of planning is seen as a technical value-free 
endeavour, merely about working out the “how”.  
Communicative planning theory grew out of a critique towards these ideas in 
rational planning. Communicative scholars faulted the rational theory, both for 
being unable to capture the complexities of human relations and for 
illegitimately excluding marginalised voices from planning (Forester, 1989; 
Healey, 1992b; Innes, 1998; Sager, 1994). Due to its affiliation with rational 
planning, the authority frame is vulnerable to this type of critique.  
I certainly agree that the authority frame is too reductive in the understanding 
of power it offers. In the language of this thesis, this frame is not employing the 
whole power family. Power is merely seen through the eyes of two of its members: 
illegitimate power over and legitimate power over. This clearly does not supply 
the broad understanding of power required to enable reflective practice. 
However, I will not go as far as to suggest that the authority frame has no 
place in reflective practice. Instead, I apply the family resemblance view of 
power and argue that the authority frame might certainly fulfil a purpose in 
reflections on power in planning; not least since expertise and the ballot box 
are still the most accepted sources of legitimate power in Western planning 
systems (Connelly et al., 2006; Strömgren, 2007). When planning is contested 
it is thereby relevant to consider if the authority frame is useful as a basis for 
planners’ actions. 
The consensus frame and its application in planning practice and 
communicative planning theory is subject to sustained critique (see Chapter 2). 
The core messages from the critics are that the understanding offered by 
consensual notions of power is weak in explaining what is going on in planning 
(Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000), that its 
application in practice might reinforce the power of neoliberal discourses 
(Purcell, 2009) and that consensual notions of power might smooth out 
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necessary conflicts and differences (Mäntysalo et al., 2011; Mouffe, 1999; 
Pløger, 2004). My research confirms that communicative planning theory, with 
its consensual framing of power, is far from supplying the broad conceptua-
lisation needed to empirically explain and normatively appraise power in 
participatory planning. Nonetheless, I will not go as far as some of the critics 
and fully dismiss this theory.  
Instead I argue that the problem with power in communicative planning theory 
can be reformulated in a manner that points towards how this theory can be 
strengthened. In the language of this thesis, the problem is that communicative 
planning theory largely makes the mistake to conflate power over with domination 
(cf. Haugaard, 2010b). My analysis shows how communicative scholars have 
taken on the task to critique power when it works to exclude issues, people and 
knowledge forms from planning. Focusing on this task they have often implicitly, 
assumed that domination is all that there is to power and largely refrained from 
elaborating explicitly on how power is created and how it can be exercised in 
alternative forms. I thereby claim that the core problem is that power in 
communicative planning theory is largely theorised as illegitimate power over, 
which excludes the richer understanding of power supplied by family members 
such as power to, power with and legitimate power over.  
Some communicative planning scholars may reject my critique. They might 
say that they have not only paid attention to illegitimate power over but also 
dedicated long-term interest to enabling forms of power. This might certainly be 
true, but their interest has not been expressed in the form of elaborated theorising 
of the kind of conflictual yet desirable power, which is included in the concept 
legitimate power over. The leading scholars have also refrained from providing 
conceptual tools for understanding the processes through which power is created 
in planning, covered by power to in the power family.  
Regarding power with, I can see how the work communicative scholars have 
done à la Habermas, to theorise inclusive dialogues and empowerment, might 
refer to similar empirical phenomena as my conceptualisation of power with. 
Yet, power has not been a central concept in this area of communicative planning 
theory. Thereby, attempts to engage in reflective practice, based on Habermasian 
communicative planning, is hindered due to the lack of an integrated vocabulary 
of power.  
I acknowledge that Innes has made attempts to theorise the empirical process 
covered by power with (Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes and Booher, 2015). But, 
as I have elaborated on in Chapter 5, these attempts are problematic since Innes 
universally rejects power over as undesirable and in the same universal manner 
endorses power with. From my family resemblance view, this is too reductive to 
provide the dynamic and situated understanding needed for reflective practice.  
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After having addressed RQ2 and 3, by synthesising the findings pertaining to 
the framing of power in the process of participatory planning, I will now provide 
a full answer to RQ2 and 3 by synthesising the findings regarding the identity 
framing of planners’ roles in power relations. 
8.2.2 Four identity frames 
The frame analysis of communicative planning theory and Swedish planning 
guidance and practice identified four alternative frames concerning planners’ 
roles in power relations. The notion of the planner as a facilitator was identified 
in planning guidance, as well as planning practice. The planner is cast as a skilful 
practitioner who can turn illegitimate power over into power with by designing 
and facilitating purposeful planning processes. This frame especially figures in 
Innes’ work, but also in planning guidance and practice.  
In contrast, in the expert frame, the planner is seen as charged with legitimate 
power over derived from expertise and democratic mandates. This frame stands 
strong in Swedish planning guidance as well as planning practice, but is largely 
refuted in communicative planning theory.  
Alongside the facilitator frame, communicative planning theory also frames 
planners as critical pragmatists. The emphasis is then on how power relations 
are situated in a specific context in which the planner ought to make situated 
judgments in view of minimising domination. This frame is ever-present in the 
work of Forester.  
Finally, in the work of Healey, and also in Swedish planning guidance, the 
framing of planners’ identities as reflexive planners is present. Here, the planner 
is seen as capable and willing to question presumed power relations and act to 
change undesirable forms of power through their micro practices.   
Table 14. Four identity frames 
 Facilitator Expert Critical pragmatist Reflexive planners  
Diagnosis Planners are working  
in contexts of 
illegitimate power over. 
Planners are experts 
positioned in a  
democratic system  
and thereby entitled  
to exercise legitimate  
power over. 
Planners are confronted 
with situated dilemmas  
in power relations. 
Planners can 
reproduce or 
transform power 
relations through 
their everyday 
practices. 
Action bias Planners ought to use 
their skills to design  
and facilitate planning 
processes that enables 
power with. 
Planners ought to 
exercise power over  
to assure process  
and outcome  
legitimacy. 
Planners ought to make 
situated judgements in 
view of minimising 
illegitimate power over  
and maximising  
power with. 
Planners ought to 
be reflexive and 
transform 
illegitimate power 
over into  
power with. 
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After having summarised the findings pertaining to RQ2 in the table, I now turn 
to RQ3 and discuss the extent to which the four identity frames enable reflective 
practice. I will do so by linking the findings to long-standing discussions about 
the role of the planner.  
The role of the planner has been subject to much controversy over the years 
(see Chapter 2). Academics, educators and policy makers have suggested an 
abundance of alternative roles for planners. These debates can be understood as 
struggles over the best way to “make up” planners (Cashmore et al., 2015). 
Proponents of different ideas are suggesting roles for planners, which fit with 
their particular view of what planning and planners ought to be. 
The findings show that, even if communicative planning scholars have 
chosen different paths in their attempts to invent planners, their shared ambition 
has been to deconstruct the idea of planners as value-neutral experts and replace 
this idea with a view of planners as agents of change working towards more 
inclusive planning. More or less explicitly, their intention has been to critique 
the power-free rational ideas of planners as experts, by providing alternative 
ideas of what it means to be a planner in power relations.   
Communicative planning scholars’ efforts to construct planners are subject 
to sustained critique from other camps in planning theory. It is argued that 
communicative planning theory is neglecting the fact that planners are working 
in contexts permeated by power and therefore provide naïve and unrealistic ideas 
about what it is to be a planner (McGuirk, 2001; Purcell, 2009). Even if I partly 
agree with this critique, I find it to be based on a reductive view of what 
communicative planning offers for our understanding of planners’ roles in power 
relations. Let me explain this claim by discussing each of the recognised identity 
frames. 
The idea of planners as facilitators is the frame that has been most critiqued 
for naivety and unrealism. The findings from my research largely confirm this 
critique, but suggest that it is not to be levelled towards communicative planning 
theory as a whole, but rather against some of its streams and towards the 
application of this frame in Swedish planning guidance.  
The problem with how the facilitator frame is applied in theory and in 
guidance is that it suffers from a conflation of power over with domination. 
Employing the concepts I have developed in the thesis, we can see how power 
is solely defined as illegitimate power over and power with, which excludes the 
understanding offered through the family members power to and legitimate 
power over. Thereby, this frame is blind to how a planner’s ability to act, their 
power to, is derived from a power system. Just as it hides how planners in certain 
episodes, even when they are facilitating, might have to exercise legitimate 
power over.  
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Even if I largely confirm the critics’ view of this frame, I differ from their 
implicit conclusion that seeing planners as facilitators is misleading. Instead, I 
posit that the problems with how the facilitator’s role is constructed can be 
addressed by rethinking power in participatory planning as a family resemblance 
concept. I will elaborate on this claim in Section 8.4.2.  
The idea of planners as critical pragmatists has attracted little interest in the 
discussions about the treatment of power in communicative planning theory 
(Healey, 2009). However, the move made by Forester to charge his planners 
with the concept “critical” in front of pragmatists, was due to the critique towards 
pragmatism for not taking power relations seriously. Given my preference for 
reflective practice, which originates from pragmatism (Dewey, 1933), I am 
largely sympathetic to the idea of critically pragmatic planners. Yet, I also see 
how this frame needs to be complemented with an elaborated conceptualisation 
of power in order to enable reflective practice. 
 The usefulness of the critically pragmatic frame is due to how it validly 
assumes that power relations are dynamics and situated in a specific contingent 
context, which requires planners to reflect and act without relying solely on 
universal ideas. How this view of planners is meaningful is demonstrated in 
Forester’s long-term work eliciting planners’ own stories (Forester, 1999, 2009) 
as well as in the stories I have obtained in this thesis (Chapter 7).  
However, as with all ideas, the idea of pragmatic planners has its limitations. 
We cannot merely rely on the idea of skilful practitioners when reflecting on 
power in planning. We also need to acknowledge how these practitioners are 
themselves situated in power relations. For that task we need access, not only to 
contextual practical understanding, but also to conceptualisation of what power 
is and when it is legitimate.   
A specific problem with Forester’s application of critical pragmatism is that 
he has mainly refrained from theorising planners in power relations. It was only 
in his Habermasian period, that Forester sought to conceptualise planners in “the 
face of power” (e.g. Forester, 1989). Due to critique of Habermasian views of 
planning, Forester seems to have distanced himself from that work and instead 
mainly directs interest towards stories of planners “working in the face of power” 
without replacing Habermas with another way of providing a more elaborate 
conceptualisation of planners in power relations.  
Forester’s stories provide us with valuable insights about how planners use 
power to get things done. But his commentary is largely informed by an inferred 
conflation of power over with domination. This leads to difficulties in extracting 
a general understanding about planners’ roles in power relations from the stories, 
and provides limitations to how his application of the critically pragmatic frame 
can enable reflective practice.   
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Healey’s work on reflexivity offers the same kind of dynamic and situated 
understandings of the planners’ roles as the pragmatic frame. In addition, her work 
also offers what the pragmatic frame is lacking: a route towards theorising how 
planners are positioned in these power relations. Thereby, Healey’s work carries 
potential for improving the treatment of power in communicative planning theory. 
Through the concept of reflexivity, there is a link to structuration theory (Giddens, 
1984; Healey, 1997). Thus, this frame offers a theoretical understanding of how 
power relations are carried from the past to the present and how planners’ identities 
are constructed through taken for granted power relations. We are also provided 
with theorised understanding, through the concept of reflexivity, of the mechanism 
through which such power relations are reproduced or transformed. 
Yet, since Healey’s work also largely conflates power over with domi-
nation, the manner in which she has applied the reflexivity frame provides a 
one-sided emphasis on transformation of illegitimate power relations. Even if 
this is an important focus, it is problematic to imply that all hierarchical power 
relations are bad, since this form of power is necessary in democracies. Instead, 
I posit that empirical explanations of power ought to be separated from 
normative appraisal (Haugaard, 2010a). I take this claim and the work of 
Healey as an additional basis for rethinking power in participatory planning in 
Section 8.3. 
Finally, the findings from this research confirm that the idea of planners as 
experts stands strong in the Swedish planning context. This is notable since the 
Swedish planning system seems conducive for communicative planning’s 
aspiration of replacing the expert planner with the facilitator. Communicative 
planning theory has certainly made imprints on Swedish planning policy and 
practice. Yet, the research also confirms that the rational view of planners as 
experts is resilient in Sweden. This is in line with findings from previous 
research in Sweden and in other planning contexts (Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 
2016; Gradén, 2016; Storbjörk and Isaksson, 2005; Strömgren, 2007).  
Even if I agree with the critique of power blindness to the idea of planners as 
experts, I find it hard to approve of the communicative scholars’ implicit view 
that we can do without the idea of planners as experts. Arguably, the practice of 
planning is part of the Enlightenment endeavors for rationality. To refute the 
idea of planners being experts is thereby perhaps the same as refuting the idea 
of planning altogether?  
The shared understanding in our societies of the value of expertise is basically 
what provides planners with their position in the power system. It is the shared 
meaning of what it is to be an expert, which provides them with their ability to 
act as planners, their power to. Given the resilience of this identity frame, also 
in the participation-friendly Swedish context, I posit that the notion of the 
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planner as an expert still has a place in reflective practice. Importantly, it is not 
the unreflective power abusing expert’s role that ought to be available to 
planners. Instead, I suggest that the reflective planner can consider if the role as 
an expert is suitable in a particular situation.   
In sum, I have in this section answered RQ2 and RQ3 by summarising the 
findings and discussing these in light of previous research. I have explicated tacit 
notions of power into two process frames: consensus and authority. I have identi-
fied four identity frames: expert, facilitator, critical pragmatist and reflexive 
planner. I have also demonstrated how the research shows that communicative 
planning theory and Swedish planning guidance, supply useful perspectives on 
power, but falls short of supplying the broad conceptualisation needed for 
reflective practice. Through a summary of the findings, it has also been validated 
that the family of power concepts developed in this thesis are useful for 
researching and rethinking notions of power in participatory planning. In the 
next section I will answer the final RQ4 by outlining the rethinking of power in 
participatory planning.  
8.3 RQ4: rethinking power in participatory planning 
How can rethinking power in participatory planning provide a set of concepts 
that can enable reflective practice?  
The synthesised findings from the research provide evidence for answering 
this final research question. In short, I claim that the research has found that 
rethinking power, as a family resemblance concept in participatory planning, is 
conducive for reflective practice. I also make the linked claim that I, through the 
research, have developed a family of four power conceptsʊpower to, power 
with, illegitimate power over and legitimate power overʊthat can enable 
reflective practice. 
Thereby, the thesis provides a route beyond the fragmented and reductive 
treatment of power in participatory planning, towards reflective practice. In this 
section I will substantiate these claims by outlining the way in which I propose 
rethinking power.16  
  
                                                     
16. The full theoretical reasoning behind the rethinking is presented in Chapter 4. 
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8.3.1 Outlining and discussing the rethinking of power 
The rethinking I propose is based on a family resemblance view of power and 
intended to provide a broad conceptualisation, which can enable reflective 
practice. The first step is to provide a concept that covers the empirical processes 
through which power is created in planning. What is needed to conceptualise is 
how power is constitutive, ever-present and productive in planning. Such a concept 
is needed because planning requires “a particular order of things and the settling 
down of governing into subtle, day-to-day, taken for granted reproduction of 
power relations by disciplined subjects” (Richardson and Cashmore, 2011, p. 107). 
My empirical investigations confirmed that an elaborated understanding of the 
creation of power is largely missing in communicative planning theory as well as 
in Swedish planning guidance. The analysed stories from planners illustrate how 
this conceptual void might impede reflective practice.  
To fill the conceptual void, I draw on Haugaard’s (2003) theory of power 
creation and propose including the concept power to in the power family. This 
concept is defined as the ability to act derived from social order. The basic 
premise is then that society gives actors the ability to do things, which they could 
not have done if they were not members of the society. This added ability to act, 
power to, is derived from the predictability of social order. If actions would not 
be ordered and predictable, if social life were entirely contingent, the added 
ability for action would disappear.  
Hence, actions and subject positions in planning are ordered through shared 
systems of meaning, social orders, which provide predictability and thereby 
supply actors with power to, the ability to act. The social order, and the power 
to derived from it, is created through a range of linked social mechanisms, 
including system bias, tacit knowledge, reification, discipline and, as a last resort 
if other mechanisms do not work, coercion.17  
In a planning context, this means that the creation of power to requires that 
planning actors, on a basic level, share a common understanding of the character 
of the social order. This includes a basic, most often unspoken, agreement on the 
meaning of core actions such as “to plan”, “to make a decision”, “to engage in 
dialogue” or “to facilitate”. The same kind of shared meaning is also required 
regarding different subject positions, their role in the social order, such as 
“planners”, “citizens” and “politicians”.  
In the Gothenburg case (see Chapter 7), we get an example of how shared 
meaning, and the power to arising from it, is necessary for planning action. In 
this story, the planner was called in late to, against his will, lead meetings with 
                                                     
17. In Section 4.2.2 I provide an elaborate description of these mechanisms based on Haugaard’s 
(2003) theory of power creation. 
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citizens on the placement of contested refugee housing. The meaning that the 
municipal communication department attached to the meetings and their 
understanding of what it meant to be a planner differed from the planner who I 
interviewed. The communication department saw the meetings as being about 
informing citizens about decisions the politicians intended to make regarding the 
location of the housing. In contrast, the planner saw the meetings as intended to 
create an arena for dialogue about broader issues related to integration. The story 
tells us how the planner could not get recognition among key actors for the 
meaning he conferred to the meeting and his position in it. Hence, he was not 
provided with the power to act according to his preferred identity as a facilitator 
of a dialogue.  
As illustrated by the Gothenburg example, including power to in the power 
family puts an end to the attempts to escape from power in participatory 
planning. Planning actors who wish to change “the way things are done”ʊto 
challenge the social orderʊcannot be successful without having their ability to 
act, their power to, confirmed by other planning actors by reference to a shared 
understanding of social order.  
If there is no escape from power in participatory planning the task cannot 
merely be, as Forester (2000, p. 915) suggests, “to carefully assess forms of 
power and their specific types of vulnerabilities [italics removed]”. Instead, we 
must also attend to the more complex task of separating illegitimate from 
legitimate power. The Gothenburg story illustrates how the common tendency 
to conflate power and domination, as in the quote from Forester, is not very 
helpful for planners who approach this task.  
As an alternative, I continue the rethinking of power by suggesting that it is 
useful to separate empirical analysis from a normative appraisal of power 
(Haugaard, 2010a). This means to distinguish questions like “how is power 
created?”, “how is power operating?” from questions of the character such as 
“when is power legitimate?”. The empirical investigations showed that part of 
the confusion surrounding power in participatory planning is due to the 
difficulties in distinguishing between these two kinds of questions about power.  
The power family offers the concept power to for empirical analysis of the 
creation of power and power with, illegitimate power over and legitimate power 
over for normative appraisal. To emphasise the distinction between empirical 
analysis and normative appraisal, power to is seen as a dispositional ability 
which, can be exercised episodically in consensus, without subjects to it 
attempting to resist (Arendt, 1970; Luhmann, 1979; Parsons, 1963), or in 
conflict, with covert or open resistance (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; 
Lukes, 1974, 2005). Hence, the power family includes three concepts for the 
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exercise of power: power with (consensual power), illegitimate power over
(conflictual power) and legitimate power over (conflictual power).
The empirical process of power with takes place when planning actors agree
on the process and/or outcome of planning. Power with might include a deeper 
form of consensus on meaning or a shallower consensus on specific planning 
processes or goals. When actors agree, social order remains unquestioned and
actors are able to exercise their power to in concert. The concept power with
thereby refers to instances of shared meaning and/or pursuit of collective goals. 
It is this kind of power, which Hannah Arendt (1970, p. 44) wrote about as “the 
human ability not just to act but to act in concert” and Amy Allen (1998, p. 35)
described as a “collective ability based on the receptivity and reciprocity that 
characterise relations among members of the collectivity”.
Some qualifications are needed in order to clarify the meaning of power with
in participatory planning. First, as pointed out by agonistic approaches to 
planning, any consensus in planning is temporary and power with can, and often 
does, enable one group to exercise their power over another group of people or 
other species. Secondly, a seemingly consensual planning processes might,
through closer scrutiny, be unmasked as imposed social order, for example
through subtle forms of two- or three-dimensional power over. Thirdly, we also 
need to acknowledge how, as demonstrated in this research as well as in the 
power literature (Haugaard, 2015), power with might not arise without actors 
exercising power over other actors to create conditions for concerted action. In 
the situated interactions in participatory planning, we might often find that 
exercises of power over constitute a condition for power with.
The story about the planning in Uppsala provides us with an example of how 
power over can be necessary to create conditions for power with (see Chapter 7).
The planner tells us about a meeting with the neighbours of the park. At the onset 
of the meeting, conflicts surfaced and the planners’ response was to structure the 
meeting as a collaborative endeavour where participants drew maps of their 
visions for the park. This intervention led to consensual interactions, where those 
who originally were in conflict could reach agreement on process as well as
goals. In this way, this episode is an example of how the exercise of power over
might be necessary for creating conditions for power with.
Notably, the manner in which I define power with is distinctly different from
communicative planning scholars’ treatment of similar empirical processes.
Even if communicative planning scholars, as well as Swedish planning 
guidance, pay attention to this form of power, it is most often without naming it 
power and largely without providing elaborated explanations of how the power 
to act is created.
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Innes’ interest in “network power” and “communication power” are the most 
explicit attempts to include consensual planning interactions in a language of 
power in communicative planning theory (Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes and 
Booher, 2015). These attempts are, in my view, problematic since Innes’ work 
is solely informed by the consensus frame. Hence, instead of shedding light on 
the interplay between power with and power over, her work mixes up empirical 
and normative analysis of power by casting power over as evil and power with 
as good. Hence, Innes’ way of theorising power suggests that we can do without 
power over in planning. 
The discussion of power with takes us to the next step in rethinking power, 
which is to deal with power over. In the power family, this concept is defined as 
the empirical process where actors get other actors to do what they otherwise 
would not have done. On a general level, power over thus signifies conflictual 
interactions in planning, where some actors contest social order and/or specific 
planning processes or goals. Hence, power to can no longer be exercised as 
consensual power with (cf. Haugaard, 2003). The creation of power through 
social order fails since meaning or specific objectives are no longer shared. 
Therefore, power over is exercised by some actors over others to restore order 
and implement planning processes and goals in spite of lack of consent. 
This was what happened in the Gothenburg story. The planner resisted the 
meaning that the communication department conferred to the meetings and he 
also resisted the manner in which they wanted to design the process. Hence, 
power over was exercised first by the communication department and then by 
the planner’s superiors, who ordered him to lead the meeting against his will. 
Power over was used to define the meetings as information meetings, instead of 
dialogue meetings and to view the planners as experts rather than facilitators. In 
this manner, social order was, at least temporarily, restored and the power to 
needed to continue the planning for refugee houses was created.  
Power over operates in different dimensions in participatory planning 
(Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 1974, 2005; Schmidt-Thomé and Mäntysalo, 2014). One-
dimensional power over is directly observable when actors openly, through 
incentives or punishments, get other actors to do what they otherwise would not 
do. This was the face of power, which showed up when the superiors ordered the 
planner to lead the meetings. But, power over can also be hidden, such as when it 
takes shape as the exclusion of issues and voices from planning processes. This 
was the kind of power that the planner referred to when he explained how refugees 
were not invited to attend the meetings about the placement of their houses. 
Finally, power over can operate, in the third dimension, by shaping what people 
desire and want. Power over then “[…] shapes people’s beliefs, sense of self and 
acceptance of the status quo – even their own superiority or inferiority.” (Gaventa, 
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2006, p. 29).18 In the story, third-dimensional power over is operating under the 
surface to form the planner’s desire for dialogue, as well as shaping the 
participants’ alternative views on the issue of refugee housing. 
The analysis of communicative planning theory (Chapter 5) found that this 
theory largely conceptualises power over as normatively undesirable. As I have 
argued throughout this thesis, this is a mistaken conflation of power over with 
domination. We cannot assume that power over by definition is illegitimate, an 
evil, since in democracies we will have to accept that conflicts over meaning, as 
well as over planning processes and objectives, sometimes must be handled, not 
merely by consensual means, but also through the use of incentives and 
punishments (Mansbridge, 2012), through the use of power over. Hence, we 
should not by definition exclude legitimate power over from participatory 
planning practice. 
Following from this reasoning is the normative task of establishing when the 
same empirical process of power over is to be viewed as acceptable and when it 
is to be seen as unacceptable (cf. Haugaard, 2012). This is, in the power family, 
about distinguishing the two concepts legitimate and illegitimate power over.  
The research confirms that the appraisal of legitimacy in planning is situated 
and frequently contested (Campbell, 2006; Connelly et al., 2006). This is 
exemplified both in the Uppsala and the Gothenburg stories. In the Uppsala 
story, the planner himself supplies competing alternative criteria for assessing 
the legitimacy of power. While in the Gothenburg story, the planner mainly saw 
power with as legitimate and power over as illegitimate. Yet, when under 
pressure, he tacitly found ways to legitimise the use of power over, mainly by 
reference to his intention to avoid violence.  
Due to the way legitimacy is situated in a specific context, rethinking power 
over in participatory planning cannot merely rely on universal normative 
theorisation. Therefore, I do not aspire to develop general criteria for how to 
separate legitimate and illegitimate power over. Instead, I argue that a 
combination of universal principles and situated normative judgements is 
suitable for appraising the legitimacy of power over.  
An abundance of principles for assessing the legitimacy of power is to be 
found within political philosophy. Following Haugaard (2012), without aspiring 
to be exhaustive, I argue that two linked universal principles are useful for 
reflecting on the legitimacy of power in all participatory planning episodes. First, 
it is the democratic principle that the exercise of power ought to be structured. 
This means that the “rules of the game” ought to be understood by participants 
                                                     
18. Notably, in this third dimension, the empirical phenomena in question is similar to the 
processes associated with power to, which is the case of the family resemblance concept overlap. 
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and that “repeat play” ought to adhere to the same or similar rules. Secondly, 
linked to the principle of structured power over, is the principle that if power 
over is exercised it ought not to be zero-sum for the one(s) subject to it. Instead, 
there needs to be a way to establish that the exercise of power over will, if not 
immediately, eventually result in a plus-sum situation, for the one(s) who lose 
out in a specific episode.19  
Regarding situated appraisal, I first draw on legitimacy theory and power 
theory (Beetham, 1991; Bernstein, 2004; Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and 
Harkki, 2014; Scharpf, 1999), to suggest that two basic distinctions can help in 
explaining and appraising the legitimacy of power over in a specific 
participatory planning episode. First, sociological interest in the legitimacy of 
power can usefully be distinguished from normative interest. Sociological 
interest is about describing how actors in a specific context assess the desirability 
of power over, while normative interest is when the observing scientist draws on 
certain criteria to appraise the legitimacy of power over (cf. Haugaard, 2010b). 
This distinction is helpful for correcting the common mistake, among 
communicative planning scholars, to be unclear about approaching legitimacy 
from their own normative viewpoints and when they are interested in planning 
actors’ viewpoints in a specific context. 
Secondly, I argue that it is useful to distinguish between process and outcome 
legitimacy. The former is concerned with the procedures through which 
participatory planning is performed and the latter with the problem solving 
capacity of such procedures (cf. Connelly et al., 2006; Raitio and Harkki, 2014). 
This distinction is helpful because it addresses the tendency, in communicative 
planning theory, to merely rely on process legitimacy by adding a conceptua-
lisation of outcome legitimacy.  
The rethinking of power in participatory planning is summarised in Table 15.  
Table 15. The proposed power family in participatory planning 
Family member Explanation 
Power to The ability to act derived from social order. Shared systems of meaning reproduced by 
socialisation provide actors with power to. This is a dispositional ability to act, which can be 
exercised episodically in planning. 
Power with Exercises of power where meaning and/or specific processes and goals remain uncontested 
and enable actors to engage in concerted action. 
Illegitimate  
and legitimate  
power over 
Exercises of power when meaning and/or process or goals are no longer shared, which 
requires some actors to exercise power over those who do not consent. Power over is an 
empirical process, which is inherently contested and can be viewed as illegitimate or legitimate 
in terms of process and outcome based on sociological or normative interest.  
                                                     
19. See Section 4.2.4 for a more elaborate explanation of these principles. 
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After having responded to the four research questions and arriving at a rethinking 
of power, I now reflect on the limitations of the research. 
8.3.2 Reflecting on the limitations of the research 
In this section, I reflect on the choices I have made and how these have limited 
the research. Among the myriad of choices, I have decided to reflect upon three, 
which I find to be especially important. 
First, is the choice to focus the theoretical analysis on communicative 
planning theory. I made this choice about half way into the PhD project. Up until 
that point, I had conducted reviews of the planning literature more broadly, with 
the determination to map notions of power in different planning theories. I 
decided to focus on communicative planning theory because this theory is so 
influential in participatory planning policy and practice, and because my reviews 
showed that, rather than one approach to power, this theory offered several. To 
explain and assess these approaches, I needed to go deep rather than broad. I 
deemed analytical depth to be important to understanding the tacit notions of 
power within the different streams of communicative planning theory (see 
Chapter 5). 
To go deep into theory takes time, and hence this choice limited the scope of 
the research by excluding the possibility of going deep into alternative planning 
theories. This would have certainly provided access to notions of power of 
relevance to participatory planning practice. Most notably, I could not go deep 
into the analysis of rational planning theory, the critical planning theory inspired 
by Foucault and the post-political/agonistic planning theories. The way I use 
these theories stays on the level of literature review, without the kind of deeper 
analysis I conduct into communicative planning theory. Yet, the notion of power 
as constitutive and productive, which is central both to the Foucauldian theories 
and the post-political theories, is represented in the power family through power 
to. While, a clear limitation, is not being able to include the notions of power in 
the stream within post-political theories, which draws on actor-network-theory 
(Callon and Latour, 1981; Latour et al., 1988; Metzger et al., 2016; Rydin, 2019).  
The focus on communicative planning theory also includes the 
consequence that I cannot aspire to make specific contributions to other 
planning theories or to a more integrated theorisation of power in planning 
theory. What I can claim is to have made use of the critique towards 
communicative planning theory by including the family of power concepts in 
this theory. When it comes to the much-needed synthesis of approaches to 
power in planning theory, I can merely claim that the thesis provides an 
example for how a family resemblance view of power can be used to build 
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bridges between different planning theories. While the more integrated 
theorisation based on a plural view of power remains to be done.20  
Secondly, I wish to reflect on the choice to focus on developing concepts. In 
the first half of the research, I focused on my own and other planners’ practical 
experiences alongside reviews of planning and power theory and analysis of 
guidance. At that stage of the research, I imagined my contribution to be 
practical and applied. Gradually, I reconsidered this way of seeing the research 
and came to focus more on the world of ideas and theories. The reason for this 
choice was that I became more aware of how tacit notions of power constrained 
participatory planning practice. Hence, I came to see my task as being about 
doing theoretical ground work to develop concepts.  
Focusing on the world of ideas, comes with a price. The consequences of this 
choice are that the thesis has little to offer in terms of practical lessons and 
applicable tools. Those who search for concrete advice and tools for tasks, such 
as policy development, educational design, training, process design and 
facilitation, might be disappointed. Instead, the work I have done is to pave the 
conceptual ground for supporting practical work in planning practice. 
Finally, I wish to reflect upon the choice to position the research in Swedish 
participatory planning policy and practice. This choice was also made about half 
way into the PhD project. Up until then I had intentions to include empirical 
work I had done in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia in the thesis. The choice 
to focus on Swedish planning policy and practice was made because I wanted to 
go deep rather than broad.  
To investigate Swedish participatory planning policy and practice made it 
possible to utilise my practical experiences, to go below the surface to explicate 
notions of power. The choice was also justified since I view the “participation-
friendly-context” of Sweden as a most-likely case, which can provide insights 
for reflective practice also in other planning contexts (see Section 1.2 and cf. 
Flyvbjerg, 2006 on critical cases). Finally, to focus on Sweden also came with 
the possibility of making a needed contribution to progress the treatment of 
power in Swedish participatory planning. 
Even if I still find this choice to be justified, I acknowledge that it limits the 
reach of the findings. In line with the view of the interpretive research tradition, 
it is not reasonable to claim that the family of power concepts developed in the 
thesis is universally applicable across planning systems. Meaning-making is 
situated in a specific context in a certain moment in time (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2013). It must therefore be recognised that the particularities of planning 
                                                     
20. See Section 8.4.1 for an elaborate discussion on the theoretical contribution. 
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cultures limit any aspiration for deceloping generalisable knowledge about 
power in planning practice.  
8.4 The contribution to theory and practice  
With this thesis I aspire to meaningfully contribute to theory and practice. Hence 
the “so what-question” is a crucial one (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2013; 
Flyvbjerg, 2001b). If the proposed rethinking of power in participatory planning 
is accepted, what difference would it make to theory and practice?  
8.4.1 The contribution to planning theory and environmental 
communication 
This thesis addressed the fragmented and reductive treatment of power in 
planning theory. I developed conceptual tools from power theory, applied and 
tested these through the analysis of notions of power in communicative planning 
theory and Swedish participatory planning policy and practice. The evidence 
from this research was used to rethink power in participatory planning by 
developing a family of four power concepts. Thereby, the thesis makes the 
following theoretical contributions. The thesis: 
• problematises the common assumption in the planning literature that power 
is a single entity and instead proposes a plural view of power as a family 
resemblance concept;  
• deems the conflation of power over and domination in communicative 
planning theory as mistaken and, as an alternative, suggests that power over 
is an empirical process, which can be appraised normatively or 
sociologically as illegitimate or legitimate;  
• questions the manner in which communicative planning theory mainly 
focuses on criticising power relations and instead suggests that theories of 
participatory practices ought to theorise power as constitutive and 
productive; 
• problematises the notion, in rational planning theory, that research ought 
to supply evidence-based methods for planning and as a complement 
suggests that research should also supply concepts for reflective practice. 
Hence, the thesis contributes to communicative planning theory, the broader 
planning literature and the discipline environmental communication.  
The contribution to communicative planning theory is to conceptualise power 
as a family of four concepts. I have drawn on the critique (Bäcklund and 
Mäntysalo, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Huxley and 
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Yiftachel, 2000; Richardson, 1996) towards communicative planning theory, as 
well as built on, problematised and developed the work of its leading scholars 
John Forester, Patsy Healey and Judith Innes. Thus, the thesis has strengthened 
the treatment of power in communicative planning theory.  
More specifically, this thesis further develops three influential streams within 
communicative planning theory. I have drawn on and developed Forester’s 
(1999, 2009, 2013) critical pragmatism, by showing how planners’ stories can 
not only be used to provide practical lessons from working “in the face of 
power”, but can also inform the theorisation of power. By linking Patsy Healey’s 
(1997, 2012) new institutionalism with Mark Haugaard’s (2003) power theory, 
I have shown a path towards (re)theorising power in communicative planning, 
beyond the reliance on Habermas’ critical theory. I have shared Judith Innes’ 
(1995; Innes and Booher, 2010) interest in practice, yet I have also demonstrated 
how theorisation can enrich a situated understanding of power, rather than 
provide universal normative direction.  
I would also like to point out how the thesis makes two contributions to the 
wider planning literature. The first contribution consists of showing a route 
beyond the fragmented debates, towards a more integrated discussion about 
power. I have drawn on previous bridge-building work by planning scholars 
(Richardson and Cashmore, 2011; Schmidt-Thomé and Mäntysalo, 2014) and 
power theorists (Allen, 1998; Haugaard, 2010a, 2012) to render different 
approaches to power in the planning literature commensurable. The work I have 
conducted, demonstrates how a family resemblance view of power can make it 
possible to relate approaches in the planning literature and clarify their 
differences, without unnecessarily portraying them as mutually exclusive. The 
theoretical contribution this thesis thereby makes, is to clarify differences and 
similarities between approaches to power, which so far have mainly been seen 
as alternative and competing. This contribution is valuable since it provides a 
perspective on power, which is useful both for understanding what is going on 
in planning and for further theorisation. 
Secondly, the thesis contributes to the work on reflective practice within 
planning theory. Reflective practice is widely recognised within the planning 
literature for the insights it brings to the understanding of planners’ everyday 
practice. Yet, reflective practice endures sustained critique for putting too much 
emphasis on the practitioners learning, without explaining how this learning is 
enabled and constrained by a social context. Hence, Forester (2013, p. 9) asks 
how we can “extend and refine, even transform, Schön’s Reflective Practitioner 
to help us to think about power […]”. This thesis answers the question by 
demonstrating how power theory can be used to develop concepts that are useful, 
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not only for the reflective planner, but also for future scholarly work to theorise 
reflective practice.  
Finally, the contribution the thesis makes to the discipline environmental 
communication is to develop novel ways in which frame, planning and power 
theory can be useful. The methodology developed for combining frame theory 
with practitioner profiles, can be drawn upon in future studies of environmental 
communication practitioners’ meaning-making. The power family is available for 
shedding light on the workings of power in environmental communication 
practices in planning and governance. These contributions are valuable as they 
enrich the repository of methods and theories within the discipline of environ-
mental communication. 
More specifically, the thesis contributes to the work of a group of environ-
mental communication scholars in Sweden to which I belong. This group is 
working to reframe environmental communication by problematising and 
changing core assumptions about how communication is performed (SLU, 
2019). To this task, the thesis contributes with rethinking notions of power in 
participatory processes. Thus, the thesis brings ideas, which potentially can be 
used in the wider reframing of environmental communication in governance 
practices. Finally, the thesis contributes by providing an example of an attempt 
to realise the groups’ shared ambition to be engaged in sustainability 
transformations and yet be critically reflective (cf. Joosse et al., n.d.). 
8.4.2 The contribution to reflective practice 
By doing theoretical ground work, to problematise notions of power and 
rethink them, the thesis makes a contribution that matters to planning practice. 
If notions of power remain unproblematised, taken for granted, they might 
exert a “spell” that conditions the way in which planners perceive situations 
and learn by doing (cf. Schön and Rein, 1994). The consequences of the 
prevailing notions of power in participatory planning can be dangerously 
counterproductive, since they can constrain and control the way planners 
construct the world and block their ability to learn, i.e. to adjust their 
understanding and action to different kinds of situations.  
Through this research I have “spelled out” the notions that guide the 
understanding of power in participatory planning. Thereby, assumptions about 
what power is and what planners ought to do about it, have been made available 
for critical reflection. I argue that this thesis thereby contributes to planning 
practice. It does so by providing a family of power concepts that are useful in 
the reflective practice, which is required if planners are to develop the practical 
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wisdom (phronesis) they need to master their profession (cf. Bornemark, 2016, 
2017; Fridlund, 2017; Wiberg, 2018). 
The contribution of this thesis goes beyond problematising current 
understandings. It also suggests alternatives to the reductive notions of power in 
participatory planning. The thesis offers the family as a generative metaphor for 
reflective practice. A family consists of members with overlapping and yet 
distinct characteristics. If the family is well-functioning, its members are more 
capable together than individually. Also, the opposite is true: if a family is 
dysfunctional it might be destructive. When in trouble we might habitually turn 
to our favourite sister. This habit often serves us well, but in certain situations 
the sister might let us down. Whereupon, we can consider turning to another 
member of the family, with different characteristics, better suited to what the 
particular situation requires. Hence, the family metaphor contributes with a more 
complex understanding, compared to the prevailing metaphors, which, for 
example, might tell planners that they are working “in the face of power” 
(Forester, 1989) and dealing with “power distortions” (Innes, 1995).  
The thesis makes an additional linked contribution to practice, by identifying 
a set of process and identity frames pertaining to power. To make these frames, 
which often remain tacit, available for reflection is, as Schön (1983) tells us, an 
important contribution to reflective practice. When planners are confronted with 
situations, which are puzzling and difficult, they are assisted by having access to 
explicated accounts of the frames embedded in their practice. Such accounts can 
be used both in reflection-on and in-action to critically scrutinise suppositions 
about how planners ought to handle power. The explicated frames can facilitate 
planners’ reflection and learning by doing. This contribution enables planners to 
develop the ability to be sensitive to what a situation requires, i.e. to develop and 
use practical wisdom (phronesis) (cf. Bornemark, 2016; Flyvbjerg, 2004; 
Fridlund, 2017; Schön, 1983; Wiberg, 2018).  
Let me finally draw attention to how this thesis contributes to the influential 
idea that planners ought to be facilitators. Due to the larger move from 
government to governance, planners are increasingly acting as facilitators of 
processes with a multitude of stakeholders. As this research confirms, facilitators 
are frequently conceptualised as standing “unbiased” or even “neutral” outside 
of power relations. This conceptualisation risks leading to the mistaken belief 
that facilitators are positioned external to the social order and do not exercise 
power. By applying the power family, we see how this position is not available 
to any social actor, because it is a position “from nowhere” (Nagel, 1989). 
The contribution this thesis makes, is to clarify that a facilitator derives his 
or her power to from social order, i.e. from systems of power. It is the power 
systems that provide the facilitator with a position that enables them to exercise 
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both power with and power over. This implies that the idea that the facilitator is 
positioned outside of power relations can be refuted and replaced with the idea 
that the facilitator is charged with power to, which can be exercised in the form 
of power with or power over.  
Following the proposed rethinking, the legitimacy of the facilitator’s use of 
power can be approached based on empirical or sociological interests and the 
focus can be on process and/or outcome legitimacy. Notably, the rethinking of 
power does not exclude the possibility that facilitators might exercise 
illegitimate power over. Instead, it acknowledges that facilitators certainly, both 
in a sociological and normative meaning, can exercises acceptable as well as 
unacceptable forms of power over.  
Thereby, the thesis enables facilitators to be more explicit in how they think 
about and deliberate with others on their use of power. Anchoring the facilitator 
in shared power systems can mitigate the risk that they, out of misplaced desire 
for symmetric power relations, give the impression that no one is in charge of 
participatory processes. Crucially, the thesis thereby provides a basis for a more 
transparent and reflective facilitation practice, capable of responding to the 
critique towards token participation and manipulation.  
In sum, this section has explained that the contribution this thesis makes to 
practice is to rethink power in a manner that is useful in reflective practice. The 
“so-what” of this contribution is that it can potentially move participatory 
practices beyond the days of naivety and cynicism, towards a state where its 
practitioners use and develop a nuanced vocabulary of power to inform their 
reflection and action.  
8.4.3 What’s next? 
Standing at the end of this research journey, I think back on the practical puzzle, 
which was the start of it all (see prologue). I was puzzled, and irritated, over the 
manner in which (some) facilitators were unwilling to provide direction for 
participatory processes. I saw how this way of acting came back to haunt 
facilitators and participants. Ambiguity hindered the realisation of the promise 
of participation. I suspected that there were tacit notions of power blocking 
facilitators’ reflections and actions. Have I now solved this puzzle? 
Yes and no. This thesis has conducted theoretical ground work which, 
arguably, sorts out at least some of the confusion surrounding power in 
participatory processes. The thesis has developed concepts, which can be used 
and further refined by facilitators (and others) to enable situated judgements 
about whether to lead from the front, lead from behind, or simply take a step 
back. In this sense, the puzzle might be seen as deciphered.  
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Yet, to do conceptual work is not sufficient to deal with power. If one wants 
to overturn and progress participatory practices, it is not enough to merely 
address conceptual problems. Practitioners are not free to remove themselves 
from the material and social world to reflect and act in any way they like. In the 
language of this thesis, we are all part of social orders, which enable, but also 
constrain, our actions. So, this thesis has not puzzled out power in a manner, 
which automatically changes participatory practices.  
Perhaps, one can say that the thesis has covered some ground, but not taken 
us out on the storming sea. What is next then? How can the power family be 
employed in research and practice? This thesis points to several future research 
tasks.  
Regarding researching and theorising participatory planning, I would like to 
point out two important tasks. First, to further theorise power as a family 
resemblance concept. The thesis has provided a family of four power concepts. 
More work is needed to both theorise this particular family, but also to extend it 
with additional concepts in order to provide an even broader and deeper 
vocabulary of power. The most pressing task in this regard is to further theorise 
legitimate power over. The thesis has identified and started to fill a problematic 
conceptual void by providing a vocabulary for reflecting on the difficult 
situations in which power over must be used in participatory planning. But much 
more work is needed to conceptualise this contested form of power in the 
intersection between representative and participatory democracy. 
Secondly, there is an important job to be done when it comes to applying the 
ideas of the thesis in planning education, guidance, policy, training, tool kits and 
handbooks. This is about making the power family available and used in 
pedagogy and policy. Policy making and educational design should take on this 
task. The role research can play, is to systematically assess and explore what 
kinds of pedagogical and policy applications are capable of enabling reflective 
practice. 
For the wider planning literature, the thesis points to a need for further connec-
tion and synthesis. The ideas in this thesis can be used and further developed as 
examples and, perhaps also as a basis for developing conceptual frameworks, that 
might provide possibilities for relating and making commensurable competing 
theorisations of power in planning.   
For researching and theorising participatory practices more generally, the 
thesis points to a continued and increased focus on the everyday practices of 
facilitators. This group of practitioners is growing and is increasingly influential 
in governance efforts. To research facilitators’ everyday practices provides 
opportunities for the development of theory, as well as for progressing this 
bourgeoning practice. 
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End words  
Some might say that reflecting on power is an esoteric and meaningless activity 
in planning and governance practice. Given the structural injustices, power 
asymmetries and the urgency of sustainability challenges, practitioners ought to 
reflect less and go ahead and challenge the status quo. Others, who are less 
optimistic, might say that power works to close down the space for reflection in 
planning practice. They might draw the conclusion that the ideas of reflective 
practice are beautiful in writing, yet unrealisable in practice.  
My answer to these objections? I do see how the space for reflection might 
be limited, but my experience shows that practitioners are still capable of 
opening up power relations for critical scrutiny. I also see the need for radical 
action, but recognise that, for practitioners, action without reflection is blind.  
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I am out running. It is my usual path around the lake in the woods. The darkness 
is falling and it is raining. I am thinking about the lecture I held today for the 
Swedish planning association. I started by asking the planners to, in “beehives”, 
discuss if and why they needed the word power to understand planning. 
Thereafter, I suggested that a family of four power concepts can be useful for 
reflective practice. While running, I am questioning how it went. Was the lecture 
too theoretical? What did the planners get out of it?  
As I continue, I think about a metaphor for learning I got from a colleague 
once. Learning is like a bird flying in an unknown territory looking for a place 
to land. The bird sees a branch high up in a tree. It glances upwards. Can I sit up 
there? It courageously flies up and lands on the branch. It attempts to find its 
footing, looks to see what the branch is like and explores what it can see from 
this new position. Eventually, it starts to sing. It stays on the branch for a while. 
Its song increases in strength. The bird, and perhaps also its fellows, find the 
song to be beautiful. Then the bird looks out in the sky and takes flight again.  
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High hopes for democracy and sustainability are placed on participatory planning. 
Policy makers and researchers argue that citizens’ participation in decision making 
can revitalise democracy and contribute to sustainable development. Participatory 
planning is intended to give citizens influence over decisions, which are of 
importance for their communities. In participatory planning, politicians and 
planners engage in dialogue with citizens on development plans, which matter to 
health, equality and the environment. Sometimes planning is non-controversial, 
but often processes and decisions are contested.  
Power relations with citizens can be difficult to manoeuvre for planners. 
Many planners would like to have more equal relationships with citizens. Yet 
their position in the democratic system inevitably provides them with different 
responsibilities and different possibilities to exercise power. Planners play a key 
role in preparing and performing participatory planning. They influence how the 
interactions with citizens play out and what kind of decisions are made. In some 
situations, it might be possible for planners to use their power to provide citizens 
with increased influence. While in other situations, planners must contribute to 
decisions where some citizens will not get it their way. What is the right thing to 
do for planners in the contested and ambiguous situations they face in 
participatory planning? There is no general and clearcut answer to that question. 
Instead, planners must reflect and develop their ability to make good judgements 
under difficult circumstances. 
The problem is that the theories, which are most influential in participatory 
planning, define power too narrowly. Rational planning theory defines planners 
as value-neutral experts who merely implement decisions made by politicians. 
While communicative planning theory, which underpins participatory planning, 
tells planners that they ought to create conditions for power sharing and inclusive 
dialogue. Both these views provide important insights, but neither offers 
planners the nuanced language they need to make sense of the difficult situations 
they are confronted with in power relations with citizens. 
Popular science summary 
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To solve this problem, I rethink power in participatory planning by 
developing new power concepts. I define power as a family resemblance 
concept. This means that different understandings of power are seen as members 
of the same family of concepts, rather than mutually exclusive. The advantage 
of this way of seeing power is that it carries potential for providing planners with 
a broad vocabulary to reflect on power. Through the research, I develop a set of 
concepts, which can be used to understand what power is and to determine when 
power is exersiced in acceptable ways.  
The first concept is power to. This concept shows how a social order is 
necessary for the predictability planning actors need to act in concert. This concept 
helps us see that those who wish to change power relations must accept that there 
is no escape from power; not even in participatory planning. Next, power with is 
used to cover situations when planning actors are operating together to reach 
shared objectives. This is the form of power, which the proponents of participatory 
planning hold dear. Yet, the research tells us that conditions for power with must 
often be created through the exercise of power over, the kind of power needed to 
order relationships and actions when there is conflict. So, instead of merely 
critiquing power over, planners and other actors ought to focus on separating 
acceptable from unacceptable exercises of power over.  
The findings from the research can be used by planners to reflect on power 
relations in order to decide how to act in participatory planning. The power 
concepts, which I develop, are useful in planning education, in-service training, 
guidance, handbooks and planning policy. Thus, the thesis contributes with 
potential to strengthen the competence needed for realising the democratic 
promise of participatory planning.  
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Det finns höga förväntningar på medborgardialoger. Beslutsfattare och forskare 
menar att dialogerna kan bidra till fördjupad demokrati och hållbar samhälls-
utveckling. Medborgardialogerna är till för att ge medborgare möjlighet att delta i 
demokratiska processer och få inflytande över beslut som rör deras närmiljö. I 
medborgardialoger möter politiker och tjänstepersoner medborgare för att 
diskutera byggplaner som har betydelse för hälsa, jämlikhet och miljö. Ibland är 
dialogerna okontroversiella, men inte så sällan är det omstridda frågor som 
behandlas. Konflikter kan till exempel uppstå när avvägningar ska göras mellan 
bevarande av grönområden och bostadsbyggande, vid lokalisering av flykting-
bostäder eller vid skolnedläggningar. I den här avhandlingen utvecklas ett nytt sätt 
att se på maktrelationer i medborgardialoger. Den kunskap som utvecklas är 
avsedd att användas av de tjänstepersoner (planerare) som leder medborgardialoger.  
För planerare kan maktrelationer med medborgare vara svårnavigerade. 
Många planerare skulle vilja att relationerna med medborgare var mer jämlika. 
Samtidigt medför deras roll i det demokratiska systemet att de oundvikligen har 
ett annat ansvar och andra möjligheter att utöva makt. Planerare har en nyckelroll 
i förberedelser och genomförande av dialogerna och påverkar därmed vad 
dialogerna ska handla om, hur de ska genomföras och vilka som ska vara med. 
De har därmed inflytande över hur dialogerna blir och vilka beslut som fattas 
efteråt. I vissa situationer är det möjligt för planerare att använda sin makt för att 
stärka medborgares inflytande, medan de i andra situationer behöver medverka 
i beslut där vissa medborgare inte kan få igenom sin vilja. Vad ska planerarna 
göra med sin makt i medborgardialogerna? Det finns inget generellt och entydigt 
svar på den frågan. Istället behöver planerare reflektera och utveckla ett gott 
omdöme så att de kan agera klokt i svårtydda situationer. 
Problemet är att de teorier som används mest i medborgardialogens praktik 
definierar makt för ensidigt. I den rationella planeringsteorin ses planerare som 
värderingsfria experter som endast genomför demokratiskt fattade beslut. Medan 
den kommunikativa planeringsteorin, som ligger till grund för medborgardialoger, 
Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning 
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anger att planerare bör medverka till att orättvisa maktskillnader ersätts med 
jämlika dialoger. Båda synsätten ger värdefull insikter, men de erbjuder inte det 
nyanserade språk som planerare behöver för att reflektera över vad som är rätt att 
göra i svårtydda situationer.  
För att lösa det problemet utvecklar jag ett nytt synsätt på maktrelationer i 
medborgardialoger. Makt definieras som ett ”familjelikhetsbegrepp”. Olika 
förståelser av makt ses därmed som medlemmar i samma begreppsfamilj. 
Fördelen med detta synsätt är att det ger planerare tillgång till en rik uppsättning 
av olika maktbegrepp, istället för ensidiga definitioner. I avhandlingen utvecklas 
begrepp som kan användas för att förstå vad makt är och värdera när makt utövas 
på ett acceptabelt sätt. Det första begreppet makt att, visar att maktordningar är 
nödvändiga för att sociala relationer ska ges den förutsägbarhet som krävs för 
att aktörer ska kunna agera gemensamt. Detta begrepp hjälper oss att förstå att 
även de som vill förändra maktrelationer inte kan fly från makt. Inte ens i 
medborgardialoger. Makt tillsammans betecknar situationer där medborgar-
dialogens aktörer agerar för att nå gemensamma mål. Denna form av makt är 
hett eftertraktad av medborgardialogens förespråkare. Men makt tillsammans 
kräver ofta att legitim makt över utövas för att ordna relationer mellan politiker, 
planerare och medborgare på ett sätt som möjliggör dialog och beslutsfattande. 
Så istället för att endast kritisera makt över behöver planerare och andra aktörer 
fokusera på att avgöra i vilka situationer utövning av makt över är acceptabel. 
Forskningens resultat kan användas av planerare när de reflekterar över 
maktrelationer och bestämmer hur de ska agera i medborgardialoger. De 
maktbegrepp som utvecklas är användbara i utbildning, kompetensutveckling, 
vägledningar, handböcker och i planeringspolicy. Därmed ger avhandlingen ett 
bidrag med potential att stärka den kompetens som behövs för att medborgar-
dialoger ska kunna infria de högt ställda förväntningarna på att fördjupa 
demokratin. 
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About the background and experiences of the respondent 
Potential questions: 
1. For how long have you been working with participatory planning? Can you tell 
me what you are doing in your current position?  
2. Why did you start working as a planner? What did you do before you started to 
work in your current position? What is your educational background? What 
would you like to achieve with your work? 
3. Can you please tell me about important people/mentors who have inspired you 
to do the work you are currently doing? 
4. Can you please tell me about important events in your life that have led you to 
do the work you are doing today? 
5. Are there any books, articles or other texts that have been especially important 
for your profesional development and can you tell me about them? 
About the participatory planning episode 
Potential questions: 
6. Please give me an overview of the chosen process. 
7. Please tell me about what you did during the process. 
8. Who were the most important people during the process, can you tell me about 
them? 
9. Which relationships were most important to you during the process?  
10. How did you see the purpose of the participatory process? Which problems was 
the processes intended to deal with? How did you see the causes of these 
problems? Did you think that someone was to blame for the problems? If yes 
who and why? Were there any controversies around the purpose and problem 
descriptions? If yes, tell me about them. 
11. How did you see the process as dealing with the problems? What did you think 
would happen if the design was not done in the way you saw as proper?  
12. Which were the most important design choices during the process? How did you 
argue for or against the choices? Which problems were these choices intended to 
deal with and how? Were there any differences or conflicts around the choices? 
13. Did you meet any resistence against your ideas during the process? If yes can 
you tell me about it? 
14. Can you tell me about any other important events or turning points?  
Appendix 1. Interview guide 
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Reflections 
15. How did the design influence the collaborative process? 
16. How did the design influence the outcome of the planning?  
17. Who were the winners and the losers on the outcomes of the planning? 
18. Which were the most important lessons learned, for someone who is interested 
in process design practice? 
19. If you could do this piece of work again, would you do anything differently? If 
yes, tell me about it. 
20. What did you learn from the people you worked with? What do you think they 
learned from you? 
21. Do you think your work was successful? If yes, in which way(s)? 
22. What does this piece of work tell us about participatory processes, the 
possibilities and limitations? 
23. When you are thinking about future work with participatory processes, what do 
you see as hopeful and what is of concern to you? 
24. What is the next step in your work? What are you looking forward to? 
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